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 The men of the East may spell the stars,  
And times and triumphs mark,  
But the men signed of the cross of Christ  
Go gaily in the dark. 
The men of the East may search the scrolls  
For sure fates and fame,  
But the men that drink the blood of God  
Go singing to their shame. 
The wise men know what wicked things  
Are written on the sky,  
They trim sad lamps, they touch sad strings,  
Hearing the heavy purple wings,  
Where the forgotten seraph kings  
Still plot how God shall die. 
The wise men know all evil things  
Under the twisted trees,  
Where the perverse in pleasure pine  
And men are weary of green wine  
And sick of crimson seas. 
But you and all the kind of Christ  
Are ignorant and brave,  
And you have wars you hardly win  
And souls you hardly save. 
I tell you naught for your comfort,  
Yea, naught for your desire,  
Save that the sky grows darker yet  
And the sea rises higher. 
Night shall be thrice night over you,  
And heaven an iron cope.  
Do you have joy without a cause,  
Yea, faith without a hope?" 
— G.K. Chesterton, Ballad of the White Horse 
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Abstract 
 
 Christopher Dawson (1889-1970) was one of his generations most 
important historians and religious thinkers, and was a significant 
influence on many contemporaries including T.S. Eliot, C.S. Lewis, 
and Russell Kirk.  This dissertation is a study of his most 
fundamental ideas concerning history and culture. 
 
 Chapter one examines Dawson’s sociological view of history.  
Convinced that history was more than a scientific enterprise, he 
believed that the true historian is one who reaches beyond the 
material world to understand the essence of history’s dynamics.  In 
this way, the world can be conceptualized as a united whole, 
separated by regional differences as a result of environment, race, 
material, psychological, and religious factors.  Dawson believed 
that the political histories of the past several centuries failed to 
grasp the undercurrents of historical change, and that the best way 
to understand the past is to appreciate culture as an expression of 
primeval religious traditions.   
 
 Chapter two treats Dawson’s understanding of progress.  Dawson 
was convinced that progress had become the “working-religion” of our 
age.  This secular faith, founded on scientific rationalism, first 
pledged to fix the material failures of Western culture, but 
unwittingly eroded its faith in God, and eventually, its moral 
fiber.  Dawson believed that true progress was progress of the soul 
in its ordering toward the Creator. 
 
 Chapter three is a study of Dawson’s Christian, and more 
specifically, his Catholic beliefs.  Informed by religion, his 
historical and cultural visions are not dogmatic, nor are they 
polemical.  He conceived of history as the unfolding of a divine 
economy in the temporal world.  Although Dawson is a proponent of 
Roman Catholicism, his scholarship is an objective treatment of 
history shaped by an undisguised, Christian worldview.   
 
Additionally, the appendix is an introduction to Dawson’s life 
and the circumstances surrounding his conversion to Roman 
Catholicism.  Particular attention is paid to the development of his 
moral and historical imagination—both of which became intertwined to 
form the basis of all of his scholarship.
Introduction 
This dissertation will attempt to give an account of 
Christopher Dawson’s principal ideas concerning history and culture—
ideas eternally bound to religion, and in the West, to Christianity.  
Little has been written about him, and he is all but forgotten among 
students of history, while only a handful of professors are familiar 
with the full-range of his works.  There is taking place, however, a 
changing intellectual atmosphere as the early twenty-first-century 
unfolds, and there is a revival of interest in Dawson as evidenced 
by a flurry of articles and the reprinting of his major works by 
prominent academic presses and commercial publishers.  Once 
dismissed by the academic establishment for his failure to possess 
an advanced degree, and for his unapologetic Catholicism, newspapers 
and popular magazines have taken him up again, and students are 
beginning to see the influence he exerted over an entire generation 
of thinkers.  There is the strong possibility that this recognition 
of Dawson’s genius can be attributed to the rising generation’s 
disgust for material culture and its blind faith in scientific 
rationalism.   
Dawson’s principal mission was to demonstrate the importance 
of our recognizing the organic unity of the West through the 
relation of religion and culture.  He did not lose himself in banal 
discussions on the nature of historical objectivity, rather he 
presented a thorough and sophisticated vision of the past, and it is 
this “historical imagination” that will be the concentration of this 
study.  Convinced that history and sociology are partners in a 
larger mission, Dawson believed in the scrupulous methods of 
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historical research, but he eschewed the concept that history is a 
discipline subordinate to science and the scientific method.  To 
Dawson, history is an intricate, deeply humane affair.  This study 
of his thought is broken into five principal sections in addition to 
this introduction. 
The first chapter introduces the reader to Dawson’s early life 
and details the circumstances surrounding his conversion to Roman 
Catholicism.  Particular attention is paid to his family’s 
background because of the immense influence it played in both his 
spiritual and intellectual development.  Imagination is a 
characteristic of the mind that takes immense cultivation, and the 
circumstances surrounding Dawson’s early years are rich with these 
qualities.   
The second chapter focuses on Dawson’s view of history as a 
sociological endeavor that is shaped by unique historical 
circumstances.  Its objective is to understand why Dawson believed 
the social sciences to be such an important part of historical 
research, but it draws a distinct line where he thinks the sciences 
are no longer applicable and lead to a distortion of reality.   
The third chapter treats the idea of progress.  Few ideas have 
so fully captivated the human mind, Dawson claimed.  He believed 
that progress had effectively become the “working religion” of the 
West since the time of Abbé Saint-Piérre, and that the treatment of 
history by western historians since then has been burdened by this 
historicism that possesses a solid element of inevitability.  The 
historians of progress do not see human psychology as variable, nor 
do they fully embrace the idea of Free Will.  To the Catholic, 
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however, history is the constant unfolding of creation with the 
active help of God, who intervenes, from time to time, in the 
affairs of His people on Earth.  The idea of Sanctifying Grace—which 
is central to both standard Catholic thought and to Dawson’s 
historical vision—is the main Catholic obstacle to the secular idea 
of progress. 
The fourth chapter is a discussion of Dawson’s vision of 
Catholicism and its influence on the historical imagination.  Dawson 
is often labeled—mistakenly—a medieval historian.  Although much of 
Dawson’s work focuses on the Middle Ages, and he appreciates the 
spiritual and material unity of that time, he was not a historian of 
any particular period.  Dawson’s task was much more “catholic,” in 
the universal sense of the term, for he wanted to trace the 
historical unity of culture in an unbroken chain.  This is a major 
factor that ultimately led to his conversion to Catholicism—a faith 
that delivers an uninterrupted historical path to antiquity.  He was 
no Church historian, but a historian of culture.  As he wrote to the 
chairman of the Department of Church History at Harvard: 
I have never been a Church Historian in the strict sense; my 
point of departure has always been historical in the broad 
sense—that is to say I come from the study of Western history 
(as understood by secular historians, like J.B. Bury) and then 
attempt to see how this stream of temporal change has affected 
and had been affected by religion whether considered as a way 
of life or as a vision of reality.1 
   
Christopher Dawson was perhaps the most important English-
speaking, Catholic historian of the twentieth-century.  The scope 
and depth of his scholarship, his elegant, yet clear style, and his 
                                                 
1 George H. Williams to Christopher Dawson, 13 October 1961, Dawson MSS, 
University of St Thomas, Box 14, Folder 164, and Christopher Dawson to George 
H. Williams, 17 October 1961, Dawson MSS, University of St Thomas, Box 14, 
Folder 164. 
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dedication to the Truth put him in a league above the Whigs, the 
German Idealists, or the high-priests of the “cult of objectivity.”  
Dawson’s powerful intellect allowed him to synthesize vast amounts 
of information and organize it into a coherent picture. His goal, 
like Butterfield’s, was not to tell the story of man’s existence, 
detail by detail; rather, he wished to convey a general 
understanding of the most important aspects of our past and show 
that religion was the most important element of our cultural 
heritage.  Religion, in this picture of reality, was not an 
auxiliary element of culture, but the foundation of it, and to 
neglect this meant certain death.  The dynamics of world history, he 
contends, are not explainable through neat formulas, economic 
trends, political victories, or military defeats—they are explained 
through an understanding of human beings and their relationship with 
God.  As Dawson would articulate in The Age of the Gods, every 
culture, even those of primitive character, possess a complete 
religious spirit.  This is the underlying force of human history, he 
believed, and the troubles of modernity are the result of a 
misplaced spiritual understanding and a crisis of spiritual 
identity.   
 Dawson did not believe that culture could be “restored” or 
brought back to some previous age—nor did he believe that such a 
task, if possible, was an admirable goal—but he did believe that it 
was possible to employ the vast powers of the human imagination to 
bring about a new “Augustan Age.”  Dawson knew the values buttressed 
by the ancient, Baroque monarchies at which he used to sneer as a 
young man were gone, but that in their place arose “sham 
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democracies,” and pathetic, often dangerous, socialist republics.  
Just as Christ needed Augustus and John the Baptist, so modern 
civilization needs a renewal of belief in the Spirit or it will face 
certain destruction.2   
 There are, however, several points of contention in Dawson’s 
work that need thorough discussion. The limits of his Catholicism as 
both an internal vehicle for spiritual renewal and as an external 
mode of cultural transformation, the possibility of his 
understanding of cultural dynamics as a “cyclical” theory, the 
limited role of material causes to fluctuations in cultural change, 
his dismissal of Thomistic thought in both historical understanding 
and in modern education, an idealization of the medieval idea of 
progress, and the use of selective sources, all require attention.  
Furthermore, some will object that his sociological view of history, 
in the final analysis, is too theological, and that although he 
criticizes the metaphysical approach to history, he is himself 
subordinating his conclusions to such a process in his defense of 
metahistory.  The formal academic historian will, no doubt, object 
to the fact that Dawson did not produce a single work of history 
that dealt with specific events or people, and will deride Dawson 
for his reluctance to spend any significant amount of time poring 
over archival records.  His failure to provide footnotes or 
citations in his major works, and the implicit need to trust 
Dawson’s evidence prima facie, exacerbates this perceived dilemma.  
Nevertheless, Dawson is no mere “popularizer,” religious 
reductionist, or “terrible simplifier.” 
                                                 
2 Christopher Dawson, specifically undated, random notes, “Notebook 18,” Dawson 
MSS, University of St Thomas, Box 9, Folder 18. 
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 Dawson was an amateur historian, but his erudition and immense 
learning are overtly obvious, and this makes him an amateur in the 
greatest sense of the term.  Although his work suffers from several 
major flaws, they are overshadowed by his keen insights, his vast 
and commanding knowledge of the past, and his theologically 
competent mind.  Imagination is a disposition of the mind to reach 
beyond the mundane in order to appreciate and grasp higher realities 
that are otherwise unknowable. 
 Dawson was vague when it came to recommending specific 
programs for political and cultural renewal.  To some degree, like 
Paul Johnson and Russell Kirk, he was apolitical.  His recurring 
theme of religious unity lacks any realistic ability to come to 
fruition in the social sphere—a fact to which he was not blind.  He 
paid little attention to the economy, and was, heavily skeptical of 
capitalist ideology, democratic politics, and especially, socialism 
and the totalitarian doctrines.  Each one of these taken to its 
extreme, he maintained, was a modern supplement that attempted to 
fill the void caused by the corrosion of spirituality.  While they 
were not legitimate faiths, Dawson argued, they fulfilled the same 
spiritual desires.  “All these New Jerusalems are earthly cities 
established by the will and power of man,” and to the Catholic, 
there is a fundamental disorder in this type of organization.3  In 
this way it seems as though everything Dawson wrote was in some way 
a reaction to the mechanical thought of Marx.    
                                                 
3 Adam Schwartz, “Confronting the ‘Totalitarian Antichrist’: Christopher Dawson 
and Totalitarianism,” Catholic Historical Review, July 2003, vol. 89, issue 3, 
464-488. 
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 At base, Dawson was a historian and a pluralist.  He was proud 
of his Catholicism, but he did not allow it to mutate into a 
fundamentalist caste.  While he was influenced by anthropology, 
sociology, psychology, economics, and the other sciences, “he 
manage[d] to preserve his historian’s virtue.”4  When he began 
publishing shortly after the First World War, “history as past 
politics” remained the paradigm, and it was Dawson, with the help of 
others, who ushered in a new view of historical scholarship.  
Uniquely, though, Dawson was the one who carried the Catholic 
banner, and despite his deep religious sympathies, he managed to 
maintain a critical degree of open-mindedness, similarly to the 
Marxist historian Christopher Hill, that won him the respect of 
those who had little sympathy for his faith.5   
Dawson’s work as a historian is not merely the product of a 
prolific career dedicated to the true story of man’s past, but the 
fruit of a humble vocation to serve what lay beyond the material 
world—the Eternal City of God.  He was dedicated to his work and to 
the idea of culture as a unified organism, continually growing from 
its religious seeds.  The haunting question of this study remains, 
however, whether or not Dawson is to be considered a serious 
historian or merely regarded as a Christian or Catholic polemicist 
in the line of Chesterton and Belloc?  His writings, however, 
indicate that there is something deeper than mere polemics as the 
backbone of his work, and that the heart of his mission is to 
understand, not only the events that gave rise to European 
                                                 
4 Crane Brinton, “Review of The Dynamics of World History,” Speculum, vol. 33, 
no.2, April 1958, 272-273. 
5 James Hitchcock, “Christopher Dawson,” American Scholar, vol. 62, issue 1, 
Winter 1993, 111-119. 
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civilization, but the “nature of the thing itself, and of the 
process by which, in general, civilizations grow, mature, and 
decay.”6   Dawson’s Catholicism did not preclude him from 
cultivating independent ideas, and he believed that faith was not 
merely the product of supernatural knowledge.  The ideal, he argued, 
was for the supernatural to be in touch with the human—an ideal that 
has been lost in modern culture’s compartmentalized character, which 
has resulted in the artistic and creative being separated from the 
theological.7  In Dawson there is a mature, sophisticated vision of 
history that transcends both politics and religious parochialism, 
and it is in this imaginative understanding of human affairs by 
which his legacy should ultimately be judged.    
                                                 
6 Robert Park, “Review of Enquiries Into Religion and Culture,” The American 
Journal of Sociology, vol. 41, no. 1, July 1935, 109-111. 
7 Christopher Dawson, undated, “Misc. Notes and Drafts,” Dawson MSS, University 
of St Thomas, Box 1a, Folder 86. 
8
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Chapter One: Sociology and the Cultural View of History 
I 
 Christopher Dawson’s importance as a historian is largely 
linked to his distinct approach to the past as something far more 
complex than a composition of disparate elements, each reducible to 
some formula accessible from the present through some simple, 
deconstructive pattern.  A cursory study of Dawson and his 
contemporaries immediately reveals the severe differences he had 
with them, not only in method, but also in an overall historical 
vision.  In Dawson, there is a deliberate break with the traditional 
study of history as it had been practiced in its rational form, and 
a return to the Patristic vision of the past of which St. Augustine 
is the most prominent expositor.   
 For Dawson, the greatness of the Christian past is not found 
in its purely material achievements, but in its mysterious nature 
that is experienced by human beings under the grace of God.  To 
Dawson, the glory of history is found in what St. Paul called the 
“fullness of time.”  History contains more than the banal facts of 
human existence: it is wrought with inner-meanings and mysterious 
circumstances.  To Dawson, this meant a theological understanding of 
the past, and not just one concerned with the study of temporal 
events. 
It is impossible to study the matter [history] aright without 
theological insight.  The Christian view of history which is a 
contemplation of the divine interposition in time, is 
essentially concerned with the supernatural and this 
supernatural dimension of history is inaccessible to 
scientific observation.8 
 
 
8 Christopher Dawson to John J. Mulloy, c.1954, Dawson MSS, University of Notre 
Dame, Box 1, Folder 1. 
This inability to access certain parts of history does not mean that 
historians should abandon their scrupulous methods of research; 
instead, it shows that they must widen their nets to allow for non-
material, sometimes ethereal, factors to intervene.   
Historians of ideas will find much difficulty in consuming 
Dawson’s thought without serious reflection.  How is it possible, 
the contemporary historian might ask, to even talk about the nature 
of history from a Christian perspective, but still deny the 
existence of a “Christian” or “Catholic philosophy of history”?  One 
must look carefully into the traditions of the Christian West to 
understand why Dawson approaches the past as he does, and it is only 
within a broad vision of this patrimony that it makes sense.  There 
remain serious questions about consistency and soundness of 
argumentation in Dawson’s thought, but in the end, there is a 
compelling logic in his approach to the past.  Dawson was not a 
professional historian in the strictest sense of the term, but by 
the same token he was no dilettante.  In his work we find seemingly 
simple historical insights, but insights whose simplicity is the 
result of diligent and penetrating thought.  Such is Dawson’s 
cultural view of history in which religion is the most significant 
factor.  Indeed, Dawson was not the first to insist that spiritual 
factors deserve a prominent place in our understanding of history, 
but he was among the first to use religion as the cornerstone of his 
panoramic view of the past.9    
                                                 
9 Lord Acton said that religion is the “key” to history, but his own writings do 
not fully carry this principle into action.  Dawson, therefore, seems to be the 
most prominent apologist of this type of historical reasoning.    
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 This chapter will discuss Dawson’s role as a historian of 
culture and the methods he employed to put his philosophical outlook 
into action.  He lived in an age encumbered by ideology, but he 
avoided aligning himself with any intellectual “club.”  He cannot be 
labeled, nor can his vision of the past be viewed as a systematic 
treatment of material circumstances, for in Dawson’s actual practice 
of history, his belief that the past harbors mysterious forces that 
cannot be qualified in human terms is ubiquitous.  Thus, Dawson’s 
value as a historian is not to be judged by his vision of the past, 
but by his acceptance of it as a partial manifestation of material 
events.  Like his friend and admirer T.S. Eliot, Dawson seeks to 
understand history as it relates to man’s relationship with the 
eternal—the coming together of time and eternity. This can only be 
accomplished through a comprehensive study of culture in which the 
larger forces are not obscured by the seemingly important, though 
insignificant, material circumstances of our daily life.  Dawson’s 
vision is at once metahistorical and spiritual, but it arguably 
captures the essence of culture more than the narrow minutiae that 
are the obsession of the modern historian.   
 In the pages that follow, there will be an extensive 
exposition of Dawson’s historical writings followed by a critical 
evaluation of his thought.  This clear separation is meant to allow 
Dawson to speak for himself, but forces his writings to be 
accountable to further inquiry and debate.  Dawson’s importance as a 
historian is fully dependent upon his ability to withstand 
objections to his view of history as a cultural concept, and more 
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importantly, as a cultural institution tied to the religious 
structures that are the patrimony of the West.   
II 
 Dawson's imagining of the past is inextricably linked to his 
idea of culture as a living organism.  What, however, is a social 
culture, and how does it differ from a civilization?  The difference 
is of high importance, and to Dawson, a social culture is a way of 
life, organized around a common tradition and settled in a common 
environment.10  This tradition is deeper and more complex than the 
materialism exhibited in its most outward characteristics, and in 
even the most primitive societies, culture is deeply rooted in the 
cult.  Dawson's first set of Gifford Lectures delivered at Edinburgh 
in 1947 examines this relationship in great detail.  Avoiding the 
temptation to study readily available material concerning the 
Christian West, Dawson fixes his attention on neglected cultures as 
a way of understanding the dynamics of history without reducing the 
process to some form of mechanistic determinism.  Dawson's findings, 
which are similar to those of Fustel de Coulanges, who died in the 
year of Dawson’s birth, are that religion is the basis of a dynamic 
culture no matter what its level of material sophistication.11  His 
examination of the Esquimaux and the Bushmen of South Africa 
provides a firm understanding of the relationship between religion 
and materialism in the building of a culture, and demonstrates 
                                                 
10 Christopher Dawson, Religion and Culture (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), 
47.   
11 Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, & 
Company). 
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important parallels between ancient, primitive cultures and modern 
society.12   
 At the foundation of Dawson’s thought is the idea that both 
advanced and primitive cultures rely upon religion to provide both 
the conservative force that preserves tradition and the dynamic 
impulse that allows progress to occur.13  Culture, however, is not 
synonymous with the term civilization, which "involves a high degree 
of conscious rationalization."14  While civilization is concerned 
with the more material development of a people, it does not 
necessarily involve intellectual, psychological, or spiritual 
growth.  Civilization usually entails a higher degree of material 
sophistication, but such progress is extensively dependent upon the 
religious impulse among various peoples.  Dawson, in The Age of the 
Gods, turns the reader's attention to the German scholar, Eduard 
Hahn, who held that in Western Asia, animal domestication and 
agricultural advancement was made possible by the "religious 
observation and ritual imitation of the processes of Nature."15  
Thus, it is as a form of religious expression that certain 
agricultural methods were formed, and material gains were merely a 
secondary consequence.  He develops this point with Sir William 
Ramsay's observation of Asia Minor: 
The art of agriculture was there taught almost by Nature 
herself, who thus revealed herself as mother and teacher of 
her people.  Step by step and precept upon precept, the 
Goddess Mother, the Thesmophoros or law-giver of the Boeotian 
and Athenian plain, educated her people and showed them how to 
make the best of the useful animals, swine, ox, sheep, and 
                                                 
12 These two cultural groups are extensively treated by Dawson in Religion and 
Culture (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), and in his first book, The Age of the 
Gods (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1933).   
13 Dawson, Religion and Culture, 48. 
14 Dawson, Religion and Culture, 47. 
15 Christopher Dawson, The Age of the Gods, 107. 
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goat, and later also of the horse, by proper nurture and 
careful treatment and breeding.  The history of education 
which she gave remains for us in the Anatolian religion, in 
which lies the key to an extremely early stage of human 
development.16 
 
 The civilizing influences of the "Great Mother"—nature—played 
a central role in the development of primitive peasant cultures.  It 
is largely as a by-product of religious rituals that we can 
understand the genesis of simple agricultural life.  Every action of 
the primitive farmer was an imitation of some natural process by 
which he was able to yield significant material gains.  The tools of 
agriculture—plows, carts, hand instruments—these were all sacred 
objects.  The opening of the earth and the reaping of her goods was 
a ritualistic enterprise, as it was with the Babylonians and the 
peoples of India.17 
 It is this anthropological approach to history that marks 
Dawson's distinctive understanding of the past.  Dawson, much like 
Eric Voegelin, understands history as "the process in which man 
articulates his own nature."18  This means that history entails a 
large degree of self-understanding and a consciousness of the 
transcendent reality of human life.19  History is the unfolding of a 
grand epoch chartered under the direction of God, but realized by 
morally-free human participants.  Understanding the nature of human 
beings, not in a national or political context, but as part of a 
metahistorical, cultural superstructure was Dawson's task.  For a 
cultural historian, there is something beyond the deterministic 
                                                 
16 Sir William Ramsay, "The Religion of Greece in Asia Minor," in Hastings' 
Dictionary of the Bible, vol. v, 135.   
17 Dawson, The Age of the Gods, 105-106. 
18 Eric Voegelin, Order and History: Volume II (Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press, 
1987), 68. 
19 Michael Federici, Eric Voegelin (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003), 89. 
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system of economics, and far beyond the fighting over national 
boundaries and territories, that defines the development of history.  
Dawson enjoyed quoting Edmund Burke's Letters on a Regicide Peace as 
an elegant illustration of his historical vision: for a “common 
soldier, a child, a girl at the door of an inn have changed the face 
of the future and almost of Nature."20  This is the essence of the 
unpredictable, unfolding process of history that forms the core of 
Dawson’s thought.  It must be noted, however, that such a view does 
not reduce his historical vision to a “great-man” theory of history.  
Werner Stark raises an objection to Dawson’s approach as 
demonstrated by his treatment of certain events in The Formation of 
Christendom. Dawson’s argument that the Carolingian Empire’s demise 
was largely the result of the personal deficiencies of Charlemagne’s 
heirs is a failure, Stark explains, to account for external factors 
that might further explain these circumstances.  In this case, the 
waning threat of a Saracen invasion, combined with a decrease in 
fear that Christendom would be destroyed “no longer forced the 
tribes of Europe into a unity of defensive action, is surely as 
least as important, and probably more so,” than any personal defects 
in a ruler.21  Stark maintains that Dawson’s flaw is not in any 
specific commission of errors, but in the omission of important 
truths.  In this way, the errors of Charlemagne’s successors are 
used as an excuse for circumstances Dawson would rather avoid.  
Although he was not immune to making errors, the criticism that 
Dawson intentionally omits material for the sake of polemics, or 
                                                 
20 Edmund Burke, Letters on a Regicide Peace (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999).   
21 Werner Stark, “Review: The Formation of Christendom,” Sociological Analysis, 
Vo. 28, Issue 3, Fall 1967, 172-173. 
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subordinates his scholarship to known falsity is to misunderstand, 
or discount, his entire historical vision.  For Dawson, truth is at 
the heart of historical knowledge, and to knowingly serve a lie—
through action or omission—is a disservice to God and a stain on the 
historian.  Dawson’s probable error here is over-enthusiasm.   
 The anthropological and sociological view of history, as 
opposed to rationalist, nationalist, or materialist interpretations, 
is for Dawson, grounded in his studies of non-Western peoples.  
Although the West is Dawson's primary interest, and it is as a 
medieval historian by which he is primarily—though mistakenly—known, 
he is keenly aware of the unity of mankind and that the basic 
dynamics of cultural history are rooted in the same elements 
regardless of race, time, or geographic region.  At the center of 
man's life are his religious inclinations, often fueled, in 
primitive times, by dependence on forces beyond his immediate 
control.  From the earliest records, there is evidence that very 
primitive people knew they could not live in isolation apart from 
the mysterious forces that govern the world.  Dawson writes: 
The conviction that "the way of man is not in himself", that 
it is not for man to walk and direct his own steps, is as old 
as humanity itself.  We can find most clear and moving 
expressions of this belief among the primitive peoples—most of 
all perhaps among the hunting peoples like the North American 
Indians whose conception of dependence on spiritual powers has 
been described with exceptional fullness by a series of 
excellent scholars and observers, like J.O. Dorsey, F. Boas, 
and Ruth Benedict.22 
                                                 
22 Dawson, Religion and Culture, 49.  Ruth Benedict (1887-1948) was an American 
anthropologist and a student of Franz Boas at Columbia University.  Her 
Patterns of Culture (1934) was a standard textbook for many years and was 
translated into 14 languages, and her The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was 
widely-read.  She died two months after being appointed to a chair in 
anthropology at Columbia.  Franz Boas (1858-1942) was one of the pioneers of 
modern anthropology.  German by birth, he received a doctorate in physics 
before turning his attention to cultural anthropology.  A staunch apologist of 
empiricism, the notion of culture as dynamic, and cultural relativism, he was 
 16
 
 It is not unreasonable to argue that Dawson’s thought closely 
resembles that of Fustel de Coulanges—excepting a few minor 
instances—for many of the same themes are found in the work of both 
men.  For Fustel, like Dawson in later years, religion is the root 
of all cultural activity whether it is in the home, the community, 
or the larger institution of the state.  Fustel captures the essence 
of religion’s place in society through his studies of ancient 
cultures, which is itself an attempt to set the stage for a study of 
the institutions of classical Greece and Rome.23  For Fustel, the 
study of a culture that excludes its religious character is vapid 
and only leads to distortion.  The revolutions of the century pre-
dating Fustel are a testament to idealizing the past without seeing 
its inherently religious character.  The proper historian, enamored 
by a search for truth, will attempt to see beyond the skeleton of 
the civilization that he studies, for he will engage in a struggle 
to see its inner-workings, its dynamics, its psychological 
character, and its overall essence.  In Fustel’s judgment, this has 
been the error of historians who idealize the classical past and 
attempt to reconstruct it without its spiritual dimensions.  As far 
as it is impossible to create a genuine spirituality ex nihilo, it 
is impossible to resurrect the great cultures to their supposed 
                                                                                                                                                 
for many years the Professor of Anthropology at Columbia University.  His 
writings include The Mind of Primitive Man (1911) and Race, Language, and 
Culture (1940).  He was a major influence on Claude Levi-Strauss and Ruth 
Benedict.  (J)ames (O)wen Dorsey (1848-1895) was an American anthropologist 
known for his work among the Native Americans.  Although much of his writing 
remains unpublished, he exerted a large influence over generations of scholars.  
He was particularly well-known for his knowledge of two Siouan languages—Tutelo 
and Quapaw.   
23 Coulanges, The Ancient City, 12. 
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former glory.24  Thus, for Fustel, and later Dawson, religion is an 
integral part of the “disinterested” historians’ task of attaining 
some understanding of his subject.   
 For Dawson, secular living is an anomaly of modern society as 
religion traditionally has been the "great central unifying force in 
culture."  Religion was the keeper of tradition and law, and the 
force behind education and cultural advancement. Lord Acton's 
aphorism that religion is the "key to history," is a recurring theme 
in Dawson's Gifford Lectures and is the driving force of his acutely 
tuned historical imagination.  Religion is, at once, the 
conservative, dynamic, creative, and life giving force of the 
community.  Dawson maintains that we cannot fully comprehend the 
"form of society" unless we are able to understand its spirituality.  
"We cannot understand its cultural achievements unless we understand 
the religious beliefs that lie behind them."25  The great literary, 
philosophic, and aesthetic traditions of the world are each rooted 
in a strong religious heritage whether it is Christianity in the 
West, Islam in the Middle East, Buddhism in East Asia, or Shamanism 
in Northern Asia and Mongolia.   
 Modern culture, despite its secular inclinations, is still 
alive with religious symbolism and spiritual activity, and one only 
need to look at the coronation of the British sovereign to find a 
seemingly secular, political event steeped in a deep religious 
heritage.26  Furthermore, marriages, funerals, and the inauguration 
of public officials are centered on ceremonies cloaked in religious 
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language.  Religion is the principal source of order in most 
societies both ancient and modern.  Social distinctions are 
routinely drawn along religious lines as we can clearly see in the 
institution of the priesthood.  Dawson writes: 
The Sumerian and Egyptian temple priesthoods, the Brahmin 
caste in ancient  India, the clergy and the monastic orders in 
medieval Christendom are not merely religious institutions, 
they are also vital organs in their respective cultures.  And 
the same is true of the Shamans, the medicine men and witch 
doctors among primitive peoples although our own current 
terminology often blurs the distinction between the sorcerer, 
whose function is non-social or anti-social, and the priest, 
who is the recognized religious organ of the community—a 
confusion which has  been increased by the attempt to draw a 
rigid and exclusive line of division between religion and 
magic.27  
 
Primitive cultures, the concentration of Dawson's early studies, do 
not possess the ability to have secular and religious authorities 
existing side by side.  Thus, in such cultures where "religion is 
bound up with the elementary needs of life," social and economic 
activity is inextricably linked to the higher, spiritual order.   
 Religion also serves as a medium for transporting ideas.  
Dawson gives us the example of the Wovoka, a little-known Indian 
tribe from Nevada, whose Ghost Dance 
spread across the plains "like wildfire," and "finally stimulated 
the Sioux to their last desperate rising against the United States 
government."28  Dawson keenly observes that a similar process 
occurred—albeit at a significantly higher level of sophistication—
with the rise of Islam in pagan Arabia during the sixth and seventh 
centuries.  In this case, an isolated culture developed into an 
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international transformation.29  Several centuries earlier, a similar 
movement that at the time seemed like a small disruption in the 
province of Judea, rocked the Roman world.  Who could have known 
that the son of a Galilean carpenter, crucified during the reign of 
Tiberius, would have such a profound affect on the development of 
culture, both East and West?  Here, both Islam and Christianity 
illustrate how the social function of a culture can be wholly 
transformed by a seemingly benign religious change.  The way, 
however, that knowledge of the transcendent is kept as a part of the 
cultural consciousness "is through the place given to prophecy and 
mysticism.  Religion becomes merely social activism, lacking depth 
or vitality, where these channels of communication with the realm of 
the supernatural are cut off or neglected."30  To Dawson, it is 
impossible to separate religious spirituality from culture.31 
In Dawson’s work, cultures are treated as organic structures 
and possess three distinct, yet general tendencies: progression, 
stasis, and decay.32  Nationalist and economic historians tend to 
miss the vital signs of such movement because political and material 
shifts are usually representative of some greater social change and 
not the direct cause of it.  For Dawson, cultural change entails 
four main factors: race, the genetic factor; environment, the 
                                                 
29 Dawson, Religion and Culture, 53. 
30 John J. Mulloy, "Preface to the 1978 Edition," Dynamics of World History 
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31 Christopher Dawson to “The Editors,” 9 November 1954, Dawson MSS, University 
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geographical factor; function, the economic factor; and thought, the 
psychological influence.33  It is the interaction of these four 
separate elements by which society functions as a cohesive cultural 
unit.  For Dawson, any attempt to explain history by excluding, or 
exclusively focusing upon, one of these factors will lead to an 
inevitable distortion.  This is similar to H.A. Taines’s view of 
race, mileu, and moment, although Dawson would have disapproved of 
Taine’s historicism, his love of abstraction, and his considerable 
devotion to positivism.34   
For Dawson, to focus exclusively upon the genetic factor is 
the mistake of the racialists who argue, on faulty grounds, that 
culture is purely the result of biological differences.  Thus, they 
assert, people are born with a priori cultural distinctions that 
give rise to natural elites.  Failing to account for environmental 
distinctions, as a factor in the development of a certain racial 
type—dark skin in warmer climates—is a critical flaw in the 
racialists' argument.  It is not purely a specific genetic 
composition that leads to the development of a certain culture, but 
a variety of influences of which race is only a single factor.  
Dawson provides the case of the Esquimaux, whose race is most likely 
the result of passive reactions to a harsh environment, and are 
completely dependent upon their surroundings, as an example of this 
developmental process of biological factors in the composition of a 
culture.35  
                                                 
33 Christopher Dawson, "Sources of Cultural Change," Dynamics of World History, 
7. 
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Similarly, he believed, the economic factor is an insufficient 
means of explaining cultural development.  Materialist 
interpretations of history exclude essential elements of a 
civilization’s maturation and offer a mere accompanying 
characteristic of cultural change.  While economic factors, such as 
tool production and sources of labor play a key role in 
understanding the history of any people, they do not account for the 
totality of its cultural achievements, nor do they exclusively 
deserve the blame for its failures.  In Dawson’s judgment, the 
Christian view of history—because it is a spiritual enterprise—is 
far more complex and difficult to understand than the rationalist’s, 
and this intangibility of fact is a principal reason why it is often 
neglected.36 
The most neglected aspect, however, of this morphology of 
cultures—which has been given credence with the rise of an 
anthropological and sociological view of history—is the 
psychological factor.  Nationalist and economic historians have 
traditionally ignored the spiritual and intellectual aspects of a 
culture in their extensive, compartmentalized treatments.  The 
artificial breakdown of historical studies into categories of race, 
material structures, and national identity did, for many years, 
distort our understanding of what lies at the heart of cultural 
achievement and decline.  Dawson argues that the inclusion of this 
missing factor sheds much light on our understanding of past 
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questions asked by Mulloy in a letter of 21 August 1953, Dawson MSS, University 
of Notre Dame, Box 1, Folder 2.   
 22
civilizations.  It is this "cultural" view of history that he, along 
with Spengler and Toynbee, strongly advocates.37   
 The rise of sociology as a science is a relatively new 
phenomenon.  Auguste Comte's conception of the science of man as the 
crown jewel of the sciences has yet to develop into his original 
ideal—much to the credit of its modern proponents.38  To Dawson, the 
three-stage conception of human history (theological, metaphysical, 
and scientific) advocated by Comte, and of which, to him, only the 
last was truly valid, was a gross simplification of history.  Dawson 
agreed that these three forms of knowledge do exist, but he believed 
they were not arranged in some triumphal manner, but acted in a 
concert of mutual cooperation.39  The inability of modern sociology 
to overcome this error, he believed, placed large barriers in the 
way of this science’s potential for good use. "Sociology no longer 
possesses a clearly defined program and method," Dawson wrote.  "It 
has become a vague term which covers a variety of separate subjects.  
Sociologists have abandoned the attempt to create a pure science of 
society and have directed themselves to the study of practical 
social questions."40  The danger, Dawson argued, is that sociology, 
as it is currently practiced in such an unscientific manner, can 
easily become the "scrap heap" upon which all discarded aspects of 
other disciplines are mounted.  If this is the case, then it is 
impossible for us to admit the possibility of a scientific study of 
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humankind.  The failure of sociology is far more than a defeat for 
sociologists—it is a defeat of the scientific method itself.41  
Anthropology suffers from much the similar fate: their 
[anthropologists’] theories of "social evolution divorced from 
history became a priori dogmatism."42 
While the anthropologist deals with more ancient societies, 
the sociologist makes it his business to study the more advanced 
cultures and contemporary life.43 Anthropology, Dawson maintains, is 
more easily seen as the objective discipline because of the distance 
the researcher is able to maintain from his subject.  Both time and 
culture separate him from the object of his research and he is able 
to report findings more easily than the sociologist whose life is 
entangled with his subject.44  Additionally, in the study of ancient 
peoples, the anthropologist is often able to work in cooperation 
with the historian and the archeologist.  Even when competing 
theories are debated, differences are not a matter of emotional 
disjuncture.  Modern historians, however, and the sociologist do not 
enjoy such a cordial relationship.45 
Dawson is careful to outline the difference between sociology 
and history, and shows how they are important complements to one 
another.  He writes: 
In reality sociology and history are two complementary parts 
of a single science— the science of social life.  They 
differ, not in their subject matter but in their  method, one 
attempting a general systematic analysis of the social 
process, while  the other gives a genetic description of the 
same process in detail.  In other words, sociology deals with 
the structure of society, and history with its evolution, so 
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that  they are related to one another in the same way as 
general biology is related to the  study of organic evolution.46 
 
Sociologists, then, are concerned with the general structure of 
society.  They study its generic points, and leave the historian to 
fill in all of the specificities.  Dawson stresses that the weakness 
of modern sociological research is in its "abstract theorizing," and 
its dismissal of historical facts.  This is the result of two 
disciplines trying to assert their mutual independence from the 
other, leaving each other in states of fractured understanding.   
Dawson provides the example of the sociological study of 
ancient Greek culture.  In such a study, the sociologist would 
concentrate on the organization of the state, its political 
structures, the family, its economy, and other general 
characteristics.  All of this, however, must be based on evidence 
provided by the historian.  The historian needs the sociologist, or 
at least his methods, as a tool to interpret the social 
circumstances of a past people, or else he is left with a heap of 
useless data.  This allows the historian to relate his findings to 
the "organic whole" of the Greek world; similarly, because of 
evidence provided by the historian, the sociologist can rely on more 
than mere presumptions and technical abstractions.   
To Dawson, the failure of modern sociology is apparent in its 
inability to place itself on any firm ground.  He argues that, "from 
the beginning sociology has been haunted by the dream of explaining 
social phenomena by the mathematical and quantitative methods of the 
physical sciences and thus creating a science of society which will 
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be completely mechanistic and determinist."47  This has earned 
sociology the deep suspicion of historians.   
Dawson draws our attention to the organic, "biological" method 
of cultural inquiry brought into maturity by Frederic LePlay.  He, 
Dawson argues, more than any other of his "famous contemporaries 
such as Marx, Spencer, and Buckle," developed a science of society 
that avoids the deterministic tendencies of Marxian historicism.48  
His admiration of LePlay is clear, but nevertheless cautious, when 
he recommends him to an admirer asking about the subject of European 
sociology: “I think much the best book on this subject is Les 
Ouvriers Europeens by Frederick LePlay in six volumes. He shows how 
the different economic occupations and the natural environment 
influence the form of the family and hence the culture. LePlay is a 
Catholic and very much alive to the religious aspect of the subject 
but he is not so strong on history as his study was directed to the 
existing types of peasant and worker families in Europe during the 
nineteenth century.”49 A culture is more than a society of material 
production or a place in a specific region—this is a centerpiece of 
LePlay’s understanding and was important in the formation of 
Dawson’s own thought.  The concept of culture entails the higher 
psychological factors of intellect and spirituality, both of which 
transcend basic material elements and are often elusive to the pure 
rationalist. 
Dawson relies heavily upon the religious aspects of mankind's 
growth to trace the development of culture.  His treatment of this 
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subject is extensive in his first book, The Age of the Gods.  Here 
he demonstrates that the comparative study of religion and history 
share an emphasis on the finding of a Transcendent Reality by which 
man finds his true purpose.  For Dawson, the external forms of 
religious systems and rigid determinism are, in the face of these 
Realities, superficial and tawdry.50  For example, he recalls the 
late Paleolithic period and argues that it is very important for two 
reasons: first, it is the time that we first see the appearance of 
modern man, and second, we can for the first time see the "inner 
life" of primitive culture.51  Dawson maintains that religion is the 
principal force behind primitive man, because he was dependent on 
supernatural forces beyond his own control.  Broader than the 
definition of religion provided by Sir James Frazer, which reduces 
religion to any worship of natural forces, primitive man saw the 
force of the supernatural as something much greater than his own 
powers.52  This creates a feeling of awe and personal debasement 
before the deity, and results in a form of emotional dependence and 
worship.53  Religious fervor is especially high among hunting peoples 
because their entire existence is based upon forces beyond their 
control.  The primitive hunter, Dawson reminds us, is a "primitive 
pan-theist" who possesses a vague notion of the supernatural.54 
 The earliest forms of religion seemed to him to be connected 
with the idea of death, but we cannot draw any absolute conclusions 
because of a lack of available evidence. Although Neanderthal man 
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seems to have practiced crude religious rituals surrounding the 
death of another, the first true picture of primitive religion dates 
to the Paleolithic period.55   It is to this time that we can date 
extensive cave paintings depicting man and his relationship to the 
supernatural world.56  These relations are often agricultural and 
involve the worship of certain animals as sacred objects.  
Appropriately, we may turn again to Fustel de Coulanges who argues 
that notions about the soul and death encouraged the growth of the 
“hearth,” which in the ancient world was the center of supernatural 
activity.  For the Hindu, the Greek, the Aryas of the East, and the 
early Romans, death was the centerpiece of spiritual life. 57  
Nevertheless, from this supernatural fascination came significant 
developments including the development of marriage and family 
structure, laws of personal conduct, property rights, political 
organization, and the idea of civic duty. 
For Dawson, the importance of religion to early man shows that 
the work of modern sociologists fails to grasp the complexities of 
human development.  In a zealous attempt to find some rational 
simplification of the process of cultural development, sociologists 
often turn to the seemingly most basic element of human life—
materialism.58  This allows them to quantify human activity in terms 
of economics, race, and geography; in essence, these thinkers 
neglect the psychological factor that is so important to 
understanding Dawson's conception of culture.  Marxian historical 
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analysis is the hallmark example of this type of thinking in which 
all other elements, such as spiritual devotion, are merely 
reflections of an economic, racial, or geographically determined 
necessity.     
In reaction to the materialists, we find the troubling 
interpretations of Idealist philosophers, and most profoundly Hegel, 
who look to the spirit or Zeitgeist, to understand the past.  This 
is a purely reactionary effort.  Dawson writes: 
To Hegel and his followers History is the progressive self-
manifestation of absolute mind.  Each culture or people is a 
successive proposition in the process of a cosmic dialectic, 
and the material aspects of culture are merely the embodiment 
of the immanent idea.  Such theories are now almost entirely 
discredited; nevertheless, we must remember that they played 
an essential part in the development of their apparent 
opposite—the dialectical materialism of Marx.59 
 
This idealism is distinguished by its faith in an "absolute Law of 
Progress," that possesses an immeasurable ability to alter culture 
through a fixed system of principles.60  Abstract concepts, Dawson 
reminds us, are considered far more than mere ideas—they are treated 
as "real forces" that dictate the direction of a culture.61  Dawson 
is clear in his argument that this type of belief, treated as the 
"efficient cause of social change," is religious and not 
sociological.62  Thus, it is an equally bad alternative, Dawson 
claims, to the materialist view of history.63 
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 Dawson's central claim is that culture cannot be reduced to a 
simple explanation of material or spiritual causes.  It is 
quintessential, he maintains, for the sociologist to forget the idea 
of reducing all human activity to a few root causes, and instead, 
focus on the interrelationship of these factors to gain a more 
complete picture of the whole.  As long as the sociologist does not 
attempt to usurp the role of the philosopher or theologian, and 
merely applies the philosophic and theological factors as an 
influence on society, he is well-grounded.  Dawson notes that the 
"sociologist who creates a religion of his own for sociological 
purposes is just as unscientific as if he were to invent new 
anthropological or geographical facts to suit his theories."64 Thus, 
it is a vision of reality that lies at the core of Dawson's thought, 
and this reality is most vividly expressed in religion and 
philosophy.65 
 Take, for instance, the Samurai in Japan.  Another of Dawson's 
non-Western examples, this group provides strong evidence to support 
his claim that cultures are far too complex to be reduced to any few 
elements no matter how seemingly simple they may appear.  Dawson 
writes: 
In order to understand it, it is not enough to study the 
historical evolution of Japanese feudalism and the economic 
structure of Japanese society.  The Samurai type is also the 
embodiment of a whole complex of moral ideas and religious 
beliefs—native, Confucian and Buddhist—some of which have a 
very remote relation both to Japan and to the military 
tradition.66  
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Furthermore, for Dawson, the ethical ideal of the Samurai is not 
merely an entity of "historical interest," but is rather a living 
part of Japanese society and an element that is needed to have any 
comprehension of its inner dynamics.67   
Dawson argues that many of the schisms and religious battles 
that have been waged throughout history are not the result of 
theological differences, but are really a matter of national and 
social tribulation.  Such disagreements are cloaked as religious 
arguments, but are not, at base, religious at all.68  It is important 
to keep separate the actual theological aspects of religion and its 
social consequences, because when the lines are blurred, grave 
cultural consequences often follow.  Such has been the case with the 
extensive conflicts of medieval Christendom, and with the modern 
conflicts concerning Islamic Jihad.  Thomas Sowell writes about this 
dilemma as being particularly difficult to overcome because of the 
nature of religion and its historic consequences.  It is sometimes 
impossible to separate the two in a distinct manner because of their 
complete interdependence upon one another, and because “purely 
secular motives can be cloaked in religious language, as can 
behavior antithetical to the very religion being invoked in its 
defense.”69  This was the case with the Christian crusaders who 
sacked Constantinople, and with Moslems who enslaved other Moslems 
in direct violation of the Koran’s teachings.70 
 This confusion is a source of great conflict in modern times, 
and modern democracies, Dawson claims, are most susceptible to 
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making these mistakes.  While the modern state continuously extends 
its powers over the whole of everyday life, centralization becomes 
only one source of social failure.  The main threat is the 
politicization of culture, so that policy-makers directly impact 
every aspect of life.  Concerns formerly belonging to the province 
of churches, private charities, and individual choice, quickly 
become instruments of social change to such a degree that they are 
incorporated into national political party platforms and the agendas 
of ruling governments.  Government leaders are called upon to answer 
questions of a sociological nature, and this may result in a 
complete transformation of society.  Dawson writes: 
The abolition of war, the destruction of poverty, the control 
of the birth-rate, the elimination of the unfit—these are 
questions which the statesmen of the past would no more have 
dared to meddle with than the course of the seasons or the 
movements of the stars; yet they are all vital issues today, 
and some of them figure on the agenda of our political 
parties.71 
 
The only solution to this is to call upon the abilities of sociology 
to remedy its own misuse.  Dawson argues that the practical 
politician will attempt to solve problems, including these questions 
of an advanced sociological nature, by invoking a combination of 
social idealism and attempting to somehow change material 
conditions.  Ending poverty, opening the markets to free-trade, and 
redistributing the tax burden are each a vain attempt to blur the 
distinctions between sociology and the historic burden of practical 
governing—the maintenance of order within the state, and the defense 
of it from external enemies.  "A sociology which disregards its 
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proper limits may create Utopias," Dawson writes, "but it cannot 
help the statesman in his practical tasks."72 
 If the historian of culture is to find a Transcendent Reality 
through the intermingling forces of social phenomena and religious 
experience, the idea of progress then requires extensive treatment.  
Dawson's conception of progress is quite different from those of the 
social philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in 
that he is patient in his understanding of the general state of 
mankind as it moves toward a position of greater goodness than the 
present.  The disciples of Condorcet, the Jacobins, and the Utopians 
of the social justice movement—their zeal for perfection in this 
world leads them to the delusion that ultimate perfection must be 
visible on the current horizon.  For Dawson, "the ultimate goal of 
perfection must lie in the infinitely distant future."73  The support 
for doctrinaire, idealistic beliefs in progress mostly finds its 
support among the political theorists, and not the historians or 
social anthropologists.  The abstractions of social perfection 
concocted by Utopians are the basis of revolutionary thought in late 
eighteenth-century France, and in the social upheavals of the 
following two centuries.  This is not the progress that Dawson 
admires as a vehicle of social change.   
 A culture that does not possess some form of progress is 
static, and for a culture to lose its religion is tantamount to its 
losing the ability to change.  Such stasis is responsible, Dawson 
argues, for the greatest cultural collapses in history.  For a 
culture to relinquish its spiritual dynamic, it must relinquish its 
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soul.  This was the fate of Rome, and for Dawson, it must be the 
fate of the Christian West in a world obsessed with materialism, 
individuality, egalitarianism, and political affairs.  Culture has 
lost its connection with the cult, and civilization will pay the 
price.  What, however, is a healthy form of progress?  Dawson makes 
an attempt to explain this in what is probably his most important 
book, Progress and Religion.   
 The distinguished anthropologist Mary Douglas, in an 
introduction to Progress and Religion, argues that Dawson's work is 
of particular importance.  She writes: 
Though focused on comparative religion this book includes for 
good measure a lot on the anthropology of the time.  It would 
hardly have been possible to take the position that he did 
without mastering a huge and diffuse literature on exotic 
religions.  In this book Christopher Dawson artfully stages a 
dialogue between the eighteenth-century philosophers, 
Condorcet, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, and the people they 
thought of as primitive: the Sioux, Dakota and Tlingit 
Indians, native Australians, African Bushmen, Zulus, and 
Shamans of the Arctic and world wide, are given a chance to 
put in their word.74   
 
Unique among Western historians is Dawson's deep respect for, and 
encyclopedic knowledge of, both primitive and ancient cultures.  
Additionally, Dawson views the sociological foundations of those 
cultures as essentially the same as those underpinning the major 
world religions.   
 The nineteenth-century sociologists seem at times to possess a 
naiveté that stifled scientific method although it was itself 
possessed of scientific idealism.  While their attentions remained 
focused upon the idea of Progress, they were negligent in their 
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treatment of a community's ability to decay.75  Russell Kirk's 
aphorism that the torch of innovation is not necessarily the torch 
of progress was a foreign concept to the social thinkers in the line 
of Condorcet and Comte.  For these men, "whatever was the fate of 
particular societies it was always possible to follow the progress 
of humanity in the converging lines of individual progress—economic, 
intellectual and political."76 
The study of civilizations must, for Dawson, be considered as 
studies of a singular, indivisible, organic entity.77  As the 
physician studies concrete biology to better understand the human 
anatomy, the sociologist must study the organic growth of human 
history.  The study of humankind is a concrete enterprise that must 
not be riddled with unsubstantiated abstractions.  Society is "a 
living body from the simple and instinctive life of the shepherd, 
the fisherman and the tiller of soil up to the highest achievements 
of the artist and the philosopher."78  Every culture has its ideal 
type which is fixed by its own standards of ethical conduct and 
moral order.  "Great cultures" produce vibrant philosophies and 
scientific achievements based on the dynamic character of their 
respective traditions.  Dawson observes that "Aristotle or Euclid 
could no more have appeared in China, than could Confucius in 
Greece."79 
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 In The Making of Europe, a particular culture shapes the 
external accomplishments of what became Western Europe during the 
so-called Dark Ages.  From the Loire to the Rhine, the rise of 
medieval architecture, university systems, and the monastery were 
all set against the backdrop of an organic cultural system with its 
roots springing from the synergistic energy fueled by two important 
systems: local customs and the influence of a Universal 
Christendom.80  Dawson removes the pejorative stigma of a savage 
attached to the term “barbarian” and shows how the barbarians of 
Europe fused with the Christian tradition to become a united, 
vibrant culture.81  Architecturally, the rise of the Gothic Cathedral 
is a paramount example of the West's organic growth, both spiritual 
and intellectual, manifested in a physical building.  The unique 
architecture of York Minster could not be found in Constantinople, 
just as the great Mosques of Istanbul, or the churches of St Basil, 
or San Marco, could not be found in northern England.   
 What, however, constitutes cultural decline?  In Dawson’s 
view, each of the great cultures is an “integrated whole, a 
functioning unity, composed of interrelated, interdependent culture 
elements.”82  Thus, when a central part of that tradition is 
weakened, the whole fabric undergoes a transformation.  For Dawson, 
an intentional break with the historic reality of any culture will 
herald its own demise.83  When new forms of religion, literature, 
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philosophy, architecture, and thought begin to artificially 
inculcate themselves in an established cultural system, a culture 
looses its significance.84  Consequently, in Dawson’s work, there was 
a “primacy…attributed to non-material factors as the significant 
motivating forces of cultural change.”85 Thus, a failure to 
incorporate new ideas into an existing system, and instead, to 
install a completely new system in place of established mores and 
social customs is the mark of cultural decline.  The Reformation, 
and to a large degree the Enlightenment, are for Dawson, both 
representative of this type of decay.  "Only so long as change is 
the spontaneous expression of the society itself does it involve the 
progress of civilization; as soon as the internal vital development 
of a culture ceases, change means death."86  Dawson’s emphasis on 
religion, it might be objected, runs the risk of simplifying a 
complex interrelation of cultural factors if there is a “unilateral 
relationship of cause and effect” among social changes.87  This is 
unfounded, however, because he explicitly understands culture to be 
the result of a combination of genetics, geography, economics, and 
psychology—the last of which entails a spiritual function.  In any 
analysis of cultural change, each of these factors would play an 
equally important role in determining the dynamics of a given 
system.  Toynbee’s understanding was similar in that civilizations 
grow in response to new challenges, but he insisted “civilizations 
die from suicide,” and not murder, because the demise of great 
civilizations is usually the result of internal strife that leads to 
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failures in diplomatic and military affairs.  In this way, Toynbee 
was more mechanical than the culturally-concerned Dawson, but he 
understood that it is the internal dynamics of a civilization that 
are most responsible for social change, and possibly, social decay.   
 An examination of the decline of Hellenic culture is an 
interesting case-study in understanding Dawson's explanation.  While 
the sciences flourished, the Hellenic world was deteriorating in 
both a moral and historical sense.  A loss of the vibrancy of Greek 
life, covered by a veneer of literary and philosophic triumph, 
resulted in the decomposition, and eventual collapse, of the 
Hellenic world.  The Greek city-state, once the rigid social 
construction of Hellenistic society, decayed "into a formless, 
cosmopolitan society, with no roots in the past and no contact with 
a particular region."88  Throughout this period of decline, however, 
the external accomplishments of the Greeks flourished.  
Intellectually, Greek culture represented an abstract form, while 
its particulars—to adopt Greek metaphysical language—were withering 
away under the pressures of cultural decay.  For Dawson, the warning 
is written in letters of fire: a high degree of intellectual and 
material accomplishment can manifest itself even in times of greater 
cultural disintegration.89  The modern West, with all of its 
scientific and material advancements, must learn the lessons of 
classical civilizations that perished while appearing to be in a 
state of pristine health.  Importantly, the seemingly weak Oriental 
cultures, because of their comparable lack of material 
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sophistication, might possess a higher degree of cultural 
sustainability and vibrancy than the West.   
 Dawson notes, however, that there is reason to be optimistic.  
The West is not fated to a particular historical destiny, and if we 
dismiss the closed-circuit historicism of Spengler, we can see that 
cultures—especially in the modern, technologically advanced world—
are in constant contact with one another, and will therefore not act 
as completely independent systems.90  The social organs of Egypt and 
China survived for abnormally long periods of time because they 
tended to preserve the foundations of their cultures instead of 
seeking gratification solely in material advancements.  Their strict 
codes of moral and social order, buttressed by a strong sense of 
religious duty, preserved the structure of their society although 
they appeared to possess relatively static economic systems.91  Rome, 
on the other hand, was seduced by material and imperialist 
ambitions, much to the neglect of its cultural foundations.  The 
result: a loss of cultural vitality and the spiritual collapse of 
the Roman ideal in the first and second centuries before Christ.   
 Early Rome, Dawson argues, was primarily an agricultural 
society.  "The foundation of her power and of her very existence was 
the peasant-soldier-citizen."  The achievements of Rome, as a local 
power, are to be primarily regarded as the result of peasant 
religion, a farm economy, and simple morality.  When Rome expanded, 
however, and the Republic cast its eyes upon conquering the 
Mediterranean world and abroad, the local culture was lost in 
vacuous sea of cultural confusion.  The professional soldier, and 
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not the Cincinnatus of legend, became the ideal type, and although 
he was not a mercenary, such a militaristic vision would soon 
overtake Roman life.  Furthermore, the slave trade and land 
speculation flourished as conquered peoples could be ravaged for 
profit.  The morality of the peasant farmer was replaced by the 
rapid materialism of a cosmopolitan Rome.  This disjunction was 
ruinous to Roman morale and to the spirit of the traditional keeper 
of agrarian life.  Roman life became characterized as a steady 
decline: "The fundamental peasant-soldier-citizen gave place--as 
farmer to the slave—as soldier to the professional—as citizen to a 
vast urban proletariat living on Government doles and the bribes of 
politicians."92   
 The situation worsened as Rome became a politicized nation.  
Conservatives like the Elder Cato, Dawson notes, tried to keep the 
old traditions alive, while radical liberals attempted to "restore 
the citizen class" through a state sponsored redistribution of 
private property among those who did not own land.93  Rome soon 
became its own end, and served no other purpose than to augment its 
own powers and prestige.  Rome no longer sustained as a unique 
cultural entity, nor did it resolve to protect its citizens.  
Similarly to the oppressive, totalitarian regimes of the twentieth-
century, Rome became the embodiment of its own ideal and its own 
purpose.   
 Dawson's concern with a loss of cultural awareness is centered 
in his skepticism over the health of an urbanized people.  Arnold 
Toynbee, writing about Christopher Dawson's thinking on radicalism, 
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urges the readers of The Gods of Revolution to consider the impact 
of the urban proletariat on the French Revolution.94  Similarly, the 
urban proletariat must be considered as a constituent part of the 
fall of the old Roman tradition in order to comprehend its full 
magnitude.  It was the urbanization of Roman life that most 
influenced the beginnings of Europe and helped to create outposts of 
civilized living throughout barbaric lands.  Dawson writes: 
At first sight it is the military aspect of Rome's work which 
is most impressive, but the civil process of urbanization is 
even more important in the history of culture.  It was Rome's 
chief mission to introduce the city into continental Europe, 
and with the city came the idea of citizenship and the civic 
tradition which had been the greatest creation of the 
Mediterranean culture.  The Roman soldier and military 
engineer were the agents of this process of expansion: indeed 
the army itself was organized by Augustus as a preparation for 
citizenship and an agent for the diffusion of Roman culture 
and institutions in the new provinces.95 
 
It was, however, this urbanization that was at the very root of 
Rome's decline.  Not only was every foreign settlement a taxing 
economic burden, but it caused a fracture in the military structure.  
The city's racial and religious cosmopolitanism, mixed with classes 
of every imaginable kind, required an extensive fighting force, 
itself an eclectic mix, with loyalties to various entities other 
than Rome.  The Imperial system paid for itself, but as soon as the 
growth stopped, the economic realities of a vast empire caused 
financial collapse.  To counter mounting deficits, imperial 
governors were forced to raise taxes, and to impose duties on the 
wealthy patricians who formerly served in municipal offices at no 
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expense to the public.  The urbanized Empire was a recipe for its 
own cultural ruin.96    
 If cultures are organic structures, grounded in a historical 
reality, then cities are, for Dawson, their natural nemesis.  
Nothing is more culturally artificial than an urbanized population.  
This is not to say that cities are nothing more than culturally 
harmful organizations, but rather to illustrate that cities do not 
have the same organic structure as more rural societies because of 
the cosmopolitanism that such an environment naturally creates.  
Cities, by their very nature, are meeting centers of different 
religions, races, economic classes, social classes, and intellectual 
ideas.  This is why urban areas are often the breeding grounds for 
violent, though not necessarily physical, cultural change.  This is 
the type of change that Dawson sees as a breach of historical 
understanding, and the usher of cultural change—often for the worse.  
III 
 Dawson’s approach to history is unique in that it represents a 
definitive break with the way history was viewed since the end of 
the sixteenth-century.  From the dawn of the scientific revolution 
and the publication of Sir Isaac Newton’s Principia Mathematica in 
the seventeenth-century, to the reign of the Whig historians in the 
nineteenth, history underwent substantive changes in both perception 
and method.  Giambattista Vico’s New Science, although neglected for 
many years, became an authority in the argument that history must be 
viewed in the same terms as other forms of scientific inquiry.  
Capturing the essence of his age—the age of Isaac Newton and 
                                                 
96 Dawson, The Making of Europe, 22-23. 
 42
scientific advancement—Vico insisted that history was something that 
could be known because men made it.  Here Vico makes an 
epistemological claim: namely, that in order to truly know 
something, it is necessary to have created it.  In Vico’s view, 
natural history is outside of our realm of knowledge because it is 
God’s pure creation; however, the building of states and 
international transactions are perfectly within the boundaries of 
man’s capabilities of understanding.  Now a firm line has been drawn 
separating natural history from its man-made counterpart, and 
history is given a plane upon which to build a greater inquiry.  
Dawson did not agree with Vico’s epistemological claims whole-
heartedly, but he did possess sympathy for his view of history as a 
developmental process.  Furthermore, Vico and Dawson share a view of 
Catholicism that possesses an intimate, spiritual universalism that 
transcends the mundane and extends to the mysterious and unknown.   
 For Vico, human nature can be seen, at least partially, in a 
historical inquiry because it is through the actions of men by which 
our own nature is most prominently put on display.  Dawson would 
agree, although he would not go as far to subordinate all knowledge 
of man to the process of history.  Thus, it is possible to know some 
things about the natural world, albeit imperfectly.  Man is not a 
purely rational creature, and this is where Vico believed the 
imaginative and critical character of man’s personality were 
instrumental in understanding the past.  Men progress, Vico argued, 
through cycles in which periods of “barbarism and myth” are 
displaced by more “civil” periods.  Here there is a definite break 
with the patristic fathers whose distaste for cycles is rooted in 
 43
the Gospels’ conception of Christ the redeemer who dies, once and 
for all, so that sins can be forgiven.  This belief in cycles, 
although not wholly inconsistent with early-Catholic thought, 
represents a major break between Dawson and Vico, although the 
importance of imagination is in the forefront of Dawson’s thought as 
it is with Vico two centuries earlier.97   
 Dawson struggles, like Vico, to put history in its proper 
place among the disciplines.  In such an organizing effort—and it is 
the nature of historians to put things into categories—Dawson 
confronts the concept of history as a branch of scientific 
knowledge.  Again, the epistemological confrontation is a matter of 
immediate concern because it is the nucleus of all prospects for 
finding a consensus upon which to view historical knowledge.   
 Dawson finds common ground with many of the great philosophers 
of history, but he has important differences with all of them.  For 
instance, Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas toward a Philosophy of the 
History of Man provides several instances where Dawson would be in 
agreement with the author concerning the scientific approach to 
history.98  Herder’s insistence that historians cannot judge the past 
from a contemporary perch is an inherent part of Dawson’s thinking, 
but Herder’s argument that the variety and individuality of specific 
nations are the core of historical change would make Dawson cringe.  
Here lies a serious distinction between Dawson and one of his 
important predecessors.  While Herder possesses a love for the 
abstract idea of the State, Dawson finds the means of historical 
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change in deeper recesses of the human drama.  Herder breaks with 
many of his contemporaries of the Enlightenment in his rejection of 
history as the deduction of general principles concerning human 
nature, and strangely, he finds good company with Dawson in the 
belief that variety and imagination are among the numerous keys to 
understanding the past. 
 While Dawson does not believe that historians are right to 
cast moral judgments upon their subjects, he does not reject the 
notions of natural law or moral responsibility.  Dawson’s vision of 
history as a function of a culture’s religious patrimony is directly 
linked to that religion’s “intimate relation” to a definite moral 
code.  Thus, morality is an important part of understanding a 
culture and the super-structure under which any particular culture 
exists.  To Dawson, if we are to identify the ends of a particular 
culture and their achievements, the historian must look upon it as a 
moral enterprise.  The worth of any moral system, for both the 
individual and the larger culture of which he is part, is the extent 
to which that system is “true to its destiny, to sacrifice the bird 
in the hand for the vision of the bush, to leave the known for the 
unknown, like Abram going out from Harran and from his own people, 
obedient to the call of Yahweh, or the Aeneas of Virgil’s great 
religious epic.”99  Dawson makes this claim because he believes that 
this view of reality is felt “intuitively” before it is 
intellectually digested or rationally understood.  Thus, for Dawson, 
the challenge to the modern world is to reconcile its inner-sense 
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and teleological vision with the discoveries of the present day and 
the growing knowledge man has of himself and of nature.100   
 Arguing against the inclusion of moral principles as a key to 
understanding history, Henry Thomas Buckle believed that it was 
through the advancement of the intellect by which history can be 
most articulately understood.  For Buckle, history’s significance is 
not the result of religious inquiry or the working-out of moral 
principles, and like Comte before him, he thought that society must 
be studied by way of some scientific procedure.  Buckle insisted 
that reluctance to embrace a scientific approach to history is the 
result of two ancient dogmas—Free Will and predestination.  In 
Buckle’s thought, the doctrine of Free Will is flawed because it 
rests upon indefensible metaphysical assumptions that are, he 
claims, mere speculation.  Similarly, he maintains that 
predestination depends upon vulnerable assumptions of a theological 
nature.101   
 Buckle’s adherence to Comtean positivism, and in essence, 
Hume’s empiricism, places him in square contrast to Dawson, but 
there remain several points of agreement.  Dawson’s thought is at 
once logical but reluctant to lend itself to any one “school,” and 
although his views seem to run contrary to Comte’s, and naturally 
Buckle’s, the disagreements are not sweeping indictments.  With Le 
Play, Comte retains Dawson's admiration despite apparent 
shortcomings.  John Mulloy writes: 
Dawson is indebted to Le Play for putting his sociology into 
touch with the concrete bases of human life, through the 
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latter's classic study of the family in embarking on 
"grandiose schemes for the reconstruction of society" and for 
creating a theory of society which "was at the same time...a 
system of moral philosophy and a non-theological substitute 
for religion." Dawson is impressed with Comte's recognition 
that the "study of social institutions must go hand in hand 
with the study of the intellectual and spiritual forces which 
give unity to the particular age and society in question."102 
 
Dawson admires Comte's strength as a thinker because of his 
recognition of the importance of the "living community" as a 
centerpiece of cultural identity; nevertheless, he is careful to 
distance himself from Comte on his pure philosophy of history as a 
replacement for sociology.  It is in the spiritual and intellectual 
development of man through which the roots of culture are most 
visible, Dawson argued, following Comte, and not in the bland 
materialism of external causes.103  Fixating upon the material causes 
of social change is the fatal flaw of modern sociologists.  Comte’s 
idealization of positivism—especially in its quasi-religious form—is 
distasteful to a mind such as Dawson’s, yet the scientific method of 
such a system, carefully incorporated into a more humane outlook, 
provides essential structure to the cultural historian’s task. 
 G.W.F. Hegel provides another important contrast by which 
Dawson’s thought is placed into context.  For Hegel, history 
represents a rational process that exists in definite stages and is 
ultimately defined by the idea of freedom—a freedom, which must be 
distinguished from the ideas of Lord Acton.  The freedom of Hegel is 
a direct function of the essence of an age’s spirit, and thus there 
is a definitive differentiation between natural and non-natural 
history.  The primary factor in the drawing of this distinction is 
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that in non-natural history, human people are involved in a rational 
process by which there is a progressive development toward some 
certain goal.  Natural history, on the other hand, does not involve 
rational principles or the actions of individual persons.  To Hegel 
and his students, history is the working-out of a progressive self-
manifestation of absolute Mind.  In this system, each culture and 
people are nothing more than the “embodiment of the immanent idea.”  
To Dawson, Hegel’s ideas are wholly simplistic, but they capture a 
renewed importance through their recollection in Marx’s dialectical 
materialism.  Furthermore, while Hegelian philosophy suffers from a 
credibility problem, its older, Enlightenment-age relative, Liberal 
idealism, is alive and powerful.104  Dawson confronts the issue of 
liberalism with a deliberate sense of purpose in that he suspects it 
possesses an inherent contradiction at its core.  While the 
scientific spirit is the pervasive element of Enlightenment 
rationalism, the practitioners of enlightened thought were all too 
quick to make unfounded metaphysical assertions of their own.  The 
belief in an absolute law of Progress, the right of Liberty, the 
supremacy of Science, the search for Justice, and the assertion of 
Reason are all forces that determine the course of culture, but are 
not empirical matters.  Dawson understands that metaphysical 
concepts are part of human development, but independently they are 
weak forms to which society needlessly conforms because of its 
dogmatic adherence to the religion of Progress.   
 Dawson could not accept Hegel’s philosophy for a multitude of 
reasons, and foremost among these is his idealization of the State 
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as the highest form of understanding.  Dawson’s Catholicism kept him 
from seeing the state as the realization of the Divine Idea as it 
exists on earth.  It is in Augustine, not Hegel, in which Dawson 
sees the proper relationship between the City of Man and the City of 
God explained.  Augustine draws a clear line of demarcation between 
the two cities, especially in their relation to the Catholic Church, 
and insists that the Church is not a reflection of Heaven, but an 
instrument of it.105  Clearly, then, Hegel and Augustine stand 
diametrically opposed in their vision of the relationship between 
Heaven and earth, and it is with Augustine that Dawson makes his 
stand.  Hegel’s thought penetrates beyond historical thinking, and 
even politics, because its quasi-religious character allows it to 
permeate every aspect of culture.  Thus, religion, history, 
politics, economics, and art, are all susceptible to the supremacy 
of the State.  Richard Wagner’s Ring, and eventually the historical 
imagination of historians such as Niebuhr, and later Ranke and 
Mommsen, are prominent examples of this vision of culture.  By the 
mid-twentieth-century, the results of this “armed doctrine” would be 
disastrous. 
 In Hegel’s system, history is accorded the highest form of 
knowledge because it is the culmination of all other disciplines in 
its ability to find the absolute spirit.  Thus, all other forms of 
inquiry, scientific and humane, are subordinate to this overarching 
concept that envelopes every aspect of society and culminates in an 
unbridled exaltation of the State.  This is unacceptable to the 
Christian, and especially to the philosophical Catholic.  Hegel’s 
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fault, and Dawson draws from his Catholic theology to justify this 
claim, is that he equates the national State with the common culture 
that is its foundation.  As a consequence, historians—especially in 
Germany—did not study cultures, but produced political histories 
that would reign unchallenged for nearly a century.106   
 Dawson’s assessment of Hegel is a devastating attack on 
Idealism and the abstraction of nationalist history.  If the common 
culture is reduced to a function of political identity, then 
historians fail to grasp the real root of what causes cultural 
change.  While wars and economic policies have tremendous impact on 
any social structure, they do not fully capture the “spirit” of an 
age.  Hegel’s markedly un-Christian conception of the State as the 
highest level of culture fails to take into account spiritual 
factors, which, no matter how intense the veneer, could never be a 
part of a genuine political machine.   
 If Hegel’s idealization of the political state is a 
distasteful, if not impossible, concept to internalize, then Oswald 
Spengler’s concept of culture, and later Toynbee’s idea of 
civilization, become objects of vital importance.  Spengler’s 
“morphological” conception of history in which civilizations undergo 
cyclical changes, each possessing its own “soul,” but simultaneously 
progressing toward the same destiny, presents a conundrum to the 
historian because it challenges the standard structure of history as 
a sequence of ancient, medieval, and modern.  The scientific view of 
history is called into question by Spengler’s argument that history 
is a special type of knowledge that cannot be studied through the 
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application of scientific techniques.  For Spengler, science deals 
with fixed systems in nature, while history is not fixed, develops 
at unpredictable intervals, and is not the product of definite 
causal uniformities.107  Spengler argues that cultures, and not 
purely political institutions, must be the proper object of 
historical inquiry.  So it would appear that he and Dawson are in 
the same camp: both reject the scientific method as a means to 
capture the past and they agree that culture is most effective means 
by which to understand what went before.  However, there are some 
important differences that must be elucidated.   
 Dawson rejects the Hegelian notion of history as the 
glorification of a political system, but he does not endorse 
Spengler’s compartmentalization of cultures as independent units.  
Spengler’s history is burdened by an intensely determinist gloom, 
while Dawson’s vision is enlivened by a spirit of Christian hope and 
Free Will.  Dawson viewed Spengler’s system, not as a philosophy of 
history, but as an attempt to create a new, “historical, kind of 
philosophy.”108  For Dawson, the insufficient means by which modern 
historians have come to view culture—as closed systems depending 
upon law of causality instead of as living organisms—reflects the 
same error committed by Spengler.  His vision of the past as self-
contained cultural units creates a problematic “philosophical 
relativism,” in which eternal truths are incapable of expression or 
basic existence.   
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 What makes Spengler’s historicism so important is its 
viewpoint.  Dawson argues that Spengler, whose Germanic background 
predisposes him to place his interests outside of the politics of 
typical English historians, produces an exceptionally practical 
history in his Decline of the West.  Dawson attempts to explain the 
relevance of Spengler to the metaphysically-blind English mind by 
arguing that the Anglo-American historians must treat him as a 
serious subject regardless of the discomfort that results from an 
undergraduate career of reading Macaulay and Stubbs.109  Europe’s 
cosmopolitanism does not guarantee that students, or even 
professional historians, will be exposed to a wide-range of 
scholars; however, Dawson writes this between 1922 and 1929, when 
Spengler was already under a cloud.   
 Dawson’s break with Spengler is particularly important because 
both men view history in terms of a larger context than crude, 
nationalist historians, but their conceptions of this underlying 
“culture” are radically different.  Dawson concedes that Spengler 
essentially holds the right cards, but has them disordered, or at 
least reads them incorrectly.  For Dawson, history is an organic 
structure that cannot be contained within neat, fixed categories.  
Spengler sees the Christianity of the Patristic period and the 
Middle Ages as two different religions, but a cursory examination of 
Catholic history renders this judgment naïve, at best.  Dawson’s 
criticism of this is not unfair because he sees the unity of the 
Christian tradition as a succession of events, ideas, and people, 
each building off of the past to achieve a sort of cultural 
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synthesis.  In this light, Christianity becomes, for Spengler, a 
great stumbling block, and for Dawson, the greatest example of how 
Spengler’s metahistorical theory is fatally flawed no matter how 
important some of its constituent elements may appear at first 
glance. 
 Arnold Toynbee’s approach is similarly lacking in that it is 
the opposite extreme which ignores the cultural foundation that is 
responsible for the construction of his basic element of human 
affairs—civilization.  For Dawson, the weakness in Toynbee’s 
approach is displayed in his Spengler-like reductionism of cultures 
to independent social units.  Although he does not embrace a 
cyclical vision of the past, he denies the unity of history, and 
embraces the idea that history is enlivened by the abstract concept 
of progressive world stages.  Toynbee does not accept the subjective 
historical approach advocated by Spengler, and it is in his 
adherence to the idea that history is subordinated to a higher, 
over-arching principle, by which all civilizations are judged on 
common ground that he and Dawson are similar.  Dawson makes the 
argument, albeit implicitly, that this is a step closer to his own 
historical vision that is chastened by Thomistic philosophy and the 
existence of natural law.   
 Natural law and the working-out of metahistorical forces in 
culture is an intellectual intersection at which the Catholic 
philosopher (and theologian) must not become ensnared in rigid, 
often confusing systems—most of them the product of nineteenth-
century German Idealism.  Dawson’s worldview, against Hegel and the 
Idealists, is that history is the servant of culture, and the 
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handmaiden of Christianity—not the converse.  The failure to 
understand the relationship between history and religion—and thus, 
the failure to understand the limits of historical inquiry—has 
placed history between the uncomfortable, unhelpful, and outdated 
extremes of subjective and objective inquiry.  When history is 
subordinated to a greater system such as Christianity, properly 
understood through metaphysics and theology, the objectivity 
question becomes moot.  This is because human events, when seen in a 
context outside of their own existence, and in relation to the 
greater eternal structure of the universe, become a secondary aspect 
of knowledge.  The question becomes, not what specifically happened 
down to the last minor detail, but rather, what value the intrinsic 
significance of historical events, or people, holds.   
 The secular historian who does not wish to subordinate his 
discipline to seemingly abstract subjects such as philosophy and 
theology will make objections to this type of thinking, but he 
cannot use history to answer his critics.  Science and philosophy 
are themselves the objects of social construction, and thus, cannot 
comment on social determinants without circularity.  They are, 
however, the best means to understanding our past as long as their 
limits are properly respected.110  “It is important,” Dawson wrote, 
“to keep the study of culture on the scientific plane and not let it 
be infected by the political controversies of the moment.  
Nevertheless in so far as it is a genuinely humane study it is bound 
to exert a liberalizing and humanizing influence on its own level, 
i.e. the world of ideas.”  In this way, scientific method must not 
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be corrupted by ephemeral fads, or by the tinge of day-to-day 
politics.111  There is an added complication for the Christian, and 
thus for Dawson: the meaning of history is found, not purely within 
the “outer world of historic events,” but rather, in the world of 
spiritual change.112  Unlike Machiavelli and Hobbes, who tried to 
understand history as a non-moral enterprise consisting of the story 
of political power, Dawson sees the meaning of history shrouded in 
the mystery of the Gospels and enlivened by the spirit of Christian 
virtue.  He imagines the significance of history in its relation to 
the eternal world and in its recognition of the hand of God 
intervening, at various points, in human affairs.   
 Dawson’s insistence that history is something non-scientific 
reflects his view that, for the believing Christian, history is 
inseparable from the tenets of faith.  History is not an abstract 
construction, as the nineteenth-century philosophers argued; rather, 
it is something that is far more intimately involved in 
Christianity’s core principles, and Christianity’s basis as a world 
religion, than a pure philosophy such as Hegel’s or Kant’s.  This 
does not mean, however, that science should be thrown aside in an 
effort to decipher the mysteries of the past.  Dawson’s view is 
elucidated by his belief that sociology and history must participate 
in one endeavor while maintaining definite boundaries.  With Max 
Weber, Dawson believed that scientific thinking, as demonstrated by 
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sociology, only achieves its proper ends when placed in the context 
of a specific historical problem.113   
 Scientific thinking has its place in historical inquiry, but 
Dawson is right to reject it as the basis of all historical thought 
because history is not purely a matter of materiality, and is thus, 
something removed from the reign of pure science.  While he doesn’t 
go as far as Trevelyan in railing against historians who, in the 
words of Peter Gay, “forget their obligations to literature in 
whoring after the false god of science,” Dawson is chastised by the 
ever-present obligations of the historian to understand the past, 
not merely reconstruct it neatly along scientifically drawn lines.114  
Dawson’s undergraduate career was a struggle to maintain distance 
from both the fanatics of scientific objectivism on the one hand, 
and the Whigs on the other.  Unlike Karl Manheim whose “situational 
determinism” turned on an argument that objectivity was impossible 
because every historian is the product of cultural and historical 
circumstance, Dawson eschews the idea of pursuing an abstract 
objectivity from the outset.115  This does not mean that his accounts 
are tinged with relativistic assertions or fanciful myths, but that 
he accepts history as an endeavor that reaches to the heart of 
humanity itself, and beyond into eternity.  Accordingly, history 
becomes a humane endeavor even more than it is a scientific one or 
the apparent results of simple, causal actions.   
 For Dawson, the hope of finding Truth in the modern age was 
not a problem of objectivity, but one of understanding the role of 
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primeval religious traditions as a component of contemporary, 
secular life.  In the West, this means the reconciliation of 
Christian values with the ideals of the Humanist tradition—including 
its scientific components.  Science is a tool that can be used to 
help understand the past, but it must not be the only avenue by 
which history is viewed.  Many of the historical problems faced by 
philosophers since the first extensive treatments of history began 
in the seventeenth-century are the result of an identity crisis: an 
inability of the West to come to a consensus on what exactly 
constitutes those constituent elements which form the basis of our 
culture.  Until the building blocks of culture are put in their 
proper context, and historians allow other, non-scientific criteria 
to affect the picture, we have no hope of ending the objectivity 
debate.  There is an inherent contradiction is the scientific view 
of history in that it commits the very error that it seeks to 
eradicate.  The scientific tradition is itself a religious 
institution with its own priests, creed, and faithful followers.  
Dawson argued against this inversion with vigorous energy.  
Does this constitute a thorough philosophy of history?  
Probably not.  Such systems depend on thoroughly material 
circumstances to support their abstract claims.  Dawson is no 
historicist, but at the same time, he does not write in the manner 
of his philosophical mentor, Augustine.  In fact, Dawson is more 
like Bede in his treatment of Christianity in early England than 
like Augustine in his grand theodicy, The City of God.  Dawson does 
not set out to create a grand system or establish an elaborate 
philosophical framework, but what he does intend is to turn man’s 
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attention back to the most fundamental part of his being—his 
relationship with God and the relationship between time and 
eternity.  For Dawson, history is the study of particulars, but 
these particulars must be framed within the context of the 
eternality of God’s time.  Thus, for the Western historian, the 
proper understanding of history is not sought in abstract 
metaphysics, but in the unfolding of a divine plan—essentially, 
within the context of a “theology of history.” 
 Dawson’s vision of history is wholly entangled with his 
understanding of the cosmos as a dynamic system that progresses with 
the active participation of God.  In Dawson, there is an outright 
resistance to the “clockmaker” view of the universe in which God is 
merely the builder of a world that He set into motion and leaves to 
its own devices.  Understandably, then, Dawson is reluctant to see 
history in a vacuum where it is divorced from the greater, 
Transcendent Reality of the cosmos.  Thus, for Dawson, questions 
concerning history are more than attempts to understand what 
happened as matters of fact, but to understand why general, 
metahistorical movements occur, and place them into the context of a 
more concrete framework.  He was not concerned, as Dermott Quinn 
writes, with “monographic miniaturism,” or particular periods, for 
his questions were metaphysical and concerned the pattern of history 
itself.116   In this way, Dawson’s historical imagination is at once 
empirical and humane, scientific and literary, factual and 
theological—and this is why he stands apart from his predecessors 
and contemporaries alike.   
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IV 
 Objections could be raised on several grounds—that Dawson’s 
sociological view of history is ultimately too theological, for 
example, and that his understanding of sociology is narrow and, to a 
degree, antiquated.  Furthermore, it can be argued that his 
dismissal of a historical metaphysics is contradicted by his own 
philosophical arguments in favor of metahistory, and that his 
Catholicism prevents him from directly answering certain claims 
about his own methodology and conclusions.117  These are broad 
criticisms that must be viewed in light of Dawson’s understanding of 
culture and its most basic elements.  To Harry Elmer Barnes, these 
criticisms are the product of “perfectionism,” and need little 
elucidation to convince even the most hardened skeptic of Dawson’s 
value as a historian.   
 For Dawson, civilizations were the ultimate social 
existence.118  When seen against the backdrop of a transcendent 
reality, they became complete social organisms and vibrant cultures 
as in the cases of India, China, Islam, and Europe.  The synergistic 
effect of this combined spiritual and social enterprise produced a 
cultural dynamic that the sociologist could not understand if he 
were to dismiss religious factors.  In Europe, which is poorly 
defined by terms of geography, religion plays an immense role in the 
cultural milieu, even in what Dawson considered to be a post-
Christian age.  The whole fabric of European culture is woven from 
various strands of the Christian faith, and at its most basic point, 
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from the universal, pre-Reformation Church.  Thus, to argue that a 
cultural understanding is too theological in its approach is to 
misunderstand the elements of culture in the first place, both in 
Europe and beyond.   
 It is unfair to argue that Dawson’s understanding of sociology 
is a dated understanding merely because it focuses on the central 
role of religion in culture.  Unmoved by pure quantitative analysis, 
Dawson’s vision of culture was a complex vision of material, 
religious, and psychological factors.  None of these alone, he 
argued, could account for the development of culture; accordingly, 
each one must be addressed if the accepted definition of culture, 
and the picture it produces, are not to be mere caricatures of the 
truth.  If Dawson can be accused of anything here, it is his 
selective choice of sources that do not clash with his methodology, 
but that selectivity is itself the product of a consistent vision of 
sociology’s limits and his own vision of that science.  “He takes 
culture in the anthropological sense of a people’s total pattern of 
living,” and this pattern is not exclusively found through 
statistics and data analysis.119  Dawson’s vision is illustrated by 
his understanding of the Enlightenment as a “complete divorce 
between the religious and the secular worlds,” with the most obvious 
breaks occurring in the sphere of education.120  This differentiation 
from and break with the traditional educational paradigm is as 
important as any economic data that could be “objectively” 
evaluated.  Arnold Toynbee sees this as the value of Dawson’s 
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approach, and often praised him for his reluctance to turn his 
studies into dogmatic apologetics or to reduce them to quantitative 
visions.121   
 Dawson’s defense of metahistory borders on the metaphysical, 
but it never subordinates history to philosophy.  In this way, there 
is no “philosophy of history,” because for Dawson, history’s 
ultimate reality is found in the intricate workings of a divine 
plan.122  Consequently, his vision is not philosophical, but 
theological; yet, this theology shows no hint of fundamentalism, for 
Dawson is a pluralist in the most liberal sense of the term.123  His 
vision is informed by theological insights, not composed by them.  
In this way, his sociological view is enhanced because it captures a 
more complete vision of social reality than if he were to 
concentrate exclusively upon material concerns.   
Dawson’s concerns were broad and the historian is sometimes 
liable to get lost in his cultural analysis.  As William McNeill 
notes, Dawson never wrote a book that dealt with an exclusive object 
of historical interest, and consequently will never be considered a 
historian in the same way as Spengler and Toynbee.124 Yet his 
interests were different in that they were not strictly concerned 
with details of the past—they were concentrated upon the larger 
historical workings that he believed were the causes of cultural 
development and social change.  In this way, and this is even 
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apparent to the Catholic thinker, Dawson is not a typical historian 
in the proper sense of the term.  Always disappointed that the 
Oxford dons did not enthusiastically receive him, he did, however, 
possess an immense body of historical knowledge that is communicated 
to his readers in all of his books.125  It is true that his limited 
use of notes and citations inhibits his students from going directly 
to his sources, and this failure to firmly establish matters of fact 
does require his readers to place a great deal of trust in his 
judgment.126  Dawson’s methods may never be fully accepted by 
professional historians, as it is almost impossible to build 
effective arguments upon “facts” that are largely unsubstantiated by 
careful references.  His arguments were never theoretical in that 
they always possessed a historical framework, and perhaps his 
overall mission was very different from that of the usual historian 
in that he was not out to recreate the past or to participate in the 
detailed research of the typical historian.  Dawson wanted to 
understand history itself as an intellectual project.  To 
incorporate a body of detailed historical works into his penetrating 
historiographical studies would have been a practical impossibility 
for any one man.  With this in mind, he had to assume that the 
reader already knew his facts so that he could concentrate his 
energies upon larger arguments.  He was rarely criticized for 
“assuming” things to be true, and the so-called “professionals” 
often praised him for his extensive, and accurate, understandings of 
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various disciplines.127  Dawson was rare in that he possessed a vast 
command of historical, sociological, anthropological, and 
archaeological knowledge that allowed him to incorporate disparate 
elements into a general setting, and to “sketch it, literally, from 
a fresh point of view.”128  Those who disagreed with him did so on 
matters of interpretation, not evidence.  As Sidney Painter argues, 
those already possessing a strong historical background most easily 
appreciate Dawson, while anyone unfamiliar with his subject matter 
would be forced to trust his evidence.129   
For instance, Everett Hughes argues that Dawson errs in his 
characterization of the psychoanalyst as one who too often mixes 
“his medical with his moral categories.”130  He does not contend that 
Dawson’s “facts” are incorrect, but that his perception and 
understanding of certain facts are misconstrued or intentionally 
skewed.  Hughes argues against the idea that no account of a 
person’s moral outlook is sufficient enough to draw conclusions 
about their historical significance.131  While Dawson does contend 
that morals are inextricably linked to the greater historical 
reality, he does not reduce history to a matter of moral judgment.  
Here it is the perception of facts, and not the facts themselves, 
that are the matter of contention.  One reviewer claims that 
Dawson’s knowledge is so vast and commanding that his subjects 
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became too big for their space.132  This was especially true with his 
Gifford Lectures, but the overarching weakness remains that his 
facts are often left unsubstantiated and the reader must place his 
faith in Dawson’s own erudition and research.  Dawson, not unaware 
of this problem, lamented that there did not exist a proper audience 
for his work—not one that was scholarly, per se, but well-educated 
enough to be “familiar with the older literature and with names like 
Andre Chenier who belong to literature rather than politics.”133 
Ironically, however, it is in this weakness that we can find 
Dawson’s strength as a historian.  His scholarship is unique in that 
it captured those movements of world history that would be lost if 
he were to strictly abide by the methods of the historical 
profession.  In his failure to both manufacture thorough notes and 
to produce parochial studies, Dawson succeeds in providing his 
readers with an understanding of history’s general principles.  In 
the Movement of World Revolution, Dawson articulates his wish to 
provide a universal history, not in the fashion of H.G. Wells, but 
in a way that shows the whole world to be a unity through the 
“diffusion of a civilization that first took shape in Western 
Europe.”134  Dawson’s historical imagination was imbued with the idea 
of capturing the essence of history’s dynamics, and to understand 
the intricacies of human affairs against the backdrop of a 
transcendent reality that found ultimate existence through an 
acceptance of certain theological norms.    
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Chapter Two: History and Progress 
I 
Dawson’s understanding of history was at once realistic and 
Christian, but it did not subscribe to the naïve assumption that the 
past is purely visible through its material achievements.  His 
engagement in a “triangular conversation” among history, sociology, 
and theology, did not permit him to view the past through an 
“objective” lens, nor through one that was completely Christian or 
Western.135  Dawson hoped to discover the “truths” of history by way 
of careful inquiry in which the imagination and the powers of the 
intellect would come together to form a unique synergy that was not 
purely scientific and not a mere literary exercise.  For Dawson, 
“the basis of all cultural achievements is some religious impulse 
and direction, often overlooked by scholars who concentrate too 
exclusively on economic and political factors in history.”136  
Dawson’s general view of history as a religious enterprise, however, 
is not enough because its ends are a matter of theological, not 
historical, belief.  In this, Dawson displays an almost Protestant 
understanding of Divine Providence and the mysterious nature of 
God’s relationship with the temporal world.  In this way, with 
Herbert Butterfield, Dawson understands the “contingent and 
unpredictable” nature of history, and that its real meaning is 
something different than any individual person could know.137 
The experienced historian will note striking similarities 
between the thinking of Dawson and his predecessor, Burke, 
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especially in their contemplation of progress as an institution of 
faith.  Burke was not the first statesman to understand the inherent 
dangers of “displacing theology by philosophy,” but he was the first 
in recent memory to conduct a sustained attack on philosophical 
liberalism that became an armed doctrine through its radical tone 
and voracious spirit.  But unlike Burke, Dawson’s historical realism 
prevented him from becoming a Christian apologist or a staunch 
defender of political conservatism.  He was aware of the 
“deficiencies to be found in various periods of Christian culture,” 
and he was mindful of the difficulties involved in restoring a 
previous, idealized age.138  While Dawson maintains that an “Augustan 
age” of Christian culture lay in the future, he offers no 
explanation of how to get there, and as a historian, he is conscious 
that he must refrain from doing so.   
Dawson, like Burke, questions liberalism as it was represented 
in eighteenth-century thought, and in the later arguments of the 
nineteenth-century social scientists, because of their limited scope 
and unscientific claims of objectivity.  The cult of the fact was 
the product of the unmitigated belief in the ability of man to 
transcend the boundaries of nature to understand the inner-workings 
of the universe through mathematical principle and rational inquiry.  
Facts, and nothing but methodically collected data were seen as 
valuable assets to both physical and social sciences.  For Dawson, 
however, history transcends the social sciences, and with Karl 
Popper, he recognizes that it is a discipline of an utterly 
different character from the physical sciences, although there are 
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some tenuous similarities.139  There was a trend, for several 
generations, to assume that fixed physical laws in nature would 
naturally mirror the perceived “laws” of history.  For Dawson and 
Popper, this was an improper analogy because history was the product 
of human actions, which, even under the direction of natural law and 
the workings of a consistent human nature, were still subject to 
psychological and other variables.   
The eighteenth-and-nineteenth-century ideas of progress and 
their development into a system of historicism in the social 
sciences is a primary concern of Dawson’s scholarship, although the 
foundations of these ideas are much deeper.  To the mature Dawson, 
the role of Erasmus as the founder of the liberal tradition was more 
central than he had ever supposed in his early career.  It is 
possible, Dawson argued, to trace a line of “intellectual descent” 
directly from Erasmus to the foundations of the Enlightenment.  This 
was just as true in both Protestant and Catholic thought, but was 
particularly telling for the Calvinists who regard him as their 
“spiritual ancestor.”140  For most of his time as a historian, 
however, he regarded both Bacon and Newton as the initial sparks of 
scientific, Enlightenment thought.  The sociological view of 
history, of which Dawson is a partisan, represents his interest in 
correcting the perceived “errors” in the subject that is paramount 
in any attempt to achieve genuine historical understanding.  The 
early-modern devotion to science, which became a secular creed, and 
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committed many of the same errors its alleged adherence to the 
doctrine of “objectivity” was supposed to eliminate, eventually 
collapsed, in Dawson’s evaluation, into an intolerant dogmatism 
complete with its own assertions and unfounded assumptions.  He set 
about setting the record straight and correcting these deficiencies, 
but he does not aim to destroy the scientific method or the idea of 
an objective reality.  In fact, the existence of an objective 
reality lies at the heart of his historical vision, and the use of 
science—in its proper context and within certain limits—remains 
paramount to a thorough historical inquiry.  It is this 
incorporation of science into history that prevents it from becoming 
a wholly literary endeavor.  Nevertheless, Dawson never looses sight 
of the idea that what we see in history is only a “partial and 
uncertain manifestation of the spiritual activity which is taking 
place at once below and above the level of historical study.”141   
Dawson understood progress as term describing movement, but a 
movement of a very specific type.  Unlike pure motion that can move 
forward, regress, or maintain stasis, progress entails a very 
specific meaning that attaches itself to advancement.  To Dawson the 
Catholic sociologist, progress is a function of how human beings 
order their lives toward God.  In the section that follows, there 
will be two overarching priorities: first, to explain Dawson’s ideas 
on the concept of progress; and second, to put Dawson’s ideas into 
context with other key thinkers on this subject and to question the 
logistical and theological implications of his understanding of this 
term.  Questions about the nature of progress will also be treated 
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in the last section, and Dawson’s attempts to understand them will 
be examined.  Of particular interest, is Dawson’s use of non-Western 
cultures to buttress his arguments in order to avoid the charge of 
possessing a provincial world-view.  
II 
 Dawson is interested in the idea of progress to the extent it 
involves cultural change.  He does not attempt to build a grand 
system of fixed laws by which to ascertain the direction of human 
history, nor does he wish to construct a grandiose scheme to 
understand history as a rational exercise in material advancement.  
To understand Dawson’s conception of progress, it is first necessary 
to grasp his understanding of the word culture as it relates to 
social life.  In Religion and Culture, Dawson begins the final 
chapter with a brief definition. Like T.S. Eliot, Dawson regards 
religious, and particularly spiritual, energy as the main source of 
cultural change.  Every social culture "is at once a material way of 
life and a spiritual order."142  The intersection of the spiritual 
and the temporal, such as in the case of the Incarnation, stands at 
the center of the reality of the human existence.  In his usual 
attempt to place a distance between himself and his subject, Dawson 
explicitly appeals to non-Christian cultures to make his argument.  
In the ancient civilizations of Egypt and China, as well as the 
Pueblo civilization in the Americas, the material and religious 
aspects of life are inextricably linked so that they form a single 
cultural organism based on this unity.  Every instance of social 
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interaction was based on a spiritual foundation to which all 
activity was directed.143  The architecture, traditions, laws, myths, 
and customs are all reflections of the divine spirit manifested in 
the temporal order.  Nevertheless, says Dawson, cultures of such a 
pure composition are relatively rare throughout the course of 
history.  Most cultures are a fusion of various sects, often coming 
together as the result of conquest.   
 The combination of disparate cultures is frequently the 
product of a variety of means.  First, some cultures migrate into 
new geographical surroundings and readapt to fit the environment 
into which they are attempting to integrate.  Dawson maintains that 
this is the simplest type of cultural change, but one of great 
importance.  The shaping of modern Europe is in large part a result 
of this type of migration.  The coming of Asiatic groups from the 
Steppe plains into India, and of inland groups moving to sea coasts 
provides for much of the movement of early peoples affecting the 
West in his own day.144 
 The second form of social movement arises through the meeting 
of two distinct cultures, often as the result of conquest or 
subjugation.  Sometimes the result of peaceful contact, this is the 
"most typical and important of all the causes of cultural change, 
since it sets up an organic process of fusion and change, which 
transforms both people and culture."145  This type of cultural change 
is marked by several initial centuries where there is an 
unmistakable clash of orthodoxies; however, this is followed by a 
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period of "intense cultural activity," where the union of the two 
cultures forms into a singular entity.  While this is a period of 
high achievement, it is also a time of serious unrest.  The 
violence, however, eventually calms and there is attained a stable 
equilibrium between the two cultures.146  Unlike Toynbee, Dawson does 
not believe that it is possible to study these cultures until their 
separate cultural components can be isolated.  The “higher 
civilizations” are usually the result of a combination of separate 
cultural factors, but although one of the pre-fusion cultures might 
possess a stronger character than its counterpart, it is not enough 
to dismiss the weaker “subculture as an internal proletariat,” which 
is, by definition, a class within a society and not a constituent 
“culture or sub-culture within a civilization.”147  Every advanced 
culture is a compound of varied elements.   
 Another way of achieving change comes through the 
transmutation of custom by way of adopting another culture's 
material elements.  Although Dawson sees this as a very 
"superficial" change, it is nevertheless one of immense importance.  
The spread of metals, weapons, and agricultural tools has provided 
the basis for many periods of cultural change.  This change, Dawson 
cautions, is not always the path to social progress, for it is often 
the road to confusion, social stagnation, and cultural decay.  "As a 
rule, to be progressive change must come from within."148 
 In some cases, a culture develops because of its adoption of 
new beliefs or practices that are not necessarily material in 
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character.  A change in a culture's view of reality may severely 
alter its operations and outlook.  This is the type of change that 
swept through the Arabian Peninsula during the time of Mohammed, and 
through the west during the evangelism of St. Paul in Rome and St. 
Columba in the Celtic regions.  Cultural transformation of this kind 
is more profoundly related to the intellectual and spiritual 
character of men, and thus more easily accomplishes change from 
inside the cultural organism. 
 The cultural achievements of new generations are built upon 
those of the past, and it is with extreme rarity that ideas based 
upon pure reason are successful in transforming the cultural outlook 
in a permanent way.  The greatest works of art and the most 
influential philosophical treatises, Dawson reminds us, are the 
result of a succession of past accomplishments upon which new 
innovations are built.  Reason provides the organizing force by 
which this process is accomplished, and the history of mankind is 
one continuous "process of integration, which, even though it seems 
to work irregularly, never ceases."149  The use of reason to 
comprehend an objective reality, therefore, is at the core of 
Dawson's understanding of cultural transformation.150  Our world is 
not a purposeless heap through which human beings must muddle in a 
meaningless existence.  Rather, it is through our ability to 
understand abstract concepts, as well as real objects in a temporal 
matrix, that we gather information to educate us about the 
intelligible order of the world.  This vision of reality allows us 
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to comprehend the ontological order, as opposed to a subjective 
world of pure illusion.  The increase in sophistication of the 
vision of reality directly corresponds to the vision of culture.  
Intellectual reflection on the basis of reality is key for 
understanding culture.  Thus, it is when man came to reflect upon 
reality that he started to become civilized.151  For primitive men, 
like moderns, this reality was the result of a spiritual outlook 
that shaped the whole understanding of the external world.  Dawson 
writes: 
Every religion embodies an attitude to life and a conception 
of reality, and any change in these brings with it a change in 
the whole character of the culture, as we have seen in the 
transformation of ancient civilization by Christianity, or the 
transformation of the society of Pagan Arabia by Islam.  Thus 
the prophet and the religious reformer, in whom a new view of 
life—a new revelation—becomes explicit, is perhaps the 
greatest of all agents of social change, even though he is 
himself the product of social causes and the vehicle of an 
ancient cultural tradition.152 
 
 For Dawson, advances in technology have made cultural 
isolation impossible; thus, he searches for an underlying unity that 
links the historical drama of various cultures into an 
understandable, coherent vision.  This is not an attempt to write a 
history of the world in the fashion of H.G. Wells or J.M. Roberts, 
but to understand the movement of world history as the product of 
some universal agent, and for Dawson, that bonding force is 
religion.153  In Christianity in East and West, Dawson makes the 
important observation that between antiquity and the end of the 
Reformation cultures were almost wholly identified by their 
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religious affiliation.  The four major world cultures of China, 
India, Islam, and Christendom were all the direct product of their 
spiritual identities.  It was not until the Reformation, and the 
birth of nationalism, that this began to change in any meaningful 
way.  For the pre-modern commentator, creed was identical with 
culture.  To leave one's religious tradition was to divorce oneself 
from the whole fabric of society.  "The Indian who ceased to observe 
the laws of caste and the worship of the gods and accepted the 
teaching of Mohammed ceased to be a Hindu and became a Moslem."  The 
same is true for the Moslem who converted to Christianity.  He not 
only abandoned his religious heritage, but he departed from his 
whole culture.154   
 By the end of the nineteenth-century, national identity had 
almost completely displaced religion as the primary source of 
culture.  This nationalism, of course, degenerated into various 
ideologies that would explode by the early-twentieth century.  
However, upon close inspection, the observer will notice distinct 
similarities among these various ideologies and religious impulses.  
The major difference, however, is the displacement of the spiritual 
by the material.  Ideology became a religion of its own, and thus in 
the modern world, a primary source of cultural energy.  For Dawson, 
this change does not pass without serious consequences.  T.S. Eliot 
offers the most poignant aphorism: If you do not worship God, and he 
is a jealous God, you may as well pay your respects to Stalin or 
Hitler.  Thus, to Dawson, the problem is not “just that of the 
triumph of materialism over spirituality, brutality over truth.”  
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Modern ideas about progress have brought a new crisis to the 
surface—the rise of a new social dynamic in which the community 
“aspires to be something more than the old state.”  This is 
totalitarianism—an ideology in which the individual is completely 
absorbed into the social fabric of his state and retains little, if 
any, identity of his own.155  The roots of this crisis are deep 
within the fabric of the Western tradition—a patrimony that is 
itself a developmental paradox.   
 Dawson’s hostile vision of totalitarianism is tempered by his 
sympathetic understanding of the human need for community.  The 
necessities man fails to fulfil in his spiritual life, Dawson 
believed, he will search to find in other places.  He has been 
accused of treating totalitarianism, especially if it is of a 
Catholic brand, with mild approbation because it is in line with his 
belief that religious unity is the primary need of culture.  Francis 
O’Malley even goes so far as to argue that Dawson has a strong 
respect for the “cultural unity accomplished by totalitarianism.”156  
While Dawson did believe in religious unity, he did not believe that 
political regimes were necessarily the proper manifestation of this 
unity.  In his view, a Catholic government is best, but only when it 
is serving the proper ends of society.  A Catholic government, and 
to a large extent a nominally Catholic society, must not be confused 
with the City of God.  O’Malley’s accusation is fair to the extent 
that he recognizes Dawson’s wish to unite Western culture under a 
single Christian umbrella, but he errs as a matter of degree and as 
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a matter of means.  O’Malley claims that this Catholic 
“totalitarianism” is not organic, and is thus contrary to Dawson’s 
own understanding of “internal” cultural change, but here he fails 
to identify any specific contradiction in Dawson’s thought.  Dawson 
worked for a reunification of the Christian people, but he did not, 
like O’Malley, confuse material and spiritual progress.  In Dawson’s 
view, a return to a universal Christendom is not an inorganic 
growth, but a correction presented to mend a past blunder on the 
part of all sides.  Dawson knew that totalitarianism was not 
compatible with the Church, for the triumph of a “Christian 
totalitarianism” could not be confused with the triumph of the 
Cross.  To him, true progress is progress of the spirit.157  
 Dawson claimed to be an heir to medieval English 
scholasticism—“a theological absolutism combined with philosophical 
relativism.”158  This is not a subscription to a hardened Catholic 
totalitarianism, but a metaphysical understanding that presupposes 
that things such as ideas and concepts, “like ethics and laws are 
relative to culture.”159  He did not believe that the Catholic 
scholar was shackled by his faith; rather, he is given the freedom 
to develop philosophically within the context of a transcendent 
reality.  Theological concepts, in this way, are separated from 
history and distinguished from philosophy.   
For Dawson, progress represents something beyond the empty 
abstraction of infinite human improvement advocated by liberal 
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thinkers from the time of the Enlightenment.  The “progress” of Abbé 
St Piérre, Rousseau, Condorcet, Voltaire, and Priestley, differs 
profoundly from the concept of progress envisioned by Dawson and his 
philosophical predecessors from the time of Burke.  The eighteenth-
century conception of progress was one of unlimited intellectual, 
moral, spiritual, and aesthetic improvement.  The triumph of reason 
over tradition, of individualism over the collective good of 
society, and the new over the ancient—these are the things against 
which Dawson makes a definitive stand.   
 Dawson's intellectual life was consumed by defending the idea 
of movement in history, but he eschewed what has become known as the 
"cult of Progress."  The similarities in thought between him and 
Burke are striking, especially when Burke's aphorism that change is 
the means of our preservation, is taken into account.  Dawson does 
not wholly condemn the idea of progress, but he puts it into a 
context that fits with the larger picture of human history.  With 
Burke, Dawson refuses to see progress as an abstract term 
representing a perpetual improvement of the human condition.160  Even 
the ancient Greeks, persuaded by Aristotle, understood that the idea 
of infinity precludes the ability to achieve any good, for if 
something is infinite, there can be no ordering from top to bottom, 
thus, there cannot exist a higher or lower.161 Unyielding faith in 
                                                 
160 Although Dawson admired Burke for his philosophical principles, his 
historical vision, and his treatment of the French Revolution, he remained 
skeptical of Burke’s everyday political judgment.  Burke’s organic conceptions 
of culture are prevalent in Dawson’s Beyond Politics and in Judgment of the 
Nations, but not in his practical politics.  He finds a similar, yet increased 
dissatisfaction with Lord Acton.  See John J. Mulloy, Record of Conversation 
with Dawson, 24 August 1953, Dawson MSS, University of Notre Dame, Box 1 of 1, 
Folder 2.   
161 Richard M. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1948), 51.   
 77
the idea of progress was in some ways a regressive metaphysical 
endeavor and bore the weight of inherent contradiction.   
 Originating as a coherent ideology in the late sixteenth-
century, the idea of progress has since captured and dominated 
culture from the time of the French Revolution through to the 
present.  Far more influential than a regional obsession, or an 
isolated intellectual movement, it has "permeated the whole mind of 
society from the leaders of thought down to the politicians and the 
men of business, who would be the first to proclaim their distrust 
of idealism and their hostility to abstract theorizing."162  For 
Dawson, progress has become the "working faith" of our civilization, 
and like all cultures, ours possesses a religion that dominates the 
entire outlook of its typical attitude—the religion of Progress.  
Dawson sees the rationalists’ doctrine of progress as having been 
driven by the idea that the human condition, and thus human society, 
is steadily improving toward some goal of temporal perfection.  The 
view promulgated by such thinkers is predicated upon a failure to 
“recognize the inseparability of Reason and Tradition.”  For Dawson, 
these two forces are dependent upon one another for their legitimacy 
and definition.  Without tradition, there can be no reason, and 
without reason, no perceptible recognition of tradition.163  It is 
ironic, Dawson argues, that the idealistic vision of unlimited human 
progress was championed, not by the historians who dealt with hard 
historical realities and the truths of an objective existence and 
                                                 
162 Dawson, Progress and Religion, 15. 
163 Christopher Dawson, “Memorandum: Dawson to Mulloy,” unpublished, 11 July 
1959, Dawson MSS, University of Notre Dame, Box 1, Folder 14. 
 78
tradition, but by sociologists and political philosophers.164  This 
inadequacy, Dawson held, cries out for the development of a more 
critical, and to a large degree, more sophisticated idea of 
progress.  
 To the Western thinker, Dawson argued, time is a very real 
concept that possesses a power to differentiate between ages.  
Unlike the Greeks and eastern thinkers (excepting certain Patristic 
Church fathers), Western man believes that time has an ultimate 
significance and meaning.  He is not lost in a cosmic cycle of 
rebirth or complete chaos.  There is meaning to his life, there is a 
point to his existence, and there is a reason for his ability to act 
without divine coercion.  This idea is centrally embodied in the 
Christian idea of history whereby the Incarnation of Christ marks a 
specific point in history from which all other events flow.  For the 
Western man, time, and by virtue of it, history, becomes the center 
of his ultimate reality.165  It seems as though the rationalist 
philosophers were at war with this conception of history for some 
time, and it was only with the rise of German historiography that it 
was re-secured in the Western intellect. 
 Dawson describes the German view of history as "musical rather 
than mathematical."  For the Germans, says Dawson, a culture is more 
than the artificial construction of separate persons living in a 
loose society.  It is a "spiritual unity for which and by which its 
members exist."166  For the German historian, especially in the wake 
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of Herder, civilization ceased to be the abstraction championed by 
the French philosophers, and instead, it became an organic entity 
with roots, traditions, and moral norms.167  It was with this 
movement that the medieval world was recognized as a period of 
intellectual and cultural growth, as opposed to the standard 
acceptance of it as a time of pure, in the view of Gibbon, barbarism 
and myth. 
 To Dawson, Spengler's thinking disguises a sinister 
subjectivism that undermines the concepts of moral Truth and 
objective cultural standards.  If each civilization is a self-
contained unit, constructed in a vacuum, then the standards of one 
culture must not be applicable to another.  If this is true, then 
culture is purely the product of racial circumstances.  Dawson 
believes that such a view of culture is untenable.  In an answer to 
Spengler's closed-circuit theory of cultural development, Dawson 
offers the examples of Aristotle and Mohammed.  While both of these 
figures were the product of their social circumstances, they 
transcended cultural and racial boundaries and achieved almost 
universal importance.168  
In order to explain the life of civilizations, it is not 
sufficient to possess a formula for the life-cycle of 
individual peoples, we must also understand the laws of 
cultural interaction and the causes of the rise and fall of 
the great cultural syncretisms, which seem to overshadow the 
destinies of individual peoples.  Considered from this point 
of view, the last stage of a culture, the phase to which Herr 
Spengler confines the name of "Civilizations," acquires 
peculiar importance.  It is not merely a negative period of 
petrification and death, as he describes it, it is the time 
when civilization if most open to external influence."169 
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One only need to look at the rise of both Oriental and Western 
societies to see their constant intermingling.  The rise of Eastern 
Christianity, as detailed in Dawson's Making of Europe, becomes a 
striking example of how cultures of a distinct flavor are not the 
result of a purely internal development.170  Gibbon is guilty of this 
cultural isolation in his treatment of the fall of Rome because he 
dismisses the rise of the Byzantine Empire as a mere footnote to the 
larger historical forces instead of treating it as an integrated 
part of cultural transmission and development.  Dawson writes that 
"while the Latin west was gradually sinking into chaos and 
barbarism, in the East the Empire not only survived but became the 
centre of a new movement of culture."171  It is easy for Gibbon to 
ignore the importance of the Byzantine world because he implicitly 
alleges, through his neglect, that it was not a culture of great 
political or economic achievement; rather, its accomplishments were 
primarily in the "sphere of religion."  Christianity was a world 
movement, transcending traditional cultures, and the spread of the 
"Good News" was not necessarily an empirically quantifiable 
entity.172 
 It is necessary, Dawson argues, for historians to cease 
justifying a "denial of the objective reality of cultural unity."  
Some of Spengler's critics would have us believe that history is 
nothing more than a blind, subjective movement, directing us toward 
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a singular universal culture.  In this way, historians attach labels 
to momentous events in the past and construct artificial periods as 
a method of explaining these events.  In his neo-Hegelianism, 
Collingwood for example, defines history as a vast, single, 
amorphous movement.  For Collingwood, materialism is a secondary 
part of the historical process and the movement of history is 
provided by a purely "spiritual movement of ideas."173  For Dawson, 
to embrace a completely material or spiritual view of history is to 
betray the goal of true understanding.  If history is an organic 
substance, then it must be something beyond a simple idea that is 
reducible to constituent elements.   
 In Dawson’s view, cultural progress—a phenomenon inextricably 
linked to its material conditions—is never the passive result of 
geography and climate.  The creative aspects of the human 
imagination, intermingled with the psychological and spiritual 
forces of religion, combine to form a dynamic that is inexplicable 
if expressed solely in empirical and material terms.  Buckle's 
attempt to rationalize history along the same lines as Comte, an 
endeavor evidenced by his assertion of the existence of universal 
laws in his History of Civilization in England, contradicts this 
principle held by Dawson.  Buckle deterministically holds that 
environmental factors, to the exclusion of most other causes, are 
the main reason for the development of the intellect of western man.  
Although Dawson would—in a sense—agree with Buckle's contention, 
which is similar to that of John Stuart Mill, that history should be 
studied from a scientific perspective, he would strongly disagree 
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with dismissal of free will as an agent of historical change.  For 
Buckle, both free will and predestination are metaphysical and 
theological presumptions that scientific evidence is incapable of 
proving.  Thus, history must move as the result of some 
quantifiable, or at least empirical, force that is universal to all 
cultures.174  This was all rubbish to Acton whose Catholicism 
contradicted such an eclectic view.  To Acton, as would be true of 
Dawson’s thought, Buckle treated men as machines and not as persons 
created in the image and likeness of God.  This allowed Buckle to 
group his subjects into bizarre categories that complicated any 
cultural understanding because of its artificial, abstract 
character.175     
A cornerstone of Dawson’s understanding of progress is the 
idea that morals are inextricably linked to the health of any 
culture.  Every society possesses a distinct code of behavior that 
is often linked to its religious heritage.  For the Jews, God's 
command to Noah at Sinai marked the consecration of a new Covenant, 
and the birth of a new order.  Russell Kirk argues that the 
Decalogue fulfilled a void in the ancient world.  The Commandments, 
far from being an oppressive regimen, freed the Israelites from a 
life of perpetual slavery in sin.  Citing Hesiod, Kirk declares that 
in a world ruled by Zeus, void of proper moral instruction, progress 
was impossible.  Order, being the first need of a dynamic culture, 
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was brought to the ancient world through the Mosaic law and the 
coming of the prophets.176   
 This description of the foundations of ancient morality in the 
Hebrew world fits precisely with Dawson's understanding of the 
intermingling of religion and social behavior.  In non-theistic 
cultures, it is possible to understand the code of ethics as a type 
of "discipline of salvation," which is a reconciliation of human 
events with the divine that governs the universe.  This, says 
Dawson, is the type of moral ordering found in Buddhism, Vedantism, 
and to an extent, Confucianism.  Furthermore, if the historian is 
inclined to look for systems of morality existing before the rise of 
the great world religions, the root of such order is almost always 
found in the primitive religions whose goal was to placate the 
vicious powers of the gods and "render them friendly."177 
 Dawson’s view holds that in a society where spirituality has 
been replaced with secular idealism, the progress of civilization 
and its relationship to morality changes into a different type of 
social environment.  While some persons adhere to the old faith, 
conserving the faith and standards of their ancestors, others follow 
a new system based on rationalism and "a new interpretation of 
reality."  There is, however, a third group that dominates the 
social spectrum, and this group follows a sort of moral pragmatism.  
Dawson maintains that this last group, characterized by its lust for 
financial gain and material comfort, adopts local tribal customs, 
and is potentially nationalistic to an extreme measure.  This 
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pragmatic moralist clings to certain ethical standards leftover from 
his ancient faith, but these tend to be almost universal rules of 
conduct and of extreme nature.  Among those near-universal 
principles of conduct, says Dawson, would be the idea that it is 
wrong to commit murder, steal, or engage in adultery.  This was the 
intellectual basis of the eighteenth-century rationalists who 
endeavored to create a perfect society based on abstract principles 
of natural right, displacing natural law because of its associations 
with religion.178  It was against this destruction of an organic 
religious patrimony, replaced with an ungrounded system of 
conceptual rights, to which Dawson directed much of his energy.   
 Far from being a moralist, Dawson did not hesitate to call his 
reader's attention to the triumphs and pitfalls of the past, and to 
the errors of modern technology.  As Russell Hittinger writes, 
"whereas the moralist will examine human choices one by one, 
focusing upon the particular act, the cultural historian is 
interested in cultural habits and institutions; for these trace out 
the actual and imaginative bounds of men and women as social 
beings."179  This was Dawson's task.  To study the parts of a culture 
in microform is the mistake of the modern historian.  Particularly, 
this is the error of those who discount the Middle Ages as a period 
of perpetual darkness.  The historian's task, says Dawson, is not to 
become an expert in an isolated field, but to embrace the whole of 
civilization in its totality so that it can be understood as a 
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living structure.  For Dawson, the Middle Ages represent the triumph 
of religion intermingling with social institutions.  The value of 
studying this aspect of our past, good and bad together, is 
incalculable to the discipline of history.180  Dawson does not judge 
the past, but he does not hesitate to judge those who make such a 
project their own private task. 
 So, against the scientific rationalism dominating the 
historical profession of his age, Dawson combated the "Gospel of 
Progress."  The nineteenth-century was undoubtedly the age of 
unbridled optimism.  Faith in God was replaced by a faith in man 
predicated upon the concept of almost universal benevolence.  By the 
close of Queen Victoria's reign, some began to express doubts in the 
coherence of this pseudo-religion, but, by 1914, no one except for 
the most partisan liberal, would argue that man does not possess a 
fully benign nature.  The Catholic belief in the fallibility of man—
the doctrine of original sin—became a very real part of everyday 
life throughout the early years of the twentieth century.  It is 
said that Pope Leo XIII had a dream in which one century would be a 
period of great bloodlust and unprecedented barbarism.  If he had 
lived another decade, the author of Rerum novarum would have 
witnessed the materialization of his nightmare in the first of its 
many forms.   
 The Great War destroyed the belief in the unyielding 
betterment of human society, but the foundations of this collapse 
can be traced to much earlier sources.  Aside from the flimsy 
grounds upon which the theory of progress is based, unforeseen world 
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events stood as barriers to accepting this secular religion de 
facto.  The French Revolution, with all of its violence and 
disorder, is a penetrating example of the raw selfishness and 
animalistic behavior intrinsic to the human being.  To Dawson, the 
intellectual forces behind the eruption of 1789 possessed an almost 
divine power, and it was this ability to seize the intellect and 
spirituality of the masses that caused it to become a powerful 
movement.  Revolutionaries, dogmatically armed and possessed of a 
frail human nature, massacred the ancient culture of France and 
maimed its Catholic tradition.  In many ways, the revolution was not 
merely a political or economic revolt, but a revolt against the 
Roman Church and its medieval patrimony. Moving away from the 
methodical learning of the Schoolmen, the elevation of state powers 
over those of the Church, and the growing faith in the 
perfectibility of the human condition—these are the most significant 
factors that contributed to the rebellion against Christendom, an 
event largely orchestrated by petty nobles and middle-class 
families.  Contempt for order, and hostility toward the religion 
that secured it, lay at the foundation of the revolutionary cause.  
In Dawson’s view, the material circumstances of pre-revolutionary 
France are only one aspect of the cause of revolt, as there were 
other important spiritual and psychological variables that need 
serious consideration as well.  This failure, he maintains, to view 
the events in late eighteenth-century France in terms of spiritual, 
as well as economic and political causes, has been a significant 
flaw in the corpus of historical literature since the time of the 
Revolution.   
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For Dawson, the material advances of civilization are only a 
part of the total picture, which if fragmented by the historian in 
his studies, will be a mere caricature of the truth.  In the case of 
the revolutionary spirit of Europe during the early-modern period, 
we see a transformation occurring that is not only material and 
social, but spiritual as well.181  The scientific advances of Newton 
were especially important to the modern observer, a stark contrast 
to the world emerging from the medieval order.  Nevertheless, these 
scientific discoveries were an integral part of the social culture 
from which they arose, for man is more than the sum of biology and 
logic.  Breaking down the constituent parts of nature's inner-
workings helped modern man to understand the world around him, but 
with his growing mastery of this world, he became more skeptical of 
the Church, spirituality, and God.   
 The empirical knowledge gained from scientific discovery 
caused a great revolt against the Christian understanding of the 
world.  Few historians capture this sentiment more than Edward 
Gibbon, the perpetual secularist and last of the true Romans, in a 
famous passage from his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.  For 
Gibbon, the miracles of the primitive Church, "after obtaining the 
sanction of the ages," had become the object of public ridicule.  
Gibbon saw the succession of bishops, popes, and saints, and the 
miracles often attached to them, as a chain that needed to be 
broken, so that "the progress of superstition," as he called it, 
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would be displaced by a skepticism brought about by rationality 
grounded in empirical thought.182      
 While the revolution that affected Europe during this time, 
beginning in the Renaissance and Reformation, was of political, 
scientific, and economic origin, none of these things, Dawson 
maintains, was the direct cause of the others.  Dawson argues that 
these were parallel movements rooted in the "organic process of 
change which has transformed western society and the western mind 
during the modern age."183  When we speak of Europe in the modern 
age, Dawson warns, we largely mean by that term a geographic region 
and attach to it a generic sense of civilization.  More 
realistically, however, if we are to understand the idea of progress 
in the West, it is necessary to understand what truly constitutes 
Europe in the cultural sense.184  Here is where Dawson's concept of 
Europe as an organic principle, most accurately depicted as a 
spiritual endeavor, similar to that of medieval Christendom, is 
placed into the structure of his historical scholarship.185   
 Dawson strongly believed that great civilizations must not 
concern themselves with social progress in the abstract, but 
instead, they must focus on the historical realities of the great 
persons who partake in the construction of its cultural 
achievements.  This is an assumption that is questioned by Werner 
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Stark when dealing with Dawson’s assertion that the Carolingian 
empire was destroyed as the result of the failure of Charlemagne’s 
heirs, when other important factors also come into account.186  In 
this case, the “great-man” conception of history is undermined by 
external circumstances such as the reduced threat of a Saracen 
invasion that no longer forced Europe into a defensive unity, 
leading to the demise of a centralized political authority.  The 
criticism, though valid to a degree, fails to understand the extent 
to which a ruler—or a peasant—can exert immeasurable influence over 
a culture.  If the Catholic view of history, as understood by 
Dawson, in which God can directly intervene in daily affairs is 
true, then God could use individual characters as vehicles of 
change.  These people are the “greats” who have an enormous impact 
on national, and on a deeper level, cultural development.  
"Culture is essentially a growth, and it is a whole.  It 
cannot be constructed artificially, nor can it be divided."187  
Cultures, Dawson maintains, are living organisms at every level of 
their material achievement, and at every level of their social 
dynamic.  It is because every culture produces its own type of men, 
as shown by its art, literature, and philosophy, that we can trace 
the decline of a particular civilization through its failure to live 
up to its own ends.  The art and literature of a culture are the 
expressions of that people.  They are not abstractions, but rather, 
they are integrated parts of a people living in communion with the 
organic culture.  "When the social tradition is broken," writes 
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Dawson, "when there is a deliberate choice of styles, as in a modern 
building contract, true style ceases—there is death."188 
 How, then, can a culture maintain any form of dynamism if 
deliberate change is a means to certain death?  The change must not 
be a deliberate, sudden break with the old system.  This change must 
have a direct relationship with the "internal vital development" of 
a culture, or it is not change, but the end of that culture.  A 
society is the sum of its changes, but when a change is sudden and 
“external,” that society ceases to exist, and a new culture emerges.  
This is the principal difference between the ideology of progress 
and organic cultural transformation.   
Dawson appeals to the "sudden blighting" of Hellenic 
civilization as an example.  Challenging Gilbert Murray's contention 
that the end of Hellenic culture was due to a "loss of nerve," 
Dawson argues that the causes are significantly deeper.  He writes: 
Hellenic civilization collapsed not by a failure of nerve but 
by the failure of life.  When Hellenic Science was in full 
flower, the life of the Hellenic world withered from below, 
and underneath the surface of brilliance of philosophy and 
literature the sources of the life of the people were drying 
up.189 
 
The spirit of the culture, while appearing to be alive with 
intellectual and scientific energy, was draining as a result of a 
devouring cosmopolitan that consumed that ancient people.  
Traditional institutions were debased, and a country life lived in 
conjunction with the ancient homeland was traded for a disconnected, 
new brand of urbanism.  Rome would suffer the same fate as its 
population became more distant from its cultural roots, tempted by 
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the appeal of city life and the material comforts such an existence 
offered.  Dawson's dislike of urban society is visible in his 
convincing arguments that culture needs to be in firm touch with its 
origins, none of which, in the panorama of the world’s major 
civilizations, is rooted in the city.  He does believe that ancient 
and medieval cities were a dynamic influence on culture, such as 
those of medieval England, but when they mutated principally into 
economic centers—as opposed to seats of religion—they became a 
cultural drain.190  Dawson’s perception that urban society fails to 
be a force of vibrancy and cultural renewal is the result, it seems, 
of their unique character as multicultural and materialist centers.  
A culture, by its definition, is something unified by its own 
nature, and cities, by their own definition, are the negation of 
such a unity.  This does not necessitate that cities must be centers 
of cultural decay, but they can hasten a culture’s demise at a much 
more expedient pace than a rural population.  Dawson’s own 
preference for rural life is tempered by his understanding of the 
limitations such a life entails.  His own relocation from the remote 
Hartlington Hall in Yorkshire to the Oxford suburbs as a matter of 
practicality demonstrates the extent to which cities are an 
important part of some cultures and their conservation, even to a 
country-dweller like Dawson.  Rome, as a republic and as an empire, 
could never have attained its greatness without the rise of a 
specific urban center that was eventually a factor in its own 
demise.  Dawson’s negative view of cities is tempered by a 
paradoxical knowledge that these places are necessary to cultural 
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development.191  In this way, he tacitly recognizes that cities have 
a role, much like change itself, in the preservation of culture, 
even though it is the character of urban society that is possibly 
culture’s greatest nemesis.  To this dilemma, Dawson gives no 
conclusive response except to sound a note of caution.  His view of 
urban life is one of uneasy acceptance. 
 It is often remarked that cities are the seat of a 
civilization's cultural assets, but for Dawson, such an idea is an 
optimistic assumption lacking in both intellectual merit and 
historical justification.  This is especially true when city life 
becomes synonymous with material culture.  It is possible, and 
history has shown it to be the repetitive paradox of apparently 
thriving cultures, those periods of intellectual progress and 
scientific expansion are often times of "vital decline."  A culture 
can appear vibrant and thriving on the outside, but if its inner-
dynamic is failing, little hope remains for its survival.  For 
Dawson, the "fate of the Hellenic world is a warning to us that the 
higher and the more intellectually advanced civilizations of the 
West may be inferior in point of survival value to the more 
rudimentary Oriental cultures."192   
 Dawson's role as a historian of culture requires that he do 
more than provide an historical framework to critique the 
shortcomings of progress.  After all, Dawson is very much among 
those historians who believe that their craft is only good insofar 
as it is done with a sense of duty to evaluate the past with a 
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dispassionate eye.  He sees that progress is the natural consequence 
of a culture that worships at the altar of rationalism, but this 
false deity is not the result of an unbridled liberalism, although 
liberalism is the vehicle by which the true culprit travels.  
Perhaps the most accurate depiction of Dawson's view of progress is 
captured in his indictment of technology, not as an abstract entity, 
but as an ideology that is the source of what C.S. Lewis called the 
"abolition of man."   
 In an essay on "The World Crisis and the English Tradition," 
Dawson maintains that there has never been a civilization that has 
been able to successfully "resist the destructive effect of urban 
and bureaucratic centralization."  For Dawson, cities are the "grave 
of culture," for they are not a part of man's organic growth, but 
instead, are artificial creations that are centers of materialism.193  
Few men, however, find complete satisfaction in ends which are 
achieved by complete self-indulgence.  The pure materialist is as 
uncommon as the pure mystic, because most men have some sense of a 
spiritual world beyond their immediate control, and more so, beyond 
their spectrum of knowledge.194  The confusion between tools which 
help man to achieve his proper ends as a human being, and the actual 
replacing of man with those tools, is much of what Dawson sees as 
the problem with the religion of progress.195 
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 While Dawson was intent on bruising liberal progressivism, he 
refused to fully condemn liberal institutions and hoped never to see 
the demise of the liberal tradition.  This tradition was, he 
maintained, an important part of the western patrimony, and not 
necessarily an enemy to it.  It is part of the West's organic 
heritage, but like technology, liberal ideology can be a vehicle of 
immense cultural destruction as easily as it can be the bearer of a 
rejuvenating spirit.  Liberalism should be, for Dawson, an 
expression of the older Christian humanist tradition, and not 
necessarily an enemy to the good order of a civilized people.  His 
hesitations about it are fed by his perception of the West being 
seduced by a ravenous zeal for technological advancement, and 
oftentimes, this advancement is in the form of a mechanization of 
the human spirit.  The attempt to find universal laws that govern 
human actions, as opposed to the Christian doctrine of Free Will, is 
the heart of the scientism that has become the creed of the 
modernity.  Faith in God has given way to faith in man's ability to 
overcome nature, to transcend the limits of our world, and to 
declare ourselves supreme over any empirically intangible force.   
 Under liberalism, God was questioned; in the scientifically 
planned, progressive society, the god became technology itself.  In 
the liberal world, God retained a place in the sphere of morals, but 
in modernity, the world finds it inconceivable that anything greater 
than its material-self can exist.  "The emphasis today," Dawson 
wrote in his 1947 Gifford Lectures, "is no longer on Western ideas 
but rather on the Western scientific techniques which provide the 
common framework of human existence and on the basis of which a new 
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scientific world civilization is being formed."196  Here it is the 
force of positive liberalism that allows the scientific spirit to 
triumph.  In an effort to create a universal understanding, the 
scientific tradition has created a banal, uniform world, in which 
moral progress and cultural stasis are confused, and the continuity 
of a dynamic culture is essentially defeated.  For the scientific 
order to claim victory, the traditional pillars of the Western order 
needed to be eliminated, sometimes by ideological force, other times 
by raw firepower, and often by a combination of the two.197  Dawson 
writes: 
The scientific revolution has been almost inseparable from 
movements of social and political revolution and with a far-
reaching secularization of social life which produces a new 
type of conflict between religion and culture.  We see a 
typical example of this in the Russian Revolution and the 
twenty years of acute anti-religious conflict which followed 
it, but this instance is far from being unique, since we see 
the same process at work in the French Revolution and in many 
of the European revolutions of the nineteenth century, as well 
as in the twentieth century revolutions in Turkey and China.  
The result of these tendencies has been to produce a wider, 
more intense and more complete secularization of culture than 
the world has ever known.198 
 
 To Dawson, the religion of progress now reigns supreme, and 
our culture, divorced from its organic faith, morals, and 
traditions, fades in meaning and in its ability to maintain order in 
the soul, and consequently, order in the commonwealth.  Progressive, 
scientific culture is "devoid of all positive spiritual content," 
and it possesses such a universal aim that it is no longer grounded 
in the western tradition, and is instead, a morally neutral force.199  
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Oftentimes, technological advances, divorced from the moral 
principles of western orthodoxy, become vehicles for mass executions 
and weapons of war, and not the panaceas envisioned by optimistic 
Utopians.  One only need to look at pre-1945 Japan, the former 
Soviet Union, and the advanced nuclear arsenals of third-world 
nations that fail to feed their own people, to see the inherent 
danger.  For Dawson, a culture based on technology is not a culture 
at all, as it has no basis in the spiritual foundations of society.  
There is, he says, a limit to the progress that science produces 
"detached from spiritual aims and moral values."200  Once this line 
is crossed, there is an unavoidable nihilism that is itself 
repugnant to the human spirit.  This is why the ordinary man is 
skeptical of wholesale progress, and must remain rooted in his 
organic past.201 
III 
 Dawson’s work elucidates both his support and skepticism of 
progress as a term of cultural significance.  This paradox is 
possible because Dawson sees the unique position the doctrine of 
progress occupies in the West, but he is careful not to succumb to 
the overwhelming temptation to place it center-stage.  Since the 
time of Abbe Saint-Pierre, the dynamism of Western culture has been 
rooted in the idea of a historical progress, but this concept is 
only a constituent element of the Western tradition, and the 
historical foundations of the West are much deeper than the 
ideologies that materialized in the seventeenth-century.  Dawson’s 
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conception of progress is made more lucid by seeing how he 
considered the shaping of Western culture from the time of the 
ancients to the present.   
 Christianity chastened the classical concept of historical 
repetition because history became an apocalyptic enterprise with the 
incarnation and crucifixion of Christ.  Although not universally 
accepted as the Messiah, Jesus of Nazareth nonetheless provides a 
center to history because of the immense impact his life had on the 
development of culture in both the East and West.  For the believer, 
however, this relationship between God and man, Heaven and earth, 
and time and eternity, attained special meaning with the coming of 
God who was at once human and divine.  The coming of Christianity is 
not the story of man’s fall—it is the story of man’s attempt to rise 
to the kingdom of heaven.  For Dawson, this means understanding our 
role in the temporal world, and our willingness to subordinate our 
own wills to the will of God. 
 Dawson does not believe the rationalist’s entirely secular 
vision to be a viable position, and as a consequence, the idea of 
progress becomes a formidable conundrum. Although religion was, for 
the thinkers of the Enlightenment, an unimportant, and indeed, a 
destructive force, their reaction to earlier ages shows a 
willingness to ignore the historical record in an effort to enact 
their dogmatic ideological systems.  The martyrdom of saints, the 
murders of young princes, regicide at the hands of fanatic mobs, and 
the countless wars between different peoples shows just how 
untenable the idea of progress as a law of constant succession truly 
is.  The philosophes, however, believed that progress was not a 
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linear or gradual progression, but rather, they conceived it as 
something that would be immediately thrust upon society in one 
instant.202  It was the enlightened philosopher, acting in the 
interests of the people, by which this progress would occur. 
 Dawson mounts a powerful defense against progressive 
historicism, but he fails to address Thomistic thought in any 
serious manner, and although Aquinas was not particularly concerned 
with history, his ideas on development are, nonetheless, entirely 
relevant.  Aquinas primarily appears in Dawson’s work as a 
historical figure, and not a commentator on history itself.203  
Dawson does not ignore Aquinas, but he is not a prominent fixture at 
any point in his work beyond matters of theology.204  Aquinas’s 
understanding of development, as an abstract idea that includes the 
material world, is that things in nature proceed from being simple 
to being complex.  In nature, those things that are most complex 
seem to be the most perfect and complete.  Thus, for Aquinas, the 
mind of man must proceed from the simple to the complex, and from 
the imperfect to the perfect.  This logic, it could be argued, 
justifies the Enlightenment idea of progress; however, upon close 
inspection, the opposite is true.  Aquinas’s “progress” is not a 
fixed-law, but a description of the value of things as measured by 
their satisfaction of certain ends.  To Aquinas, progress is a 
function of teleology, and for the human being, much of this 
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progress is tied to morality, and specifically for the Christian, to 
his relationship with God.  The language here must be understood in 
terms of Progress as an immutable law versus progress as something 
freely-chosen by men in search of morality and guided by something 
deeper than vanity.   
 Dawson conceived Thomistic thought to be an inadequate 
understanding of reality because of its abstract, unhistorical 
nature—a worldview at odds with his own.  His differences with 
Jacques Maritain are largely concerned with educational reforms that 
place Thomistic thought at the center of undergraduate education, 
while Dawson wanted to introduce a specific type of “great-books” 
program that included a wide-range of classical, as well as 
religious texts, to spark an almost devotional, rather than 
intellectual, interest among his students.205  Through such methods, 
Dawson believed, students would come to understand the unity of 
society—Western and non-Western—through experiencing the vibrancy of 
an actual culture.206  To Aquinas and the high-medieval thinkers, 
truth was “encapsulated in particular forms once and for all,” while 
Dawson, as a historian, “was interested in tracing its changing 
embodiments over time.”207  Such a view shapes Dawson’s conception of 
progress as mystery that will only be revealed at the end of time.  
Dawson did not believe, it must be observed, that a fundamental 
contradiction existed between Thomism and the cultural view of 
history.208  Accordingly, “the importance of secular history 
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decreases in direct proportion to the intensity of man’s concern 
with God and himself.”209  In this understanding of history, progress 
becomes distinct from any conception of secular idealism and is only 
measurable in relation to God, and its ends are found in the 
eternal.  To Dawson, John Dewey missed the point in his 
understanding of progress as a steady march toward democracy.  While 
Dewey and the pragmatists were very skeptical of teleological 
thinking, they believed that society would ultimately prevail as a 
sort of unified intellect in which all minds would pool 
intelligence, and thus, create the ideal, “democratic mind.”210  In 
Dawson’s vision, these views were a misunderstanding of ends.  He 
long believed that Aquinas’s metaphysical emphasis did much to 
damage the Hebrew understanding of history that is so fundamental to 
Christianity, and using the “historiographical tools that Augustine 
himself completely lacked, Dawson brings the theme of the two cities 
into the midst of contemporary historical understanding.”211 
To Enlightenment thinkers and their heirs, Dawson believed, 
progress was not a moral term, but in this he is somewhat imprecise, 
and the criticism needs elucidation.  Philosophers such as Condorcet 
surely believed their actions to possess a moral end, but for 
Dawson, these ends were not founded upon anything more than 
theoretical ideas of right and wrong.  Without an informing guide, 
these principles became the dogmatic teachings of a religion founded 
upon abstraction and self-righteousness.  No matter how unaffected 
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by a “higher authority” these moral ideals may have been, the 
progressives nevertheless believed that they were advancing humanity 
and an objectively rational standard of living.  Dawson’s 
understanding of morals as something intimately connected to a 
religious heritage makes it impossible for him to accept the idea of 
a “rationalist morality,” and this accounts for his lack of clarity 
in this instance.  His general point that religion and morality are 
closely bound, however, remains unharmed by admitting that the 
rationalists may have believed their actions to be aimed at a 
supposed standard of moral excellence. 
It can be argued, of course, that progress is a natural, even 
inevitable part of human affairs.  Thomas More’s Utopia possesses 
this spirit, and although it is sometimes read as a treatise on the 
development of society, it is probably more accurate to view it as a 
reflection on the development of the soul.212  Either way, at the 
very least, it forces us to draw a distinction between two types of 
progress: material and spiritual.  Spiritual progress is unique 
because it cannot be quantified, nor can it be equated with 
“progressive” as an adjective of social improvement.  Spiritual 
progress, then, becomes the cultivation of the soul and its 
relationship with God.  Of course, this type of progress becomes 
manifested in a variety of social circumstances, but it is not an 
abstract moral system like the ones advocated by philosophers such 
as Adam Smith and David Ricardo.213  For Dawson, however, some of the 
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most significant achievements in human history were the product of 
material failure, and some of the greatest long-term failures have 
been the result of immediate material success.  Dawson’s 
understanding of the limits of progress are informed by this spirit 
of the limits of the corporeal world as something by which 
metahistorical judgements are not easily rendered.  In this light, 
progress becomes a term devoid of almost any meaning because of its 
abstract nature.  Progress is limited, not just in the strict sense 
of its describing forward momentum, but in its application to 
different circumstances as well.   
Defining the limits of progress is a principal task of 
Dawson’s because progress has become the foundation of secular 
thought that diminishes the unifying bonds of culture.  The decline 
of spirituality, coupled with a rise of materialism from the end of 
the Middle Ages, is a function of the idea of progress as a temporal 
project that is disconnected from the higher realities of the 
universe.  In Dawson’s view, and it is a fairly logical one, such an 
understanding reduces historical explanations to an isolated 
caricature of half-truths.  If history is something that grapples to 
understand man’s existence, it cannot simply discount his spiritual 
beliefs, nor can it displace the influence of his religious 
character on the development of morality.   
 The limits of progress became increasingly pronounced in the 
early-nineteenth century when the very concept of progress as a law 
of history was challenged by sombre social circumstances, a 
realization of the horrors produced by the Reign of Terror, and the 
rise of Napoleon.  Skeptics of progress, nevertheless, did not 
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completely abandon faith in the old system, but they began to 
understand that progress was not necessarily something that occurred 
as the passive product of time’s progression.  Chateaubriand’s 
observation that when men lose their faith in God they begin to have 
political doubts becomes exceptionally clear around the turn of the 
nineteenth-century when he wrote his Essay on Revolutions, and this 
reflects the widespread doubts expressed by an entire generation 
raised in the wake of almost unprecedented civil unrest since the 
fall of Rome.214   
The scientific spirit that Dawson lauds in his essays on 
sociology and anthropology provides an almost paradoxical view of 
the social sciences and their impact on history.  Buckle's approach 
differs from Dawson's methodology in that Dawson demands the 
presence of free will in his analysis, and as a Catholic, 
predestination is seen as a theological conundrum that is both 
unsubstantiated by logic, and incompatible with the Roman conception 
of Christology.  Dawson does not accept the idea that history is 
trapped in a cycle, bound to a restrictive process, and devoid of 
any means of escape.  Nevertheless, in his attempt to build a 
"realist" view of history, Dawson finds certain recurring qualities 
in the dynamics of world history that leads him to subscribe to a 
form of metahistory, of which religion is the keystone.  Unlike C.S. 
Lewis, who calls the philosophy of history a "pseudo-science," 
Dawson, understands history as a discipline containing a certain 
degree of universality. 
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Martin D'Arcy conceives Lewis's position to be that there are 
many legitimate objects that the historian can study, but that when 
he attempts to systematize a universal dynamic process by virtue of 
natural powers, or to discover an "inner meaning in the historical 
process," he becomes a historicist.215  The attempt to receive from 
history conclusions that are not historical, and are many times 
abstract models, is an error of historicism in Lewis’s sense of the 
term (which also resembles Popper’s).  Lewis's inaugural lecture at 
Cambridge, De Descriptione Temporum was largely an attack on 
historicism.  He even goes so far as to call himself a "desperate 
skeptic," and decries the ability to know whether or not "the human 
tragi-comedy is now in Act I or Act V, whether our present disorders 
are those of infancy or old age."216  His view of the limits of 
history is an indictment of the looseness with which the modern 
historian, and most notably those employing methods of 
quantification and "facts," construct grandiose theories, which are, 
after all, mere conjecture.  This is the primary objection Dawson 
has to the way sociological research is conducted today.  
Understanding fully that man is an active participant in history, 
with Herbert Butterfield, Lewis frowns upon the arrogance of 
historians who try to stand on a pedestal and view the entire past 
from their modern positions of relative comfort.  Lewis writes: 
Between different ages there is no impartial judge on earth, 
for no one stands outside the historical process; and, of 
course, no one is so completely enslaved to it as those who 
take our own age to be not one more period but a final and 
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permanent platform from which we can see all other ages 
objectively.217  
 
This does not indicate that Lewis wants historians to give up the 
conversation about historical understanding; ultimately, he is 
arguing against the presupposition that a priori historical 
arguments can be made, and furthermore, he denounces the idea that 
grand, dogmatic generalizations about trends in history are the 
proper subject of the historian.  D'Arcy objected to this notion, 
and Dawson would probably have agreed with him, on several grounds.  
Although Dawson questions whether there is indeed such a thing as 
the "philosophy of history," he gives the existence of historical 
theory more credit than Lewis. Dawson and Lewis agree that there is 
something deeper in history than the mundane facts that could be 
found in a chronicle, but they differ in degree to the extent to 
which each conceives history as containing larger truths.  Lewis’s 
mildly-positivist position is simpler in that he denies that we can 
derive from history any sense of understanding of the inner-workings 
of human affairs.  Dawson’s understanding of the historical 
character of Christianity, however, forces him to accept a more 
sophisticated, metahistorical view.  Lewis broadly accuses anyone 
who attempts to find meaning in history of being a historicist, but 
in Dawson, there is an equilibrium, which allows for truths to be 
uncovered, while not creating a sense of inevitability, circularity, 
or inescapable pattern.  To some degree, Lewis followed Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Herbert Butterfield, who, on Christian grounds, believed 
that history is too complex and unique to be understood through even 
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the “profoundest philosophies of history.”218  Niebuhr, however, 
sides with Dawson on this matter because he does not reduce 
historical understanding to a function of metaphysics, and thus, 
believes in the viability of a “theology of history.”  For 
Butterfield, sounding much like Dawson, the “understanding of the 
past is not so easy as it is sometimes made to appear.”219  D'Arcy 
warns, in agreement with Dawson, that failing to look beyond the 
facts of history to find an inner meaning might lead the historian 
down the path of positivism.220  Karl Popper's insistence that 
history remain free of philosophical questions is laden with such 
implications.221    
If the positivism of Popper and his school is a valid lens by 
which to view the past, then it is impossible, D'Arcy maintains, to 
include religious or moral judgments as a valid part of historical 
inquiry.  If religion and morals are a part of history, a point 
thoroughly argued by Dawson, then it is impossible to adopt this 
view.  St. Augustine, who fits Lewis's definition of a historicist 
because of his conclusion that Rome "suffered the fate it deserves 
because of its failure in morals," bases his arguments on exactly 
the type of evidence that would exclude him from the label of 
historicist, chiefly, those arising from religion and ethics.222  
Again, morality becomes the cornerstone of historical understanding 
and a foundational element of progress in its most positive sense.   
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 The changing face of the temporal order is only apparently due 
to mechanical, universal forces in Dawson’s worldview.  Although it 
may seem as if change, and indeed material progress, is sometimes 
inevitable, these changes are in fact the result of both human 
creativity and anonymous forces. 
This vast transformation of human life is not due to external 
causes, although it may seem as universal and impersonal as 
the forces of nature.  It is a result of the creative activity 
of the human minds and wills: not of human mind in the 
abstract, but of the mind and will of concrete personalities 
living in a definite social environment and working in and 
through a definite historical tradition.  For this world 
revolution, universal as it is in its effects, is not 
universal in its origins.  It has its source in a particular 
society and a particular civilization and it has spread 
outward from this centre by cultural expansion and diffusion 
instead of by a process of independent parallel development 
according to the old evolutionary conception of the law of 
Progress.223 
 
 While the revolution that affected Europe during the late 
eighteenth-century, with roots in both the Renaissance and 
Reformation, was of political, scientific, and economic origin, none 
of these things was the direct cause of the others.  Dawson argues 
that these were parallel movements rooted in the "organic process of 
change which has transformed western society and the western mind 
during the modern age."224  When we speak of Europe in the modern 
age, Dawson warns, we largely mean by that term a geographic region 
and attach to it a generic sense of civilization.  More 
realistically, however, if we are to understand the idea of progress 
in the west, it is necessary to understand what truly constitutes 
Europe in the cultural sense.225  Here is where Dawson's concept of 
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Europe as an organic principle is placed into the structure of his 
historical scholarship.226   
Turning again to the commentary of Russell Hittinger, it 
becomes clear that liberalism is not the problem Dawson has with 
modernity.227  In fact, it is fairly obvious that the liberalism of 
Burke, Smith, Tocqueville, Macaulay, Acton, and Dawson is not a 
betrayal of western orthodoxy, but a reaffirmation of it through a 
program of reconciling the organic culture with the new energy 
required to keep it from stagnating. Although the liberal tradition—
which in Dawson's view only reigned triumphant for a little over a 
century—can be a devouring conflagration, it is not the root of 
cultural demise.228  It is the planned society which seeks to achieve 
its ends by means of a steadily advancing technological apparatus 
that threatens the stability of culture.229  Here, Dawson fits well 
with other contemporary critics of modernity such as F.A. Hayek, and 
even more strikingly, Wilhelm Roepke, whose A Humane Economy is a 
warning against this type of cultural organization.230  The 
industrial world of Eliot's Wasteland, planned, mechanical, 
emotionless, and self-serving, is what the techno-obsessed society 
must expect.  As Professor Hittinger warns, however, we must not be 
quick to judge all technology as the path to our eminent doom.  It 
isn't necessary for the Catholic thinker to throw away his microwave 
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along with contraceptives.231  The crux of any technological dilemma 
is the way in which our new methods and tools are employed.  Here 
enters the role of morality in cultural progress. 
 While Hittinger is well-grounded in arguing that Dawson's 
primary concern is the bourgeoning faith in material progress as it 
is expressed in an ideology of technology, we must approach such an 
understanding with considerable caution.  Technology is a constant 
problem for traditional orthodoxy, no matter the level of its 
sophistication, because it often bursts onto the cultural scene with 
immense power.  Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
shows how advances in technology often mean a shift in the 
paradigmatic structure of an established society.232  Nevertheless, 
it is Dawson's view that culture is an organic unity, firmly planted 
in the soil of a primeval way of life.  When the paradigm shifts, as 
Kuhn maintains it does, then culture, as Dawson understands it, 
dies.  Although technology is given a means of empowerment through 
liberalism, it is necessary to see the corrosive effects—culturally—
of a liberal system.  
 Dawson’s conception of progress is ultimately a pessimistic 
understanding because it is often conceived as being exclusively 
material.  To Dawson, Progress is an illegitimate, secular religion 
that is based on neither spiritual nor qualitative factors, but is 
instead an abstract ideology grounded in a techno-scientific view of 
history, which is itself grounded in rationalist ideas first given 
complete expression in the seventeenth- century.  Dawson, with 
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Pegúy, argues that the passing of a religion—and this includes its 
replacement with a secular ideology—“is not a sign of progress, but 
a token of social decay.”233  The spiritual dynamics of a culture 
are, in Dawson’s view, the cornerstone of a healthy social order—for 
we cannot expect to possess order in the commonwealth if we lack 
order in the soul.  
 Dawson’s importance as a historian is linked to his defense of 
religion as the driving force of history.  When the spirituality of 
a culture erodes to the point that it is an empty representation of 
its former self, that culture necessarily becomes something 
different from what it was when it possessed an active spiritual 
life.234  While some of the material facts of Dawson’s scholarship 
have been adjusted with the findings of new research, his main 
thesis has found some support by the same methods.  As Gerald 
Russello writes: 
Dawson’s insights into the importance of religion in the 
history of culture have been vindicated by recent empirical 
research, which has largely refuted the “secularisation” 
thesis of social theory.  The contemporary value of Dawson’s 
work lies in his recognition of the continuing importance and 
influence of the religious impulse in the postmodern age, and 
its enduring ability to shape culture, even when diverted into 
what Dawson saw as pseudo-religions, such as consumerism.235 
 
Akin to the materialists’ consumerism, progress became, for Dawson, 
the genuine spiritual dynamic of culture led by false prophets, and 
fed by false hope.  Thus, for Dawson, progress as an ideology 
represents the decline of culture, and that position alone justifies 
his claim that progress is an inarticulate abstraction—although 
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seemingly benign—that carries heavy cultural burdens and 
questionable intellectual merit.   
  The question has been raised whether Dawson’s view of history 
is cyclical as a result of his rejection of indiscriminate 
progressivism.  The conspicuous trend of turning away from linear 
conceptions of progress that were made popular by Comte and Spencer 
has resulted in a “re-emergence of cyclical and ‘tirelessly 
undulating’ theories of cultural dynamics.”236  Although Dawson 
believed that cultures go through periods of growth, progress, and 
maturity, he did not adhere to any specific, wholesale theory of 
cycles.  He did believe that there was a cyclical aspect to culture, 
but he readily admitted that the scientific knowledge of such cycles 
remained unknown.237  His belief was that many cultures go through 
similar stages of development because of certain constants in human 
nature and in environment.   
 Furthermore, it must be asked whether or not Dawson 
understands the traditional problems of history since the time of 
Augustine: progress, conceptions of time, human nature, and divine 
judgment.238  Those who would accuse Dawson of being antiquated in 
method and in scope fail to acknowledge that he, like Augustine, is 
concerned not just with the “why” of history, but with the “when” 
and “how.”239  He combines the qualities of a medieval chronicler 
with those of a scrupulous, modern historian.  This, combined with 
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his carefully articulated cyclical view, brings another question to 
the surface: is Dawson an eschatological thinker? 
 This is perhaps the most crucial question regarding his 
understanding of progress if it is to be considered as a spiritual 
endeavor.  To Dawson, with his spiritually vibrant character and 
morally cognizant mind, progress cannot be measured in material 
terms—thus, in his view, the scientific method is useless to 
determine whether or not something is ultimately “progressive.”  
Progress as an ideology, though, is not so easily dismissed.  
Dawson’s thinking is teleological, but it is not historicist—his 
ends are not of this world, but they provide meaning and context for 
it.  The Christian view of history, and consequently of progress, is 
concerned with the “contemplation of the divine interposition in 
time,” and is supernatural in character.240  The Christian view—
similarly to the traditional humanist—is super-ideological in 
character, and is thus a creator, not a product, of ideology.241  
Empirical measures of cultural advance, Dawson held, were not always 
adequate scales of genuine cultural progress; consequently, much of 
what is considered “progressive” hinges on theological assumptions 
and spiritual belief.  Dawson hopes for the triumph of a spiritual 
culture over one that is material, but this temporal creation is not 
the City of God, nor is it a re-emergence of Christ’s presence in 
this world.242  Catholic theology holds that Christ is eternally 
present, for He is—according to the Council of Nicea—“begotten, not 
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made,” and “one in being with the Father.”  Thus, Christ is not 
“created,” nor is his presence ever absent from this world.  
Dawson’s understanding is markedly Catholic in that he views history 
as an eternal “becoming” in partnership with God, and not as a 
perpetual anticipation for the arrival of the “end of history” and a 
re-entering of Christ into time.  For Dawson, progress is movement 
toward ultimate perfection and a conscious choice to live in God’s 
love.   
 Dawson’s conception of progress is limited by its intensely 
theological nature, but it is simultaneously given depth by its 
spiritual character.  In this vision, progress cannot be divorced 
from the transcendent, ultimate reality that has God as its center.  
Like history, with its strange corridors and twisted paths, progress 
in the material sense has no truly objective spirit; thus, progress 
must be viewed in terms of an overall cultural framework that 
includes material, spiritual, psychological, and environmental 
factors—this was Dawson’s sophisticated understanding.  His vision 
of progress as something that cannot be isolated from the various 
facets of culture is a testament to his universality and pluralistic 
historical vision.  
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Chapter Three: Christianity, Catholicism, and History 
I 
To the Christian, and particularly the Catholic, history 
entails a much more sophisticated nature than that of cause and 
effect empiricism or the scientific positivism practiced by pure 
rationalists.  Thus, the Christian scholar considers historicism of 
any form as an invalid attempt to foresee the will of God, but his 
vision remains plural and open.243 
 For Dawson, history was the product of free will interacting 
with the will of God.  Man is not the slave of his time and place, 
but the master and creator of his environment through a dynamic, 
creative process powered by the imagination.  History does not 
repeat itself, for it grows, Dawson believed—in the tradition of 
Augustine and Origen of Alexandria—into an organic whole that 
parallels the human experience.  The past is constantly incorporated 
into the present, and although he commits himself to a major 
theoretical assumption in believing this, Dawson argued that it is 
this compilation of human experience that produces a cultural 
dynamic of either a progressive or regressive character.  Some would 
claim that Dawson is unjustified in his belief that the present is a 
combination of past events, but to him, this is the only reasonable 
way by which to understand the development of human affairs in an 
organized, empirical, and coherent vision.  This stems from his 
unflinching belief in the doctrine of Free Will and the consequent 
effects freely-chosen, past actions have on the future.  For him, 
the mechanization of the modern state was a breach with this 
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fundamental aspect of human nature and an example of the type of 
products such a denial entails.244  Like his vision of progress, 
Dawson sees in the present the distinct fingerprints of the past.  
Take Dawson’s definition of Europe: 
What is Europe? Not a geographical expansion, not a racial 
unity, but a spiritual community. It is a dynamic tradition of 
thought and life which has been transmitted from people to 
people from land to land through the ages for nearly 3000 
years. It began almost outside geographical Europe in both 
sides of the Aegean and then it has passed slowly westward and 
northward, until finally it passed the ocean and became the 
organizing principle of a new work. Europe has never been a 
static self-sufficient unitary culture like the great 
civilizations of the ancient east. Multiplicity and change are 
its essence. The oriental civilizations have been like 
pyramids standing powerfully and heavily in the same 
foundations, seemingly built for eternity but slowly eaten by 
the erosion of time. But the West is always building afresh in 
new foundations, and changing its form and content in every 
age, yet for all that preserving spiritual continuity.245 
 
The vision of Europe as a spiritual community is the fundamental 
structure by which any measure of progress must be measured in the 
West—essentially, for Dawson, there must exist some degree of 
context.  The question of progress, then, becomes teleological: to 
what degree is European, and indeed, Western culture fulfilling its 
spiritual ends?  Additionally, progress must be seen in light of the 
objects of spiritual devotion, for it is necessary to draw 
distinctions between a faith in God and faith in man-made 
ideologies.  Dawson, it must be noted, did not believe that we 
should concentrate exclusively upon Christian culture, although such 
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a concentration was necessary if any understanding of the West was 
to be attempted.246       
 The essence of Catholic historical thinking is captured by its 
theological approach to understanding time and eternity.  This 
theological viewpoint obviates the need for an abstract “philosophy 
of history” such as those propounded by the scientific rationalists 
or the nineteenth-century Idealists.  Theological explanations, it 
might be objected, lack the intellectual grit needed to form a 
thorough historical understanding—or at least as complete an 
understanding as this mysterious world allows.  The insistence that 
philosophical explanations—or even more vapid, scientific 
explanations—compose the corpus of thought on this subject reflects 
the secular character of modern culture, but does not, although it 
is its intention, pose a threat to the credibility of theology as a 
valid process of understanding.  To the believing Christian, 
something special happened to history when Christ entered the world 
as a living, breathing man.  His crucifixion at Golgotha signifies 
an almost unimaginable shift in human affairs for the believer and 
non-believer alike.  In Christ, God entered time—not as an abstract 
spirit—but as a physical man.  In doing so, there is a convergence 
of time and eternity.  Because Christ is God, and is begotten not 
made, he is eternal and thus eternality entered into temporal 
existence at the moment of His incarnation.247  Consequently, the 
question of Christ’s standing in history cannot be separated from 
His relationship to the present physical reality and the people in 
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it.248  In Christ, history is not given meaning, but Christ is shown 
to be “history Himself”—this is Dawson’s historical norm.249   
 St. Paul’s observation that love is the center of Christ’s 
mission is at the crux of the Christian vision of history, and this, 
along with faith and hope, cannot be divided into temporal and non-
temporal virtues.250    The theology of time, the basis of temporal 
context, is “determined as to its content by faith, hope and 
love.”251  Thus, mans’ time is subordinated to, and contained within, 
Christ’s time which is eternal and without human measure.  In 
Christ’s eternal reign with the Father, the love of the Son is alive 
in the daily affairs of men—it is not merely contained in the first-
century person of Christ.  Accordingly, the Christ of God’s 
affection existed forever and always, and was not a mere creation in 
time.  Balthasar elegantly explains his view: 
Only a genuine theology of time, gained from the contemplation 
of Christ’s existence, can provide a sound concept of 
eternity, consistent with revelation, as a basis for the very 
ground of Christian existence, which is believing and hoping 
love.  If we think in terms of escaping from time, faith and 
hope will necessarily be reduced to preliminaries belonging to 
this world.  But that is an attack on the basic phenomenon of 
Christian existence: the perfect openness of Christ to every 
word which comes from the mouth of God and, since the Son 
himself is the Word, openness to himself only in openness to 
the Father.252   
 
Christ’s death on the Cross represents his submission to the Father 
as the master of his this-world existence, and in doing so, he shows 
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that He must speak to the Father and not to Himself.  The eternal is 
embodied in the temporal through Christ’s incarnation, and the 
ultimate meaning of history, for the Christian, is embodied in God 
entering time.  God the Son changed the course of history by shaping 
it instead of being formed by it.  Every experience, every event, 
and every person—before and after Christ walked the earth—is given 
significance through His begotten nature.   
 The coming of Christ into history forever altered the path of 
human affairs.  From the time of the Incarnation forward, humans 
lost the ability to possess a naïve realization of time, for in 
Christ’s life and death, time was consecrated as the embodiment of 
selfless, perfect love.  In the eternal life of Christ, God is 
reborn, suffers death, and is resurrected every day.  All of the 
contemplations about sociology and progress, economics and politics: 
these are of mere secondary importance because they are constituent 
elements of the historical “norm” that has Christ at its center.  
Although Dawson is quite right, and well grounded, in his refusal to 
quit the traditional techniques of historical scholarship, he knew 
the focal point of history was not found exclusively in empirical 
facts.  Dawson did not believe that every secular historian was 
guilty of misunderstanding—or even worse—distorting the past, 
through inadequate methods; rather, he believed that their questions 
regarding history were inadequate because of a failure to understand 
the true nature of reality—a transcendent reality based on God.  He 
understood that secular thinkers possessed their own methods, 
theories, questions, and approaches, but he found them to be empty 
of any enduring value. 
 119
 This chapter will examine Dawson’s view of Christianity, and 
especially Catholicism, and its unique relationship to history.  
Dawson’s traditional understanding of a “theology of history” is a 
sophisticated view of the past that challenges the more mechanistic 
“philosophies of history” that have been developed since the 
collapse of Christendom both before and after the Reformation.  
Additionally, the question as to whether Dawson should be considered 
primarily as a historian or as a Catholic polemicist is further 
examined.   
II 
 Dawson’s historical writings, explains the English Dominican, 
Aidan Nichols, are very similar in intention to Augustine’s in that 
he “tries to show the special history of Christian revelation 
confronting and transforming the general history of the world, while 
remaining conditioned by its possibilities and limitations.”253  With 
this in mind, Dawson’s defense of metahistory becomes more clear and 
principled.  Catholicism is a universal concept in which social and 
spiritual functions are ordered toward one end, “not by the denial 
and destruction of the natural human values, but by brining them 
into living relation with the spiritual truth and spiritual 
reality.”254  Thus, metahistory does not obscure the vision of 
reality by loosing sight of the particular but, when kept within 
limits, it allows the historian to grasp the more general movement 
of human affairs.255  Dawson’s distinctive character as a historian 
is linked to this claimed-ability to see the flowing currents 
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beneath the day-to-day affairs of men.  Here the calling of Abraham, 
the Covenant at Sinai, the testing of the Prophets, and the 
Incarnation and Redemption—the last of which forms the foundation of 
all history—are all a part of the creation of a “new humanity,” that 
is the consequence of intangible, spiritual dynamics.  For Dawson, 
human observers merely see the superficial plane of material change, 
as the deep dynamics of spiritual causes are never fully manifested 
in this world.  His own words clearly capture the dynamic spirit of 
his historical imagination:    
In my view and dominating my whole life work, the key problem 
is that of Theology and History.  For while philosophy and 
theology occupy different spheres, theology and history do 
not, except in so far as history is purely factual or untied 
to special aspects of culture.  Christian theology is a 
theology of Incarnation and of the successive stages of 
revelation—Mosaic, Prophetic and Christian; and each of these 
stages is not simply a question of new truths, but of events 
through which the truths are revealed. 256 
 
Dermot Quinn comments extensively on Dawson’s ability to see 
the wider landscape of history as opposed to the “monographic 
miniaturism” represented by the English Whigs and their successors.  
“His [Dawson] preoccupations were the nature of culture and 
civilization, progress and religion, the pattern of history itself,” 
writes Quinn.257  While Dawson does not ignore the particulars of 
history, he values them only inasmuch as they correspond to what he 
sees as the deeper dynamics of human affairs.  Thus, some events 
acquire a much greater significance than others although minor 
occurrences might initially seem dramatic, but in retrospect, have 
little enduring value.  Likewise, seemingly unimportant events, and 
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almost positively unimportant persons, might become the objects of 
significant historical inquiry.  This is definitely the case with 
St. Paul and his early converts, and even more poignantly, it is 
true with the seemingly unimportant life of Jesus of Nazareth. 
Dawson’s choices of what constitutes these “deeper dynamics” 
can be seen as being arbitrary or whimsical, yet these selections 
appear more defensible when placed against the backdrop of cross-
cultural, sociological research.  Religion seems to be the common 
denominator among the vast majority of primitive cultures, he 
maintained, and this is most lucid when studying the foundations of 
the major world cultures.  It can be objected that this emphasis on 
religion is a matter of pure belief, regardless of the culture in 
which it thrives, and that such belief possesses no ability to 
affect reality in an existential sense.  To Dawson, this is where 
the idea of true belief in one’s faith is applicable to historical 
understanding.  In his view, God is part of a larger, objective 
reality upon which the entire world order is based; thus, every 
culture seems to have at its core a belief in a transcendent reality 
that is the groundwork of its historical vision.  Since human beings 
are possessed of free choice, they are affected by their religious 
values and spiritual heritage, thus forming an extra-material force 
that shapes cultural, and as a consequence, historical development.  
This was why Dawson was convinced that history was more than the 
product of material circumstances, biological development, and human 
psychology.  In Dawson’s vision, the malady of modern society, and 
especially Christian culture, was a result of its failure to 
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understand its spiritual inheritance—it was a “malady of the 
soul.”258 
 Dawson’s embrace of metahistory is at once warm and careful.  
While he recognizes that historians tend to become lost in the petty 
details of narrow specializations, he is equally aware of the 
possibility of sinking into complete abstraction.  Again turning to 
Dermot Quinn, we see how Dawson deals with the “universal 
metahistorical vision” of Spengler, and why such a conception of the 
past can easily become a trap.259  While Dawson sees great benefit in 
Spengler’s conception of the past, he is disappointed by his 
“philosophic relativism” which is the necessary result of conceiving 
each civilization of the past as an independent cultural unit, 
completely severed from all other influences.  For Spengler, there 
are no eternal truths and the only measure of a philosopher is 
whether or not he embodies the “spirit” of his age.  Spengler sees 
the civilization around him as “civilization” in the abstract, and 
thus, each one of them has its own soul, brought into maturity by 
some essence of “progress.”260  Each culture is a “fixed organism” 
that is its own end, and it must pass through a life-process much 
like that experienced by the individual human.  History, then, must 
be an unintelligible garble of civilizations that possess no ethical 
meaning, and it is destiny, not Causality, that represents the 
dynamism in human culture.261  In Spengler, the metahistorical vision 
is so great, yet so restricted, that we loose touch with the 
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historical reality of cultural interaction.  As Dawson notes, there 
are two movements in world history, one of which is touched upon by 
Spengler’s concept of culture as a life process in contact with a 
specific people in a specific geographical area, the other, however, 
is “common to a number of different peoples, and results from 
political, intellectual and religious synthesis and interaction.”262  
Dawson here finds himself more comfortable with Toynbee’s vision of 
the past that includes a respect for universal states that he sees 
as a possible metahistorical paradigm, which encompasses smaller 
cultural units within.  Dawson does possess a hesitation with 
Toynbee that stems from the his view that there is an inconsistency 
in his insistence that religions are more important than 
civilizations while simultaneously expecting those religions to 
conform to political and cultural ends.  Furthermore, Dawson 
believed, the intellectual conversion of Toynbee to Jungian 
psychology was a major “setback” in his thought because of its 
insistence that psychology replace theology as the “ultimate 
criterion in religion.”263   
 The Catholic historian is necessarily beholden to a universal 
historical sense because Christ came as a redeemer, not just for 
those who believe in Him, but for all of mankind.  Thus, there can 
be no Catholic “view” of history, nor can there exist, strictly 
speaking, a philosophy of history that is compatible with Catholic 
theology.  Developed by the book of Daniel, and springing forth from 
the ashes of an earlier Mediterranean civilization, the Catholic 
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possesses a “theology of history” that bears a deep significance.264  
For the Christian, and especially the Catholic, there is merely a 
Christian history—to be clearly distinguished from a “philosophy of 
history”—and as a matter of understanding, a Christian “theology of 
history.”  Furthermore, to demand that a Christian—and even more 
specifically, a Catholic—historian separate his faith from 
historical judgment is an impossibility given that the world is 
linked in a historical drama with God at its center.  The Catholic 
is imbued with a sense of history because his faith is at once 
embodied by the concepts of Incarnation and Providence—it is a view 
enraptured by the idea of openness to spiritual transcendence and 
untainted by ideology.      
 The Protestant historian is similarly bound to a historical 
universalism developed in pre-Reformation thought because his 
understanding is tied to a Patristic, Augustinian model, which is 
shared by the Catholic.  Nevertheless, there are distinct 
differences growing out of disagreements over Free Will, different 
ideas about predestination, and various eschatological visions.  
Certain Protestant groups are more closely associated with—and in 
the case of Anglo-Catholics, almost indistinguishable from—the old-
Catholic tradition.  Nevertheless, differences, some minor and some 
not, continue to exist.  Dawson was keenly aware of this and sought 
to bring Christians to a consensus based on their common historical 
and theological heritage.  He is sometimes accused of wanting to 
form this consensus along strictly Catholic lines, and to this 
charge, there is some merit.  In The Judgment of the Nations, Dawson 
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argues that “the sin of schism does not arise from a conscious 
intention to separate oneself from the true Church.” At first there 
seems to be no problems with this statement, but there is revealed 
one major assumption: he presupposed that Catholicism is the “true 
Church.”265  Dawson wore his Catholicism on his sleeve, and he 
believed that the problem of religious schism needed to be settled, 
but on Catholic terms—especially when dealing with questions of 
history.    His Catholicism was not dogmatic nearly as much as it 
was principled, and the spirit of William McNeill’s criticism that 
Dawson was a Roman Catholic fanatic—and even more alarmingly that he 
was looking to settle theological claims through historical 
analysis—is misguided.266   Dawson converted to Catholicism precisely 
because of its openness to truth, its universal character, and its 
search for reality in the human existence.  He did not view his 
faith as a barrier to achieving a high degree of professionalism and 
objectivity—he believed it to be an agent of clarity.267  His 
unwillingness to stray from Roman Catholicism in questions of 
orthodoxy was a matter of faith and not of history.  To Dawson, even 
if the Catholic Church could be faulted for various things, it was 
nevertheless the most “sound” of the Christian sects, both 
historically and theologically.  Nevertheless, Dawson understood 
that both Catholics and Protestants share in one overarching belief 
about the significance of history: that it is important to “value 
history but not to overvalue it.”  Human beings are judged, as 
Niebuhr reminds us, by their actions committed within a historical 
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existence.268  Thus, in Christianity, there is a clear “affirmation” 
of the historical as an essential element of any conception of a 
transcendent reality.   
 Dawson sees the Catholic historian as one who must see the 
value of objectivity to, and within, his faith.  Particularly 
impressed by Irenaeus’s “spirit of historical realism,” Dawson 
focused his attention upon the clues that history can offer in the 
interpretation of theological objects.269  Metahistory is a concept 
that helps the historian to gain a grasp of the overall landscape by 
which the past is understood.  It is the creative powers of the 
historian, and in many cases his “moral imagination,” by which the 
past can be rescued from the grips of an overly scientific view of 
the past, and elevated to a higher plane that coexists with his 
vision of reality. This is why Dawson was so imbued with the idea of 
a “positive theology” that was first developed in the Baroque 
period.  In contrast to philosophy, which Dawson viewed as an 
obstacle to religious understanding, this critical form of 
theological thinking was, he believed, the only way by which the 
Catholic could confront the problems of historical and religious 
relativism.270       
 J.P. Kirsch writes of the reasonableness of the Catholic claim 
to withstand pressures from secular theorists to disavow their faith 
for the sake of an abstract objectivity.  He reasons that faith is 
an integral part of any objective reality: 
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To demand from the ecclesiastical historian an absence of all 
antecedent views is not only entirely unreasonable, but an 
offence against historical objectivity…It could be maintained 
only to the hypothesis that the end of scientific 
investigation is not the discovery, but merely the seeking 
after truth without ever finding it…[a hypothesis] quite 
impossible to defend, for the assertion that supernatural 
truth, or even plain objective truth of any kind is beyond our 
reach, is itself an antecedent hypothesis.271 
 
Secular history, itself unfounded upon “objective” grounds, need not 
object to a Catholic “theology of history” on the basis that it is 
not an impartial account of the past.  Catholicism is intimately 
bound to its historic reality, and it is only by the means of 
studious research that history, and thus Catholicism, can be fully 
understood.  For Dawson, the Christian view of history is not “a 
secondary element derived by philosophical reflection from the study 
of history,” for it is an understanding rooted in a primary 
participation in the Eternal order and characterized by a 
consciousness of God in human experience.272  History forms the very 
center of Christianity through the Incarnation, and thus, without 
history, the Christian faith could not be a viable creed.   
 Non-Christian historians, however, will still raise objections 
to this view of history because, they maintain, it is colored with 
the stain of blindly-accepted precepts.  This leads the philosophic 
historian to ask about the nature of history, and whether or not it 
is merely a chronicle of the past.  For the Christian, history 
contains truths which are displayed through a material medium, and 
it is only in the context of reconciling these eternal truths with 
the tangible world that we are able to grasp any understanding of 
                                                 
271 J.P. Kirsch, “History,” The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. VII (New York, 
1910), 367.  
272 Dawson, “The Christian View of History,” Dynamics of World History, 246. 
 128
history.  This does not mean that it is the historian’s task to find 
what Gabriel Marcel called “that armed ghost”—the meaning of 
history.  History must, says Russell Kirk, reflect truth, and the 
real meaning of history is found by searching for what we can learn 
about the “framework of the Logos…about the significance of human 
existence: about the splendor and the misery of our condition.”273  
To the Christian, Dawson believed, this meant understanding the 
universality of the human soul, and realizing its coextensive 
relationship with the Universal Church, “which has become incarnate 
in history.”274   
 Kirk brings our attention to a very important Dawsonian theme: 
that the concept of a philosophy of history possesses an inherent 
contradiction.  With Jacob Burckhardt, Kirk and Dawson both maintain 
that “history coordinates, and hence is unphilosophical, while 
philosophy subordinates, and hence is unhistorical.”275  For Dawson, 
the great historians such as Tocqueville and Ranke are not 
practitioners of a universal metahistorical vision based in an 
allegedly “objective” reality formed through a scientific lens, but 
rather, they are the exemplars of a sophisticated view embodied in a 
deep humanist tradition, which is itself imbedded in a long 
tradition of faith.276  Metahistory, then, is not something that 
needs to be separated from the Christian tradition—in fact, it must 
not be separated unless it risk being reduced to banal 
generalizations and superficial moralizing.  While the academic 
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historian must follow scrupulous methods of inquiry, he must not 
become encumbered by the burden of the nineteenth-century creed of 
scientific objectivity.  Dawson writes: 
The academic historian is perfectly right in insisting on the 
importance of the techniques of historical criticism and 
research.  But the mastery of these techniques will not 
produce great history, any more than the mastery of metrical 
technique will produce great poetry.  For this something more 
is necessary—intuitive understanding, creative imagination, 
and finally a universal vision transcending the relative 
limitations of the particular field of historical study.277 
 
Hence, what is crucial to Dawson is his sense of the historical 
imagination.  The creative powers of the historian, enacted in 
conjunction with his moral and intellectual strengths, are the 
elements of any history embedded in the fabric of a dynamic culture.  
For the European, especially, this dynamic culture is bound with the 
historiography of the Catholic Church.  For as Dawson maintains, it 
is the Church, and not secular humanism, that provides a direct path 
leading from the ancient to the modern world.278  To insist that the 
historian impose a standard of material objectivity would diminish 
his ability to write truthfully.  Creating a dualism of material and 
spiritual matter would do much to destroy the historical unity upon 
which our current conception of reality is based.   
 Material events are intimately tied to the spiritual formation 
of Christendom as a body of faithful believers.  Russell Hittinger 
insists, then, that there is a natural “tension” between believers 
and non-believers in their vision of the past.  Christianity’s 
historic character insists upon fully partaking in the material 
order, and thus, makes it necessary for the Christian historian to 
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confront the past in a realistic manner.  Dawson’s concern, writes 
Hittinger, “is the inclination of many schools of secular 
historiography to either neglect or distort the subject-matter in 
which Christianity has considerable interests.”279  Hittinger gives 
the example of Gibbon, whose real problem with Christianity was not 
a matter of doctrine, but rather, one directed at the material 
concerns of the faith.  For Gibbon, the “Dark Ages” represented a 
material regression that led him to call into question the cultural 
contributions of the Christian religion, not the theology itself.280 
 Some philosophers of the eighteenth-century, and most notably 
Voltaire, saw the modern age as a step in an unending progress of 
cultural gentrification that rejected spirituality, but Dawson sees 
a recovery of Christianity as a necessary task if we are to ever 
establish “definite points in time and place” in our larger 
historical quest.  The soul must be open to the transcendent and 
ordered to the ethical.  Importantly, Dawson eschews the temptation 
to reduce Christian history to the subject of ecclesiastical 
history.  Such an error, he reasoned, would isolate Christianity as 
an entity not fully incorporated into the material and non-Christian 
world.  For Dawson, Christianity not only possesses a power over the 
faithful, but it casts its net over the whole drama of human affairs 
and touches every aspect of creation.  For this reason, Dawson makes 
it his ambition to attempt an interdisciplinary approach to the 
study of culture, thus allowing him to understand the full impact of 
Christianity aside from its internal nature.  As R.V. Young 
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maintains, what makes Dawson such an important historian is his 
“ability to consider his subject in the broadest possible terms—the 
development of world civilizations and their interactions—without 
losing sight of the concrete details of history.”281  Within these 
concrete details, Christianity plays an immense role. 
 The relationship between Christianity and history has been 
severely damaged, Dawson argues, by the nineteenth-century 
historical theorists.  Idealist and materialist philosophers both 
did a great disservice to this relationship by complicating the past 
with philosophic systems—especially that of liberal Protestantism.  
Thus, we have two competing schools of Christian history—the 
original, as understood by the Church fathers, and then, various 
philosophical systems based on speculation that are the result of a 
century-and-a-half of metaphysical interpretation.  Dawson insists 
that an authentic Christian theology of history is based, not in 
Idealist philosophy, but rather, in a realistic conception of the 
past.  This “realism” includes the belief that God consistently 
intervenes in human affairs at definite times and places.282  In this 
way, the doctrine of Incarnation takes a central role in our 
historical consciousness as a fixed moment.283  In addition to being 
a central part of the Christian faith, the Incarnation provides a 
measure by which the historian can assign a chronological system to 
provide context to individual people and events.  
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 This concept also informs Dawson’s view of other religious 
cultures.  He draws our attention to the Hindu concept of 
incarnation found in the Bhagavad-gita.  Here, however, there is 
little significance to “history” because Khrishna is “mythical and 
unhistorical,” and this incarnation is not unique, but reoccurring 
in an unending, cyclical process.284  If history is to be judged by 
some “objective” standard, then the eastern tradition—in its non-
Christian sense—provides little guidance.  For the Christian, there 
is more to the Incarnation than a permanent standard by which to 
measure time: it is a transforming event in the history of man, and 
it is a unique event which gives life to the dynamic of world 
history.  The Christian interpretation of history is a tempered 
vision because it is a temporal vision that includes an end, and is 
an “interpretation of time in terms of human events in the light of 
divine revelation.”285 
 The Catholic historian must make sense of providentialism—he 
must make the case for a divine purpose working through the material 
forces of this world.286  History is concrete in that discovers 
events in time interacting with the eternal.  Human events are but a 
small part of the history of this world, the universe, and beyond.  
This is a concept with which Dawson is intimately familiar, and it 
affects the way he writes history, as well as the way in which he 
deals with his faith.  There is little difference among the various 
methods shared by good Christian historians and their secular 
counterparts, but the Christian historian wants to penetrate to 
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something deeper than the mundane details of the material world—he 
sees the unfolding of a “divine economy” that is both mysterious to 
us and ordained by God.  Thus, the Catholic historian’s task differs 
from that of the secular historian in one significant sense: he may 
worry less about perspective, but he must continually decide the 
“extent to which his historical project is more or less open to 
theological norms which he acknowledges in acknowledging his 
Catholicity.”287  In Dawson’s understanding, faith and the sacraments 
are intimately tied to social institutions, morals, and behavioral 
norms.  This belief is, he maintained, largely Catholic in origin 
and practice, although many Protestants possess similar 
understandings.288 
 In the Historic Reality of Christian Culture, Dawson brings 
our attention to the metaphorical character of history as 
represented by coronations.  While it is not the physical act that 
captures the reality of the past, these events penetrate beyond the 
regalia and pomp to show the psychological and spiritual 
transformation of a leader.289  Charlemagne’s coronation on Christmas 
Day, 800, shows the conversion of a barbarian military leader into a 
Christian monarch.  The reality of Christian civilization as it 
existed for over a thousand years is based in a culture transformed 
out of barbarism.  The Catholic historian is one who is able to see 
this transformation, and looks beyond the material circumstances 
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that surround it to find its inner dynamic.290  The Catholic 
historian looks to see the inner-soul of culture as opposed to 
giving artificial credence to a temporal façade.     
 This is not to say that Catholicism involves a belief in the 
rise of a theocratic form of government, or in an idealized—notably, 
medieval—past.  Although Dawson is enchanted by the architecture and 
lives of medieval people, he is by no means a medieval romanticist.  
The Catholic historian—properly understood—is one who exercises 
imaginative faculties in conjunction with the material world.  Thus, 
his subject matter is not Christendom, but rather, the Christian 
people—Christianitas—and how they relate to God.291  This 
relationship is seen, especially in the Middle Ages, through 
architecture, education, literature, and art—all enlivened by the 
historical imagination.      
 For Dawson, the meaning of history transcends the rise and 
fall of great empires.  From the past’s great events—often 
cataclysmic—we can find only means, not ends, to the most important 
and mysterious aspects of our being.  Christianity confers 
significance upon events that would otherwise lack any transforming 
or dynamic power.  The rise of a small, and seemingly insignificant 
clan in a Jewish province of Rome, and their development as the 
people of God became the epicenter of historical inquiry, not just 
for Christians, but also for the development of world history on a 
truly universal scale.  It is in periods of great crisis and doubt, 
he believed, that God’s Providence could most fully assert itself, 
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and through this interposition of God in time, history is given its 
divine and mysterious character.292      
It was not until the beginning of the Middle Ages that men 
became aware of the differentiation between the end of an age and 
the end of history itself, although some still find confusion in the 
modern world as well.293  The fall of Rome was not the end of time, 
nor was it the end of history, Dawson argued, but it must have been 
a psychologically disturbing event to witness.  It is easy to see 
why so many would view the fall of the Eternal City as the end of 
the world, but the sacrifice of Christ reassured his followers that 
the end of a regime is not the end of time.  Although there is an 
unending conflict between the City of Man and the City of God, the 
two orders coexist in a matrix that forms when they meet and it is 
this matrix that is the crux of history.294   
The real meaning of history is often obscured by material 
factors that overshadow the more crucial, yet seemingly 
inconsequential, people and events.  Catholic historiography 
attempts to transcend the empiricism of the rationalists, such as 
Hume, because it refuses to discount the miraculous and 
unaccountable events that occur throughout the ages.  How does the 
rationalist explain the ascendancy of Christianity when most of the 
early Christians, and indeed Christ himself, lived obscure lives?  
Compared with the great emperors, consuls, generals, and senators of 
the time, the life of an obscure peasant, in the eyes of the 
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rationalist, could not captivate, and in essence change, the course 
of human history.  While the rationalist looks for patterns and 
scientific causalities, the Christian historian makes the case for 
the unique character of every living person, and the ability of that 
person to have a profound effect on the dynamics of world history.   
To the Christian, material circumstances, when placed in 
opposition to the will of God, stand no chance of dominating the 
course of history.  Material causes are not necessarily causes per 
se, but instead, they can be tangible signs of God’s will 
transcending from eternity into the temporal world.  The coercion of 
peoples by state power is an insufficient means by which to overcome 
the dynamic forces of history; thus all of history that is divorced 
from God’s grace is nothing more than the tale of successive 
attempts to build Towers of Babel.295  Echoing St Augustine, Dawson 
argues that love is the most powerful force by which men are 
compelled to action.  Thus, it is the appropriation of love that 
determines the inherent goodness in a particular event.  When men 
are drawn to material comforts and fall in love with the temporal 
world—whether this love is directed at money, power, or comfort—they 
confuse the true good with illusions of a false paradise.  The 
Catholic historian is keenly aware that temporal happiness is not 
the ultimate goal of this life, and the overwhelming force of God’s 
love chastens him to seek something beyond the Gnosticism of 
material and rationalist dogma.  Thus, the love of the self, often 
fueled by material gratification, is the foundation of the earthly 
city, while divine love accompanied by its creative powers, is the 
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basis of the City of God.  The destructive powers of self-love, a 
yearning that grows in proportion to our willingness to shy away 
from God’s grace, leads to disorder in both the soul and in the 
commonwealth.  When men cannot order themselves toward God, the 
unity of the material world dissolves.   
Dawson is not a metaphysician, but his approach to history is 
philosophical and reflective.  Nonetheless, he maintains a strictly-
grounded way of attempting to make sense of the past by calling into 
action particular persons and events that reflect broader meanings.  
Bede’s Ecclesiastical History represents a great milestone in the 
historiography of the West, and for Dawson, this work provided a 
framework in which historians could work for centuries.  Bede had 
the unique ability to capture people and events in a chronology that 
reflects their relation to the broader scope of history.  This is 
especially true in his treatment of the saints.  For Dawson, Bede 
wrote so that “the saint is not merely an historical figure…[he is] 
a citizen of the eternal city, a celestial patron and protector of 
man’s earthly life.  So that in the lives of the saints we see 
history transcending itself and becoming part of the eternal world 
of faith.”296 
 Bede’s monumental achievement captures what Dawson called the 
Third Age of the Church’s historical development.  In this time, the 
Good News was spread to the Anglo-Saxon and German lands, notably by 
St Boniface and the Benedictine order.  The conversion of the 
Frankish Court represents the maturation of a somewhat barbaric 
dynasty into an explicitly Christian enterprise—it shows the 
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transformation of pagan lands, and thus pagan history, into one 
enlightened by Christian ideas.  
 The transition from the so-called “medieval” into the “modern” 
period is marked by the rise of nationalism and the empowerment of 
rulers whose entire basis of authority is found in the medieval idea 
of kingship.  Furthermore, this kingship is emphatically connected 
to the Christian ideal of just authority—thus, it is within the 
coronation ceremony that the legitimization of a ruler is bestowed.  
From the fifteenth-century onwards, the consecration of supposedly 
secular rulers is only legitimated by the Christian ceremony of 
coronation.  This development of the secular state, writes Dawson, 
was “disguised by the religious prestige which still surrounded the 
person of the ruler and which was actually increased during the age 
of the Reformation by the union of the Church with the state and its 
subordination to the royal supremacy.”297  Take, for instance, the 
following passage, utilized by Dawson, from Bossuet’s Politique 
tiree des propres paroles de L’Ecriture Sainte: 
The power of God [he writes] makes itself felt instantaneously 
from one end of the world to the other, the royal power acts 
at the same time throughout the kingdom.  It holds the whole 
kingdom in being, as God holds the world.  Should God withdraw 
His hand, the world would fall back into nothingness and 
should authority cease in the kingdom, all would be 
confusion…. 
 
Bossuet continues: 
To sum up the great and august things we have said concerning 
the royal authority.  Behold an immense people united in a 
single person; behold this sacred power, paternal, absolute; 
behold the secret cause which governs the whole body of the 
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state contained in a single head; you see in the king the 
image of God, and you have an idea of the royal Majesty.298 
 
The process of change from the medieval world into modernity is not 
marked by an immediate break with the past.  In fact, the 
seventeenth-century is alive with religious fervor and it is Hobbes 
and Locke who compose a radical minority.  The apparently dominant 
ideologies of the period, namely materialism and nationalism—to 
Dawson—are cloaks for an intensely religious culture undermined by 
the directors of intellectual culture.  It is a mistake, he writes, 
to consider the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries a secular age, 
for the mass of public opinion did not belong to the grandiose 
thinkers, but rather, to the local clergy.299   
 Dawson further rejects the “European view of history,” 
specifically those theories espoused by Machiavelli and Hobbes, 
which empty history of its moral character.  Reducing history to a 
chronicle of “the straightforward expression of the will to power” 
subordinates it to a quasi-scientific process with its own laws and 
axioms.  The subjective, amoral character of this type of historical 
thinking further caused alarm even among its contemporaries for its 
shocking inability to form any standard of judgment.300  The 
Idealists, however, are not much better in their assessment of the 
past.  Their idealization of the state as the product of divine 
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providence inspired generations of thinkers to embrace an ideology 
that society is progressively moving toward ultimate perfection.  
 Ultimately, Dawson sees Christianity as the only true source 
of cultural unity because it is the only world religion that 
possesses an unbroken lineage to ancient times.  Unlike the purely 
spiritual religions such as Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, and 
Shamanism, Christianity retains an innately historical character—
which is distinct from merely being old—that is rooted in the deep 
patrimony of the Jewish faith.  Even Islam, itself rooted in a 
historical enterprise, is devoid of a truly historical character in 
that there is no specific relationship between God and man except in 
a purely spiritual sense.  The Christian view of history is 
intimately connected with the concept of time, and accordingly, no 
other world-religion possesses its unifying ability.  The meaning of 
history, for the Christian, is to be found in the development of 
time in the “womb” of eternity.  The Christian view of history is 
not an ideology, and it does not find ultimate triumph in the 
temporal world.301   
 Early Christianity was itself challenged by the spectre of a 
purely spiritual philosophy while developing into its current 
framework.  The Oriental heresies of Gnosticism and the Manicheans—
in a trait shared with Islam—denied the importance of the material 
world and placed its faith in the idea of pure spirit.  The Church, 
however, steadfastly combated these forces and showed the importance 
of humanity by stressing the importance of the body, consecrated by 
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Christ’s Incarnation and crucifixion.  In doing this, the early 
Church demonstrated the importance of the unique historical 
character of Christianity that is rooted in revelation, and secured 
by the sacrifice at Calvary.   
This was the great stumbling-block to the Oriental mind, which 
readily accepted the idea of an avatar or of the theophany of 
a Divine aeon, but could not face the consequences of the 
Catholic doctrine of the Two Natures and the full humanity of 
the Logos made flesh.  This conception of the Incarnation as 
the bridge between God and Man, the marriage of Heaven and 
Earth, and the channel through which the material world is 
spiritualized and brought back to unity, distinguishes 
Christianity from all the other Oriental religions, and 
involves a completely new attitude to life.302 
 
The Christian view of history differs from its other eastern rivals 
in that it requires more than metaphysical contemplation of a higher 
being, or in modern times, the idealization of a material state, to 
achieve salvation.  When the mind is removed from practical matters 
so that the highest expression of human achievement is a divorce of 
intellect from matter, the whole world will fall to anarchy and 
order is a distant hope.  What Dawson though of as the Oriental 
view, in its contempt for almost anything material, fails to capture 
the essence of history as something intertwined with man.  The 
normal course of human activity is conducted in the physical world, 
and to possess contempt for knowledge beyond the limits of spiritual 
worship is to withdraw from the reality of human existence and to 
ignore fundamental aspects of our nature.   
The Christian, and specifically for Dawson, the Catholic 
historian, sees the importance of the material world and its union 
with eternity as an essential part of understanding the past.  Human 
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rationality and the scientific process are intimate parts of the 
human mind, and for the Christian, these cannot simply be set aside, 
but yet they must be held in check.  The responsibility to bridge 
this gap between the eastern idealization of the spirit and the 
western progressive’s worship of the material world falls to the 
Catholic Church.  For Dawson, the Church is the medium between these 
two extremes, and at once embodies both views, while not completely 
lending itself to either one.  It is the Church that brings man into 
relation with his spiritual nature and allows him to bring the 
“transcendent reality of the divine Logos into relation with the 
tangible and visible facts of human experience.”303 
What saved, it must be asked, the early Church from sinking 
into some abstract form of spiritualism that was very much a real 
part of its fellow eastern traditions?  Dawson points to the First 
Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians (c. A.D. 96), in which there 
is a clear argument for the hierarchic organization of society that 
reflects the eternal law of the universe.  Like the Roman military, 
there must be organization within the Church—God at the apex, his 
apostles, saints, and bishops beneath—so that moral discipline and 
social order prevail.304  The primitive Church survived the dangers 
of schism through appeals to the apostolic tradition such as those 
advocated by St Irenaeus in his polemics against Gnosticism.305  
Thus, there is an inherent tradition within Catholicism of a social 
order that is based on the authority of the apostles, who gain their 
authority directly from Christ.   
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The rise of the Western world, then, is due to two 
corresponding ideas that are embodied in this duality of body and 
spirit.  From its earliest foundations, the West has achieved a high 
degree of cultural unity through its unique recognition of the 
religious and scientific aspects of life.  In the Oriental 
tradition, the spirit is paramount; in the secular West, materialism 
is the creed.  Thus, in Christianity, and especially in the Catholic 
Church, we see the meeting place of the eternal and the ephemeral—a 
tangential relationship between matter and spirit.   
For Dawson, the Catholic historian is the “heir” to a 
universal tradition.  The Catholic historian sees the past 
differently than any other type of historical thinker because he 
sees himself as freed from provincialism and narrow parochialism.  
He is not confined to nationalist interpretations of history, for 
the true Catholic historian is striving to be a member of the City 
of God.306  He sees the uniqueness of the process of history, and in 
contradistinction to Hume and the rationalists, he sees the mystery 
of divine will and possesses an apocalyptic vision of human 
affairs.307  Catholic historians are not content with the economic 
and political interpretations of history practiced from the 
seventeenth-century to the present.  For such understandings, Dawson 
argued, neglect the dynamic elements of cultural change.  The 
political and economic happenings of a particular period do not 
necessarily reflect historical causes, but are often themselves the 
product of historical change.   
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Dawson’s vision of the past was marked, not by a naïve faith 
in progress, or in the triumph of justice in the material world, but 
by a distinct hope.  Like St Cyprian, Dawson sees that although the 
material world may rest in chaos, there is hope in the world to come 
that is found by understanding the spiritual dynamic of world 
history.308  Although the forces of the modern world are often set 
against that understanding, it is the Catholic historian’s duty to 
remember the consequences of a pagan culture.  The lessons of 
antiquity, of the medieval world, and of the fight against Communism 
in the twentieth-century, are all relevant to the Catholic 
historian’s argument on behalf of a spiritual interpretation of 
history that understands the role of the transcendent reality in 
human affairs.   
Dawson was too astute, however, to believe that a Catholic 
culture could ever become the dominant order of modernity.  The 
seduction of the West by material and intellectual forces is too 
imbedded in its society to ever be completely erased.309  As James 
Hitchcock writes, Dawson’s optimism was not lurid idealism, but a 
recognition of the historic reality of the world in which we live.  
A political party system based on Catholicism was a bad alternative, 
for Dawson shared Acton’s contempt for history’s most incompetent 
and self-centered “betrayers” of the Church, such as Cardinals 
Wolsey and Richelieu.310  This does not, however, mean that political 
systems should not take Catholicism into account when developing 
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their platforms, and particularly, the natural law tradition as 
expressed in many recent encyclicals are exactly the type of 
religious expressions that a properly functioning government should 
take seriously. 
To Dawson, the Catholic historian’s submission to divine will 
makes him well-equipped to deal with unpredictability, and he 
embraced this as an essential part of his historical understanding.  
The secular historian, writing in the first-century A.D., could 
never have imagined the immense impact of a small religious movement 
in the province of Judea.  Dawson writes: 
All that Roman world with its power and wealth and culture and 
corruption sank into blood and ruin—the flood came and 
destroyed them all—but the other world, the world of apostles 
and martyrs, the inheritance of the poor, survived the 
downfall of ancient civilization and became the spiritual 
foundation of a new order.311 
 
Christianity did not challenge the authority of Caesar, nor did it 
call for any specific system of political organization.  
Nevertheless, in God’s time, Caesar’s throne turned out to be an 
ephemeral institution, while Christianity became the basis of the 
new world order.  Dawson is careful to remind his students that it 
is not the duty of the Christian to revolutionize mankind through 
the creation of a new paradigm.  Christianity fulfills a different 
function than the State, but their relationship is occasionally 
symbiotic.  It is not the duty of a Christian to build a world of 
perfection or absolute peace, but it is his task to spread the word 
of God, and to transform the human spirit so that it can look beyond 
the temptation of temporal bliss.   
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 The mysterious nature of Christianity, and especially 
Catholicism, is found in its apocalyptic view of history.  For the 
Christian, there is a spiritual purpose in history, and it is not 
the task of the historian to fully understand it; rather, it is his 
duty to understand that it exists as an unknowable aspect of our 
reality.  As Dawson writes, “the Christian order is a supernatural 
order…Its victories may be found in apparent defeat and its defeats 
in material success.”312  It is around the profoundly historical life 
of Jesus by which the Christian historian is called to find unity in 
his world, and it is with this historical reality by which many of 
the other world religions have found their dynamism. 
 Dawson argues that Islam, the Protestant Reformation, and the 
Liberal Revolution are each “abortive or partial manifestations of 
the spiritual power which Christianity brought into history.”313  In 
some ways, each of these spiritual institutions draws its energy, 
and its historical character, from the older Christian tradition.  
Christianity, as we noted earlier, is not all spirituality, but is 
distinctively bound to the material world.  It is wrong for the 
Christian historian to possess an absolute hostility to the temporal 
order, for that, says Dawson, is the nature of heresy.  The 
Christian historian, as well as the faithful, must be formed by 
faith, but he must not deride the existence of the material world.  
After all, Christ came to this world in the body of a man when he 
could have come in any form He chose.  The Christian historian sees 
the temporal order as a means of achieving salvation.  Although the 
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means of achieving political or economic perfection will elude the 
Christian statesman, he need not view the end of history as an end, 
but as a beginning.314  To the Christian, and particularly to Dawson, 
the world is always ending, “and every historical crisis is, as it 
were, a rehearsal for the real thing.”315 
III 
 Shirley Jackson Case observed in her seminal book The 
Christian Philosophy of History that there is a crisis of 
understanding in the historical profession that is caused by the 
confusion of metaphysical and historical ends.316  This is, of 
course, the result of a belief in the epistemological subordination 
of historical knowledge to philosophy.  While history is incapable 
of providing a philosophical system it is through history that 
metaphysical truths can be substantiated in time.  There is no true 
subordination of history to philosophy, for they are different 
disciplines concerned with different ends, but participating in one 
endeavor to reach an understanding of human affairs.  The 
distinction of philosophy, and its place with respect to history, is 
important because there is a third, often-neglected element that 
must be considered—theology. 
 Case’s title itself reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of 
history’s place within the Christian tradition.  A “philosophy of 
history,” enlightened by the Gospels and the Grace of God, is a 
strange contradiction that is rendered impossible by the constant 
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interposition of Christ in history.  The term “philosophy of 
history” evokes a sense of historicism and mechanization—it does not 
account for mysterious forces and otherworldly factors, nor does it 
provide explanations for simple breakdowns in human psychology or 
plain forgetfulness.  A philosophy of history entails the idea that 
history is a process that can be intimately known, and even more 
alarming is the contention that it affords man the ability to use 
the past as a source of foreknowledge.  Dawson and most Catholic 
thinkers believe that a “theology of history”—a history based on the 
Incarnation—offers a more complete understanding that is true to 
human affairs precisely because it involves man’s interaction, not 
only among his own kind, but also with the spiritual world of the 
eternal.  Every culture is a reflection of its spiritual beliefs, 
and to the Christian, the dynamics of world history are inextricably 
linked to the coming of God into time. 
 Thus, for the believing Christian, there can be no philosophy 
of history; rather, there must be a theology of history, and 
plainly, a Christian history.  To Dawson, what we see in history is 
only a “partial manifestation” of the spiritual activity that forms 
the basis of human activity.  Although we can fully study the 
material aspects of society through scientific methods, we are 
unable to ascertain the full-details of spiritual values.317  This 
does not render comparative studies of culture impossible, but it 
shows why the modern historian is so likely to abandon such elements 
in his own work.  Since the time of the Enlightenment, the 
concentration of history on material causes has been the result of 
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this failure to come to terms with religion as something that is 
different in every culture.  Nevertheless, there are certain 
underlying forces that are common to each of them, and each of these 
religions shapes the entire outlook—philosophically, spiritually, 
and historically—of that culture.   
  The traditional vision of the Christian historian is that the 
outer-dynamics of material transformation are mere reflections of 
the inner-world of spiritual change.  The true meaning of history, 
then, is not to be found in the varied stories of powerful empires 
and political regimes, for they are only means, not ends, in the 
development of God’s people on earth.  C.S. Lewis said that the 
present is that point at which time touches eternity, and Augustine 
said the same about history.318  The significance of these statements 
lies in their reliance on the coming of God into the lives of man, 
through the Incarnation, as a means of giving true life to 
humankind.  On this reading, it is necessary to be a Christian to 
understand the Christian view of history, and to accept it as a 
valid belief.  Other religions possessing an incarnation theology 
lack the originality found in the birth of Christ because His 
coming, to recall the argument of Origen, was a one-time event that 
removed man from the wheel and placed him on a track toward eternal 
salvation.319  Thus, the coming of Christ is the pivotal point of 
human existence and the starting point for all men in their quest 
for grace and everlasting life. 
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 The Christian historian is unique in that he possesses an 
acute understanding of God’s everlasting love for creation, and uses 
that knowledge to develop a vision of history that is at once full 
and mysterious—it captures the essence of our being, while refusing 
to cave to the pressures of materialism, historicism, and the 
arrogance of historical omniscience.  The Christian historian is one 
who allows space for the mysterious forces of God—forces we are not 
always permitted to see.  Dawson’s insistence that we must capture 
the inner-dynamics of the spiritual world to understand human 
history further reflects this deep understanding that mankind was 
not made to serve material ends.  Men of the Cross, although blind 
to the wishes of God, are not blind to the fact that God does not 
answer to man.  So history becomes the “dynamic process in which the 
divine purpose is realized.”320  This is a central reason why the 
life of the saint is so immensely important to Dawson.  
Additionally, the medieval synthesis of the material and spiritual 
in one dynamic unity represented the unique greatness of the culture 
that arose in the years following the fall of Rome.  To Dawson, the 
saint was the manifestation of history “transcending itself” and 
becoming a part of the “eternal world of faith.”  Not incidentally, 
the medieval world was the world of the saint.  
 The cult of the saints, Dawson believed, was perhaps one of 
the most important aspects of the medieval world because the saint 
was seen as being present in both this world and in Heaven.  People 
prayed at the tombs of saints for intercessions on their behalf, for 
the saint represented the joining of Heaven and earth.  Peter Brown 
                                                 
320 Dawson, “The Christian View of History,” Dynamics of World History, 251. 
 151
observes that from end of the sixth-century onward, the saint was 
seen as an active part of Christian life.  For instance, Gregory of 
Tours was not decaying in the ground, but rather, he was at once 
present at his tomb, yet still in Heaven.321  Accordingly, relics 
became objects of immense value, and they were often sold and traded 
as market commodities.  The saints were a spiritual presence in a 
material world—a gateway to the eternal.     
 In later years, the names of saints became fixtures among the 
names of newborn children, for a “Christian name stood for a new 
identity associated with a new birth.”322  A patron saint could be 
called upon as an earthly protector—one who walked this earth like 
any other, but is possessed of an intimate relationship with Heaven.  
They were seen as Heavenly intermediaries who could serve as solace 
in world of discord and confusion.  Saints could also be called upon 
to help cure illness, for the suffering of the martyrs, brought the 
favor of God upon those associated with them, and with this favor 
could come healing.323  For Dawson, this concept of intimacy with the 
saints is an integral part of understanding the life of medieval 
people because it strikes directly at the heart of the genuineness 
of the Christian people.  The Christian faith exhibited by medieval 
man—especially the peasant—was genuine and deep.  Dawson points to 
the irony that saints and prophets, like Jeremiah, are often social 
outcasts, whose “action is only felt creatively by the spiritual 
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elite.”324  They do, however, form an important cultural dynamic that 
is fundamental in determining the shape of history.   
 The Christian view of history is something that “corresponds 
with time” and covers the whole of humanity.  At base, it is an 
understanding of time and eternity and how they relate to one 
another in a cooperative development.  Man is not merely an economic 
being, nor is he the “Superman” of idealistic utopians.  If he is 
willing to limit himself to an animal-like existence, and processes 
only that which appears on the surface of everyday affairs, then the 
“higher values” of life gradually disappear.325  Dawson explains the 
nature of man with great care: 
He is an animal that is conscious of his mortality and 
consequently aware of eternity.  In the same way the end of 
history is not the development of a new form of economic 
society, but is the creation of a new humanity, or rather a 
higher humanity, which goes far beyond man as man himself goes 
beyond the animals.326 
 
Dawson can be accused of being arbitrary here, but it is a conscious 
and genuine attempt to reach for the truth at a sophisticated level.  
His assumption that man is “aware of eternity,” and his second 
assumption that the end of history is not economic, but the 
“creation of a new humanity,” requires more attention than he is 
willing to give.  In this, it seems that Dawson is writing to an 
audience of people who already believe—he is attempting to reach out 
and help his “base” to understand their faith and its relationship 
to the temporal.  His interdisciplinary approach to the study of 
both primitive and advanced cultures is the key to understanding why 
                                                 
324 John J. Mulloy, “Compilation of Christopher Dawson’s words from letters, 
interviews, etc.,” Dawson MSS, University of Notre Dame, Box 1, Folder 15.   
325 Christopher Dawson, “The Nature and Destiny of Man,” The Dawson Newsletter, 
Spring 1994. 
326 Dawson, “The Christian View of History,” Dynamics of World History, 261. 
 153
Dawson believes these ideas to be something more than mere 
assumptions.  If religion is the common denominator, then economics 
and material circumstances become secondary causes.  If these are 
secondary causes, then they naturally become secondary ends.  This 
was Dawson’s conception of the relationship between the temporal 
world and history. 
Men are not defined, Dawson argued, by their acquiescence to 
the law of animal nature, but in their steadfast refusal to submit 
to every appetitive desire.327  The Church is the steady guide in 
helping people to understand that it is in transcending the 
appetitive to achieve the moral by which our nature is most fully 
realized.  To that extent the Church is the “guardian” of the 
secrets of history because it is the membrane through which the 
human soul can find redemption.  The Church may not be able to 
fulfill the same material cravings targeted by modern ideologies, 
but it does offer Truth: the truth that history possesses 
unpredictable elements that are themselves part of the past.  Faith 
in Christ entails a hope in the coming of new life, but the Church 
does not—rightfully—offer the naïve optimism that human life is 
always “improving” or “progressing” toward an infinite good.  “At 
the devil’s booth, all things are sold,” goes the maxim—and it is at 
the devil’s booth that history is offered as something wholly in our 
possession.  Human beings are possessed of free choice, but choosing 
the “right” is not enough for salvation.  The basis of all of 
humanity is love, and it is through love that we can choose to come 
to know God and understand His creation.   
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The power of the Catholic view of history that attracted 
Dawson’s attention is found in the belief that Christ is alive in 
our daily lives and is an active participant in the direction of 
human affairs.  Augustine’s view of the two cities, running parallel 
in history, yet constantly intermingling with one another, is the 
classic example of this symbiotic relationship between time and 
eternity.  The injection of the Incarnation into our daily lives and 
a “contemplation of the divine interposition in time,” is the crux 
of Catholic historical thinking.328  Those things that historians see 
in rationalist terms are only manifestations of the divine in 
temporality, and accordingly, there must be a large degree of 
mystery incorporated into any account of the past.  A historian 
concerned with telling the truth must account for the unaccountable 
and not make his subject a slave to scientific methods.   
 The problem of secularization in the West has presented a 
unique conundrum for Catholic historians.  Dawson was convinced that 
Western secularization was based on its own quasi-spiritual 
idealism, which was really a “transposition of Christian moral 
idealist to a purely this-worldly end.”329  Naturally, the 
intellectual roots of this dilemma can be found in the failures of 
the medieval period, but they began to explode with the liberal 
idealism of John Stuart Mill and the thinkers of the nineteenth-
century.  Secularization gave rise to a certain type of class 
structure that was at once urban and monotone.330  With Maritain, 
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Dawson agreed that the Christian conception of society was at once 
pluralist and united, while the urban, democratic idea of society 
was its polar opposite.  Dawson believed that the unity of the 
modern world was found in the spiritual dynamics of a fading 
Christian culture.  He further believed that Newman’s identification 
of Western culture with “civilization in the absolute sense,” was an 
over-simplification, but that it showed how much Christianity—as it 
defines the West—penetrated to every part of the globe like no other 
culture in history.331   
 Dawson does not wish to set Christianity, which is inexorably 
tied to its view of history, against civic responsibility or good 
citizenship.  In understanding the idea of civilization as a high 
degree of social development, and not mere “civic security,” Dawson 
believes that the artist, philosopher, and spiritual leaders are the 
best exemplars of society because they are among its most 
sophisticated contributors.332  Thus, civilization is a material 
achievement fed by its cultural underpinnings.  Civic responsibility 
nurtures and secures the underlying culture that is the real source 
of dynamism.  Christianity, then, is the power behind everything it 
touches, unwittingly or not.   
 The view of history espoused by Dawson is uniquely Catholic in 
its attempt at universality.  Perhaps it was his distinctly 
Protestant upbringing, and his deep English roots, that gave Dawson 
such a spectacular vantage point from which to develop an 
understanding of history that is deceptively simple, but 
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sophisticated in its argumentation.333  Unlike Belloc, with his 
intense cradle Catholicism, Dawson was able to fully engage and 
contemplate the eccentricities of Catholicism, and at one point, the 
limits of Christian theology, from an outsider’s perspective.  
Dawson did not want to suggest that Christians should come together 
and do whatever it takes to impose Christianity on the secular 
world, but he did believe that a Christian unity would restore a 
“spiritual center” to a new world order that could “provide new life 
for our civilization.”334  This new life would possess a 
distinctively historical element and shape our view of history.  
Essentially, to the Christian, history is the meeting place of time 
and eternity—a great mysterious incorporation through which, as the 
Gospel of John says, the Word of God becomes flesh, and is inserted 
into the life of mankind so long as the human race persists.335   
 Dawson is aware that there are some limitations to the scope 
of Christianity’s claims, and he is further aware that there exist 
large assumptions in arguments that Christianity, and specifically 
Catholicism, is the true model by which history is universally 
unfolding.  The Christian duty to seek the truth, and to embrace 
that which is correct over that which is not—these virtues translate 
to every part of life, including historical inquiry.  This is why 
Christianity at once exists within history and out of it.  In 
addition, there is the obvious limitation that all people are not 
Christians.  Dawson presents his readers with an almost inexplicable 
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conundrum in that it is impossible to accept the Christian view of 
history without being Christian, yet he claims it is, in truth, the 
universal paradigm.  Developing out of the ancient Jewish tradition, 
Christianity “transformed into a universal religion which conquered 
the Roman Empire.”  It kept the Jewish literary tradition, as well 
as its doctrine of God, while it simultaneously adopted the Hellenic 
tradition of liberal learning.336  It became a transforming cultural 
force on an international level because of its ability to 
incorporate local customs within the context of a larger, universal 
organization.  In this view, it is impossible to understand the true 
dynamics of world history without a spiritual commitment.  Those who 
do not believe in the risen Christ are not condemned, in Dawson’s 
view, but they do possess an incomplete historical vision.  This 
view may never be an acceptable explanation to the historical 
profession, but it does not disqualify Dawson from a position of 
scholarly prominence.   
 Dawson’s Christianity is never hidden, and he is aware of the 
difficulties and “deficiencies to be found in various periods of 
Christian culture.”337 Nevertheless, he saw in the Church the 
foundation of European culture in both its spiritual and material 
character.  The secularization of European culture, Dawson believed, 
coincided with a burst of material progress and spiritual 
fragmentation.  This new dynamic lacked a “unifying religious force” 
or “intellectual synthesis” and left Europe heading toward social 
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anarchy.338  It soon becomes clear that Dawson’s task is not 
historical in the strictest sense, but cultural.  He has an agenda, 
but it is not fixed upon an abstract idea, an ideology, or some form 
of fanaticism.  He is a historian and a Catholic apologist—but an 
apologist in the best sense of that term.  Never dogmatic, and 
always open to whatever evidence becomes available, Dawson sees in 
history the unfolding of a grand epoch ordained by God.  In his 
view, Christ is the “norm” of history and everything that occurs is 
just one part of a divine plan.  
 A committed Catholic, Dawson arrived at his faith through a 
search for transcendent truth.  Dawson the sociologist and Dawson 
the Catholic, as William McNeill writes, “often speak a rather 
different language,” and in this assessment he is largely correct, 
but he fails to see this as a matter of degree.339  Dawson’s role as 
a historian is characterized by his dedication to reality, but this 
reality finds its norm in Christ.  Nurtured by an immense faith in 
the risen God, his historical imagination is informed by theology, 
buttressed by sociological data, and open to the idea that God 
constantly intervenes in the life of man.  The non-Christian 
observer will, no doubt, object to Dawson’s identification of a 
“transcendent reality” as being a function of Christ’s divinity, but 
this was something Dawson anticipated.  To him, one must be a 
Christian to accept the Christian view of history.  Other historical 
visions, he believed, were not wrong, but somewhat incomplete.340   
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In Dawson, the tension between a sociological and theological 
understanding of the past is hampered by each discipline’s claim of 
universality.  This problem is resolved, however, by the 
understanding of the cosmos as a unified whole in which science is 
not the enemy of religion, but one element in an overall conception 
of the universe.  Religion should not contradict science, but it 
should provide it with reinforcement and an ethical dimension.  To 
Dawson, science is a tool, and not an end.  It is in understanding 
the limits of technological advancement, he maintained, that we can 
chastise science to serve humanity, and not be its slaves.  When 
science and technology become ideologies, he believed, they fail to 
stay within their boundaries and betray their true ends.341  Thus, in 
Dawson, there are two complementary approaches working in harmony to 
form a unified vision of history and culture.   
Dawson’s historical imagination is inextricably linked to his 
vision of Christianity as the basis of the world order.  To him, the 
coming of Christ forever changed the direction of man from one 
centered on the material and the mystical, to one focused upon 
living for the greater glory of God.  Christ became the “norm” of 
history upon His divine incarnation, and his crucifixion at the 
demand of the Sanhedrin fulfilled a prophecy whose beginnings, 
although not always explicitly realized, reach to the foundations of 
time itself.  Dawson did not see a need to separate his faith from 
his vision of the past because the two were so intimately connected.  
With Bergson and his disciples, and the European Thomists, Dawson 
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believed that intuition was a true source of religious knowledge, 
and this knowledge could be used to inform history.342   
To some degree, Dawson’s Christian writings have a definitive 
polemical purpose.  Dawson realized that his writings could be 
broken into two distinct categories: history and Catholic advocacy.  
Nevertheless, his polemical writings serve to illuminate his 
historical vision as one informed by an intense, orthodox 
Christianity.  This does not jeopardize his historical judgments 
because he is very clear about what books are meant to persuade 
versus those meant to find understanding.  They did, however, 
participate in forming a single, coherent vision of culture.343  
There is an inherent tension that cannot be resolved, but this is a 
paradoxical vision that requires both an understanding of reality 
based in theological belief and a reconciliation of these beliefs 
with the tangible signs of God’s creation.  In essence, Dawson’s 
historical imagination is enlivened by a moral imagination of 
Christian origins.  This makes history an ethical, teleological, and 
intelligible process that is ordained by God, and not wholly 
revealed to man. 
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Conclusion 
 The legacy of Christopher Dawson as a major cultural historian 
remains undecided as the new century dawns, but there is a growing 
swell of compelling evidence to support the claim that he is a 
significant force in the historical debate.  The power of Dawson’s 
work is not found in formulaic methods—for he really did not possess 
any single “method,” and shunned the idea of a “historical method” 
as a whole—nor is it the result of some linguistic enterprise or 
polemical mission.  Dawson’s strength lies in his approach to 
history as a cultural unity that, although fragmented, can be 
recovered through a reinvigoration of religious values and a renewal 
of spiritual energy.  Dawson sets the standard high. 
 In the first chapter, history was discussed as something that 
is intimately tied to the idea of culture and Dawson’s 
interdisciplinary approach was introduced.  For Dawson, a culture is 
most accurately defined as a moral order based in specific religious 
traditions.344  A culture is a moral enterprise, he explains, because 
it 
extends downwards to the most primitive forms of social life 
and upwards to the higher ethical systems.  And all cultures 
from the lowest to the highest are similar in their essential 
structure.  That is to say they all depend on religious or 
spiritual sanctions; they are all rooted in particular 
material circumstances—economic, geographical, and biological, 
and they themselves represent the patters of social and moral 
behaviour by which these two factors are coordinated.345   
 
Theology and comparative religion are paramount to a historical 
study, but additional disciplines are required to reach a fuller 
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understanding.  This means that any study of history must be 
informed by sociology and anthropology, and the subsequent methods 
such sciences entail.  Science as a method of historical 
scholarship, Dawson cautions, must be a means, not an end.  
Additionally, science is a partial means because not all of history 
can be understood through the techniques of the scrupulous 
scientist.  Material causes and their effects—observable things—are 
the subjects of scientific investigation, but where this fails to 
fully capture the essence of historical scholarship is that the past 
is not always so accessible.  This lack of accessibility goes beyond 
a search for lost or destroyed evidence, data, and relics.  The 
character of history, as Dawson tells his readers, is one of mystery 
and unexpected revelation.  The temporal is subject to both natural 
and spiritual factors, which cannot always be accounted for in a 
purely material rendition of the past.  This is the flaw of 
rationalist historians who attempt to recount the whole human drama 
in terms of economics, politics, and quantitative analysis.   
 The study of political economy and various parts within a 
larger society are warranted endeavors, but it is when these studies 
claim absolute authority in explaining the past that extreme caution 
should become the law.  Man has never been satisfied to be led, 
contrary to what Buckle would have us believe, by practical and 
material ends, for he has continually placed his faith in a 
transcendent reality, illuminated by spiritual dynamism and moral 
rectitude.346  For instance, the rise of Hitler and the Nazi regime 
can be attributed to any number of material causes—economic 
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instability, the evolution of a political vacuum, or a desperate 
attempt to recover a heavily injured national pride.  The first two 
conditions, while indisputable, cannot alone explain the rise, or 
the specific actions, of the Nazi party.  Of course, economics was a 
major factor in the seizing of power in a heavily destabilized 
system, but it is the recovery of national pride—the filling of a 
spiritual vacuum—that becomes the most provoking.  Dawson believes 
that culture is the most basic unit of man in his function as a 
social being, and thus, it logically follows—based on Dawson’s 
definition of culture—that his spiritual instincts must be served.  
Two options become clear: either fulfill this spiritual need through 
some form of transcendent religious belief, or find satisfaction by 
substituting it with various forms of material gratification that 
are cloaked as spiritual endeavors.  Many times, these imposter 
religions take on a dimension that extends beyond the individual 
self, thus allowing the practitioner to believe that this “false 
creed” is justified because it reaches past his own personal 
interests.  This is the result of sentimentality, or in more modern 
terms, the humanistic spirit.  False gods are found in national 
pride, material equality, obsessive egalitarianism, and sentimental 
humanitarianism, and when they rule alone—because they are purely 
earthly ends, supported by earthly means—they become tyrannical, 
unnatural forces of cruelty, wantonness, and destruction.  Indeed, 
culture is a spiritual corporation even if society refuses to 
recognize it as such, and replaces the genuine objects of adoration 
with things of this world.  This understanding was the foundation of 
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Dawson’s work and the base for his attack on ideology in the 
sixteenth through twentieth-centuries.   
 The ends of historical scholarship are widely understood to be 
a kind of understanding of the past.  The past cannot be 
reconstructed, nor can it be captured as a frozen relic.  Of course, 
artifacts survive, first-hand accounts of particular events and 
people are saved from destruction, and stories are passed from one 
generation to the next; however, these “sources” are only capable of 
giving historians a brief glimpse of the past as opposed to a 
complete picture.  Seeing the past as it was is an impossible task, 
but what we can capture, as was Ranke’s intention, is the essence of 
the past.  We can come to an informed understanding of history if 
the historian understands his own limitations and the limits of his 
discipline.  This was the fatal flaw of Hegel who understood history 
to be the highest form of knowledge, and this misapplication of his 
subject produced dangerous ideologies followed by grave social and 
spiritual consequences.  History understood as the primary object of 
knowledge—especially in the materialist view—is dangerous because it 
fixates our attentions on this world, and leaves no room for the 
unexpected and the unknowable.   
 To Dawson, God was not the object of human knowledge, but this 
is only because we cannot fully know God.  God is, however, the 
center of our source for understanding everything in existence.  In 
Dawson’s view, and to the traditional Christian, we can know God on 
a personal level, but we do not possess the power to know Him in any 
measure of wholeness.  Because Dawson, following in the tradition of 
Catholic teaching, shunned William Paley’s idea of a “clockmaker” 
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Creator, God plays an intimate part in the life of man, and through 
grace, participates fully in creation.  Thus, we can never fully 
know the will of God, nor can man ever attempt to circumvent His 
intentions.  Materiality, in this understanding, takes a secondary 
place to the spiritual forces enacted by God.  It is up to man to 
accept or reject them, to include them in his life or to live for 
the ephemeral sensations bestowed by a purely temporal existence.   
 Dawson’s understanding of history is completely informed by 
theological insights, but it is simultaneously grounded in the 
temporal.  To Dawson, God is the ultimate reality, and thus the 
exclusion of God from an inquiry into the nature of reality must 
become an abstraction.  God, and accordingly, theology, must be part 
of the actual. Nevertheless, Dawson understood the importance of 
scientific method as something contributing great truth to the 
historical discipline and believed that the methods of the scientist 
must, to a large degree, be incorporated into any proper study of 
the past.  The incorporation of a tamed sociology into the 
historical imagination was necessary to come to an informed 
understanding of human affairs. 
 These scientific techniques, however, are subordinate to the 
theological framework under which history operates.  Scientific 
method is only able to explain the physical, and at the very most, 
the quantifiably empirical.  Even in certain material elements, 
science gives little or no explanation.  Chemical imbalances and 
past experiences explain much in psychology, but it is almost 
impossible to explain all psychological impulses in terms of solid 
evidence.  Additionally, what is the materialist historian to make 
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of plain forgetfulness or of a shift in an individual’s 
spirituality?  Surely, these cannot be classified as psychological 
abnormalities.  Dawson is clear in his assertion that the political 
historian of fourth-century Rome could not have seen the coming of 
the end of his empire given the material and military strength it 
possessed, for he was unable to see the immense spiritual power 
possessed by growing numbers of Christians.  History, then, is not 
subordinate to scientific method, but science is in many cases 
subordinate to history.  Disciplines must not work as independent 
units, separated by pathetic rivalries, because they participate in 
one common task—coming to an understanding of man and his place in 
the cosmos.  
 The second chapter assessed Dawson’s understanding of the idea 
of progress.  Antiquity viewed movement as something cyclical in 
nature, and it was not until the coming of Christ that man was 
“taken off the wheel” and placed on a straight path.  To the 
Christian, this path is an apocalyptic one that leads to final 
judgment at the end of time.  Thus, the coming of Christ, at the 
moment of Incarnation, was the entering of eternity into time.  To 
the Christian, the coming of Christ gave meaning to human life, and 
our existence—in an instant—became a teleological enterprise.  
Progress, then, possesses a special meaning to the Christian. 
 Progress, as a term of eighteenth-century sociology, is the 
belief that civilization is consistently improving as it moves 
toward some unknown goal of ultimate perfection.  The problem with 
this understanding is that it is purely relativistic and narrow.  
The rationalists viewed progress exclusively as material progress 
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coupled with abstract morality that was largely based on intangible 
objects such as equality.  To Dawson, progress is something more 
dynamic than material advancement because it entails a degree of 
existential, overall improvement, and not just advancement in a 
single area.  Cultural progress, to be more precise—and as a 
function of Dawson’s definition of culture—is the advancement of the 
soul in its relation to God.  When men’s souls are genuinely ordered 
to something higher than this world, the effects on temporality are 
often positive in any so-called “objective” sense.   
 Much of Dawson’s writing is focused on critiquing a form of 
progress that has degenerated into a type of god.  To a large 
degree, Dawson’s conception of progress can be framed as a movement 
from the time of the Incarnation of Christ to the end of history 
when all men will be judged.  It is more of a cultural dynamism than 
a specific formula for social improvement or the aspiration to 
achieve some unknown perfection.  Dawson believes in progress, but 
where he differs from many of his predecessors is in his 
understanding of the supposed “laws” of progress, and with Karl 
Popper, he eschews the idea that history is governed by various 
inevitabilities.  There is poverty in historicism because it is 
reductionism in its most culturally vicious form.  In coming to 
understand the causes and effects of everyday events—with some 
causes being out of our perceptual reach—Dawson subscribes to a 
Thomist view of human nature, with its acute understanding of our 
place in the cosmos.  In this way, he believes that every person is 
subject to the will of God, but free to choose his own path, make 
his own decisions, and be subject to the responsibilities his 
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choices entail.  Human events are not the result of abstract laws of 
history, in this sense, but the result of human actions in 
participation with God.  It is the Catholic view, par excellence, 
and Dawson is its most eloquent expositor, if not since the time of 
St Augustine, at the very least in his own age.   
 Dawson keenly understands that history cannot be judged by its 
material successes, or failures.  Some of history’s greatest 
triumphs have been the result of a material loss, while some of its 
most significant defeats are the result of material “progress.”  The 
limits of progress become clear in these terms, and understanding 
these limits was a principal task for Dawson.  The decline of 
spirituality in the modern world leaves man craving some form of 
otherworldly satisfaction, and this is fulfilled—in our own age—by 
ideology in the form of political-economy.  Christendom’s final gasp 
of unity in the sixteenth-century further propelled this faith in 
the rational to irrational ends.  With the Reformation, the unifying 
bonds of Christian culture were forever dissolved and ideology 
filled the void that was left by a previously vibrant, spiritual 
society.  
 The rise of scientific rationalism as the prism through which 
society is both organized and understood provided a spirit quite 
contrary to the one that extended throughout the West since the time 
of the late Roman Empire.  Dawson admires science and many of the 
great achievements in technology, but he cautions against placing 
faith in such abstract institutions.  The threat to modern culture 
is not necessarily a blind faith in progress—although Dawson sees 
this as a means to improper ends—but an unyielding belief in 
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technology.  Liberalism is a key part of western culture, but it 
must be tamed to prevent it from becoming an avenue to its own 
destruction—a destruction caused by unrestrained belief in a techno-
culture.  The god of progress easily mutates into the god of 
technology—in essence, whatever ephemeral “good” is occupying the 
thoughts of man becomes the object of his worship.  To Dawson, this 
was more than an inconsistency in logic and a misrepresentation of 
the definition of God; it was something inexorably corrosive to the 
soul and destructive to the greater order of society. 
 Dawson’s historical thought is immensely Catholic in its 
universalism and orthodoxy.  This is not only shown in his 
philosophical writings on history, but in his actual treatment of 
it.  Two volumes of Gifford Lectures on the role of religion in 
culture, both primitive and Western; a history of the “Dark Ages”; a 
critique of the French Revolution; and an extensive treatment of the 
“dividing of Christendom,” all combine to create a sophisticated 
vision of the past that transcends any one ideological system to 
form a historical unity that is absent from any previous treatments 
by “world historians.”  Dawson’s work is not a history of the world, 
per se, but it is a history of culture that is sensitive to the 
bonds that hold people together as the children of God.  Western 
culture, like all others, is driven by a spiritual engine that must 
be maintained if it is to function as a coherent, ordered unit that 
is capable of interacting with other cultures and civilizations. 
 Two overarching ideas dominate the work of Dawson: religion 
and cultural unity.  It is through these two related concepts by 
which Dawson understands the dynamics of history as an unveiling of 
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divine mystery that is shaped, although not exclusively, by human 
actions.  History is the unfolding of a divine plan and the 
responsibility of understanding the limits of this discipline is the 
modus operandi of the proper historian.  To Dawson, religious belief 
and spirituality are forces that cannot be separated from the idea 
of culture, and as such, they play an immense role in determining 
the structure of progress and the vitality of a people.   
Dawson contends against the heirs of Enlightenment history by 
providing a lens through which the past can be seen as a spiritual 
enterprise, and not just as a rational sensation or emotional 
journey.  To Dawson, every Christian mind is one that is alive with 
hope and potentiality as long as it is a “living mind”—that is, not 
“enervated by custom or ossified by prejudice.”347  The role of the 
Church is to produce men of high intellect, but even more 
importantly, men of high spirit.  It is in this way that the true 
“Superman” is realized and that culture is given life.  If 
Christianity loses its spiritual dynamics, as it is in constant 
danger of doing, it will abdicate its ability to make any impact or 
be an agent of cultural change.  For Dawson, echoing his great 
teacher, Augustine, the true choice to be made by humankind is 
between the City of God and the City of Man.  The danger with 
choosing the latter is that it will be taken away by time, while the 
choice to be a citizen of the former is the choice of everlasting 
life.   
In Dawson’s vision, the Catholic Church is a medium that 
stands between material culture and the eternal world.  The danger 
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with modern ideologies is that they fulfill the spiritual needs of 
man without delivering the spiritual substance that is truly 
required.  This was the danger of the “new humanists” in the early-
twentieth century, just as it was with their predecessors in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth.  T.S. Eliot, writing about his own 
teacher, Irving Babbitt—whom he refuses to undermine— shows his 
hesitation with such false religions: 
My chief apprehension about “humanism” has been lest the 
teachings of Mr. Babbitt should be transformed, by a host of 
zealous disciples, into the hard and fast dogma of a new 
ethical church, or something between a church and a political 
party.348 
 
The key word in Eliot’s language is dogma.  When an ideology becomes 
so hard, omnipotent, and indiscriminant—that it becomes the voice of 
a new creed with misdirected ends—it develops into something 
dangerous to the soul, and consequently, dangerous to the wider 
culture.  In Dawson’s work, this is a reoccurring theme, and one the 
highlights the important place of the Church in history.  Not only 
is it the bridge between the spiritual and the temporal, it is the 
shepherd that keeps a mischievous flock in order.  Thus, relegating 
God to some quiet corner in a culture based on material achievement 
is not a sign of social progress, but as Peguy said, it is a sign of 
social decay.   
 The great religions of the world have not been the result of 
an auxiliary development within the civilizations in which they 
reside.  Historically, the opposite has been the case: those 
civilizations themselves are the product of the great religions and 
owe their foundations to the spiritual activity that extends 
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throughout the whole of culture.  To Dawson, “a civilization which 
has lost its religion becomes sooner or later a society which has 
lost its culture.”349  This is why a rejuvenation of spiritual energy 
is necessary in the West if any degree of cultural unity is to be 
achieved. 
 The ancient religions of the East transcend every aspect of 
culture, and in this there is a major difference with the West, 
which possesses a secondary element: the scientific tradition.  In 
reality, the West is really an alloy and not an element like its 
Eastern counterparts.  The beauty of the western tradition is in its 
balance of religious and secular elements that combine to form a 
unique synergy.  Since the Reformation, in Dawson’s mind, a steady 
trend has arisen of turning to the secular.  This is the dilemma of 
the West.  To Dawson, the creation of a perfect synthesis of 
material and spiritual values—a culture, which was most closely 
achieved in the Middle Ages—is a practical impossibility.  
Nevertheless, the spiritual foundations of culture must be recovered 
and reanimated if our culture is to remain dynamic.  The life of the 
West is slowly slipping away, and for Dawson, the only chance of 
survival is predicated upon rediscovering our primeval faith in the 
risen Christ.  The unity of the West, and specifically of Europe, is 
founded upon, as Francesca Murphy argues, the Christianitas—the 
Christian “folk,” and as long as Christendom is divided among 
believers, non-believers, and competing factions of Christians, the 
idea of the West is nothing more than a formless abstraction.  The 
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body of Christ must be a single organism, united by the love of God, 
and under the protection of His sanctifying grace. 
Dawson believed that the unity of mankind extended beyond the 
“borders” of individual cultures and embraced all.  Although those 
who know Christ have an obligation to live under His law and in His 
love, those who do not are not denied His affection, esteem, or 
protection.  Dawson’s understanding of history shows that a unity of 
the human race is possible because we are all participants in a life 
created by God, and under His direction.  Although it is necessary 
to be a Christian to accept this exact interpretation as truth, one 
need not be a devout follower of Christ to comprehend the idea that 
we are one people, produced by the same creator, and participating 
in the same cosmic order.  This does not mean that all cultures are 
equal in their intellectual, material, spiritual, or psychological 
development, but this understanding intrinsically demands that each 
person be treated as a child of Christ.   
 It is in this universalism that Dawson’s strength as a 
historian and as a social thinker is most fully realized.  This is 
where the Catholic understanding of history—its theology of history—
comes to full fruition and is conceived as a universal endeavor in 
which God is the central figure in all of existence.  It is in the 
“fullness of time,” as St Paul tells us, that we will come to know 
the mysteries of our existence and the unending love of God.  The 
Catholic view of history, as Dawson understands it, is the most 
complete understanding of history that man can possess because it 
embraces the unknown and the mysterious, the unexplainable and the 
unimaginable.  The pledge of secular ideologies, the seductive tonic 
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of materialism, and the false promise of rationalism—as alluring as 
they present themselves to fulfill the demands of the present age—
are ephemeral institutions that are as fleeting as time itself.  It 
is only when the mind is concentrated toward the Resurrected Son 
that it radiates its true being, and as a consequence, serves the 
interests of men in time.  This was the humble beauty of Dawson’s 
understanding of man and history, and the reason it will, like that 
of his mentor, Augustine, transcend the ages.     
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Appendix: Biographical Sketch, Conversion, and Introduction to Major 
Writings 
 Christopher Dawson is an enigmatic character in the history of 
Western thought.  No scholar of his generation was a greater 
champion of the idea of a united Christian culture, yet no scholar 
was so simultaneously aware of the problems such a unity entailed or 
the complications presented by the existence of other peoples.350  
Though his influence, much like T.S. Eliot’s, declined in the years 
immediately preceding his death, Dawson is experiencing a revival in 
both academic and popular circles as his sagacity is more widely 
recognized and his writings appear in new editions.351  Unlike other 
“committed” historians of his generation, Dawson does not approach 
his subject from the backdrop of his own religion; instead, like 
John Henry Newman, he comes to his faith as a consequence of his 
scholarship.  His conversion would be as much an intellectual 
awakening as it was a spiritual transformation.   
Born at Hay Castle, in the Wye Valley, on the border of 
Herefordshire, to an Anglo-Catholic family in the waning years of 
Victoria’s reign, Christopher Dawson spent his most formative years 
among the ancient ruins of the Yorkshire countryside.  No doubt 
inspiring, this setting provided Dawson with the imaginative quality 
of mind that would serve his scholarship throughout his life.  
Wandering through ancient abbeys and castles provided countless 
hours in teaching the young Dawson to appreciate the past, not as an 
object of distant sentimentality, but as a reality in which we can 
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attempt to find meaning.  For Dawson, the past came alive in the 
gothic architecture of medieval Europe, and when the family moved to 
those ancient lands in the Yorkshire Dales upon which his father 
would build Hartlington Hall, Dawson found himself steeped in 
religious and cultural traditions dating back to a time beyond 
recent memory.  It was this upbringing that led him to see the 
virtues of country life and instilled in him a dislike of urban 
environments.  This distaste for the city would echo throughout most 
of his important writings. 
Dawson’s unique intellectual background, steeped in the 
romantic serenity of Northern England, as well as his early-
conversion to Roman Catholicism, are both central components of 
understanding his thought and legacy.  Dawson was, first and 
foremost, a Catholic thinker, and he firmly believed that a Catholic 
scholar benefits his Church only if he seeks Truth with an open-
mind—for Truth serves the Church just as much as falsity causes it 
immense harm. Dawson’s desire to show parallels between the 
Christian patrimony and the heritage of non-Christian cultures 
underscores this strong conviction.352 
First, however, a brief account of Dawson’s early life will 
show how his mind was formed into a powerful and imaginative 
intellect that would consistently show itself in all of his later 
scholarship.  Christened at Hay Parish Church by his grandfather, 
Archdeacon Bevan of Hay Castle, on 18 November 1889, Dawson began 
his journey as a Christian in much the same manner as would any 
infant of his lineage.  Although a stuffy, Victorian picture shows 
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him to be a robust baby, Dawson grew to become a sickly child, and 
like many children who grow-up with medical complications, he was 
extremely precocious.  Hay Castle was a medieval estate built by the 
Norman de Braose family in the twelfth-century, but extensively 
remodeled during the Tudor era.  According to Dawson’s daughter, 
Christina Scott, Celtic legend holds that the castle’s origins 
stretch back much farther and associate it with “a figure called 
Maude of St Valery, mentioned by Giraldus Cambrensis in his 
Chronicles.”353   
This house—although recently gutted by fire, and now the site 
of the largest second-hand bookshop in the world—was quite the place 
for a young child to develop an intensely active imagination.  
Thankfully, much of the original structure endured the recent blaze 
and the castle’s exterior looks as it did when Archdeacon Bevan 
called it home.  The young Dawson lived at Hay Castle for six 
impressionable years, exploring its haunted tower, its secret 
passages, and the ivory covered walls within which he lived with his 
family.  Hay Castle was a magical place, not only because of its 
mythological foundation and its aesthetic charm, but also because of 
where it was situated geographically.  Here a mix of English and 
Welsh traditions illuminated an already mystical, culturally vibrant 
landscape.354   
 Dawson’s father was an officer in the British Army and had no 
home of his own.  Thus, the young Christopher was raised in his 
mother’s ancestral house—filled with a feeling of antiquity, warmth, 
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and continuity.  Burke’s concept of the “unbought grace of life” is 
alive in such great houses, and Dawson’s understanding of the 
generations at such a young age would have pleased that noble 
statesman as much as if he had been the heir of Cawdor or Traquair.  
Dawson’s love of his heritage was not an actively intellectual 
enterprise, but it was a trait developed by his surroundings and 
encouraged by his family.  At Hay Castle, the present was alive with 
the memories of the past, and each successive generation laid 
chapters to its winding history.  Here, shadows lingered, and Dawson 
was completely enveloped by the feeling of belonging to something 
beyond the mere moment.  An unconscious realization it might have 
been, but it was nonetheless an intimate part of his heritage and 
his life.   
 Dawson inherited from his mother—a Welsh woman of exceptional 
competence—a love for the Welsh countryside, along with its people, 
literature, and most of all, its saints, on which subject she was 
fluent.  Dawson’s later understanding of Christian culture as 
something inextricably linked to the cult of the saints—especially 
in the Middle Ages—must have developed in this period.  Mary Bevan 
Dawson was a descendant of an ancient Welsh family whose origins 
stretch so far into the distant past that their tale is often “more 
colorful perhaps than credible.”355  Dawson’s grandfather, however, 
was not as Welsh as his mother, for he had the temper of a Victorian 
churchman, and was the vicar of Hay for fifty-six years.  His 
education at Hertford College, Oxford, was followed by his 
ordination and subsequent assignment to the congregation at Hay.  
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While he never prospered from his ecclesial position, the Archdeacon 
did leave a substantial estate upon his death; yet, the Bevan 
children were reared in the manner typical of upper-middle class 
Victorians—“half an egg was considered quite adequate for a child’s 
breakfast for instance, while butter and jam were never allowed 
together.”356   
 The Archdeacon’s unflinching character was only matched by his 
penchant for scholarship.  He was, according to Dawson’s mother 
Mary, a gifted linguist not only in Latin and Greek, but also in 
French, German, Dutch, Norwegian, and, strangely, Walloon.  It is 
reported that before he died he had begun to study Hebrew while he 
took his breakfast.357  Additionally, two books he had written on 
ancient and modern geography became standard textbooks and were used 
extensively at public schools such as Eton.  The country life, and 
all of its benefits to scholarship and clean-living, were paramount 
to the Archdeacon’s development and on his influence over his 
grandson, Christopher.   
 In 1886, Mary Bevan married Henry Phillip Dawson, a member of 
the Royal Artillery, whom she had met several years earlier.  Both 
were approximately 36, and possessed of similar academic interests.  
Captain Dawson was more of an explorer than a soldier, and the 
closest he ever came to actual combat was behind the front-lines in 
the Franco-Prussian War, where he was an officer with his cousin, 
later Lord Kitchener of Khartoum.358  He had, however, been sent all 
over the world to exotic places such as Cuba and on a circumpolar 
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expedition where he was stationed at Fort Rae on Great Bear Lake.  
Although Henry Dawson was sent to this region to take magnetic 
readings, he spent much of his time conducting sociological studies 
of the Eskimos and local Indian cultures.  Especially important in 
his research was his treatment of their religion and its role in 
primitive culture.  In 1896, the War Office ordered Henry Dawson to 
the command in Singapore—a prospect he loathed.  Instead of taking 
his family to what he considered an unhealthy and unfriendly part of 
the world, he retired from military service—at which point he was 
promoted to Colonel—and moved the family to his ancestral land in 
Yorkshire.   
 The land upon which Colonel Dawson would build Hartlington 
Hall had been in the Dawson family for over two centuries.  Although 
the ancient house that had been on the property was demolished in 
the mid-nineteenth-century, the site was the perfect place for 
Colonel Dawson to move his growing family.  Situated on a hill above 
the River Wharfe in an area known as Craven, it lay between Burnsall 
and Bolton Abbey, which played an important role in young 
Christopher’s development.  Colonel Dawson intended to build a small 
country home that would, for his son—in later years—be the setting 
for many fond memories.359  He wished to establish a country seat 
that could be loved by the generations—for Colonel Dawson obviously 
believed in the “great mysterious incorporation of the human race,” 
where the living, the dead, and the unborn are brought into 
communion with one another.  Tradition and family were paramount.   
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 Here, Christopher discovered the value of legends and the 
immeasurable worth of ancient myths.  Most important, however, was 
the family’s example in all things religious.  With his sister, 
Gwendoline, Christopher began his day with prayers led by their 
father.  At these daily gatherings, the entire family was present, 
and these prayers closely resembled the daily Office of the Catholic 
Church—not typical in English Victorian households.  To Dawson, 
religion became bound with the natural world of the elements, and 
Christopher’s mystical romanticism was laden with Scriptural 
parallels. 
Dawson saw what he perceived to be fatal flaws in the 
Protestant service in which religion seemed to be a moral system 
emptied of its spiritual elements.  The young Dawson was drawn to 
the idea of religion as a spiritual force that is alive and active 
in daily existence.  Even more striking was his understanding that 
history and religion are closely linked.  He later wrote: 
Bolton Priory which lies a few miles from Hartlington down the 
Wharfe, always seemed to me the perfect embodiment of this 
lost element in the northern culture—a spiritual grace which 
had once been part of our social tradition and which still 
survived as a ghostly power brooding over the river and the 
hills.360  
 
Dawson’s father was an Anglo-Catholic, who was involved in the 
Church Union party, and was a close acquaintance of Lord Halifax.  
Although his mother harbored deep anti-Catholic prejudices—most 
likely from her upbringing as a conservative Anglican— Christopher 
was taken by his father’s keen interest in Roman Catholicism.  He 
developed a deep affection for Dante, whom he thought to be the most 
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perfect poet in history, and whose genius exceeded the talents of 
Shakespeare and Milton.  He was also attracted by his father’s 
intellectual pursuits, which were broadly Catholic.  Christopher 
found great dynamism in the traditions of the Roman Church and 
especially in its liturgy and its ancient literature and art.  Years 
later, Dawson would discover the power of Catholic theology, and 
would become a great champion of its dogmas.  Yet, at this early 
stage, Dawson’s love of Catholicism was brewing, not out of 
spiritual devotion, but out of an intellectual awakening.  Dawson 
knew that religion was something more than an empty moral system and 
the Catholic faith’s apparent spiritual character provided an 
attractive alternative to the asceticism and rigidity of the 
protestant service.  This began a process of conversion that would 
take several years to complete, culminating with his entering the 
Church on the Feast of the Epiphany in 1914.   
 At the age of ten, Dawson was sent to public school at Bilton 
Grange, near Rugby.  His frail demeanor and “secluded childhood” 
were major disadvantages to him at a school that was fairly rough 
and full of germs against which he had never built immunity.361  
Dawson never held it against his parents that they sent him away to 
school, for he knew that they believed it to be a central part of 
his education if he was expected to grow as an intellectual and a 
gentleman.  Because of his ill health, Dawson’s academic success at 
Bilton Grange was limited.  An exceptional student in history and 
English, he achieved poor grades in mathematics, which consistently 
impaired his overall record.  Especially repugnant to Dawson was the 
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school chapel, which was strangely different in style and custom 
from the Anglo-Catholic tastes that he developed throughout the 
years.  He left Bilton Grange in 1903 to enroll at Winchester, 
rather than Harrow—his father’s school—and although they did not 
meet, Dawson was a schoolmate of Arnold Toynbee.362   And then, much 
to his delight, and contrary to the darkness of Bilton Grange, there 
was Winchester Cathedral.   
 Dawson’s mind was at once developing into an eclectic mix of 
Baroque and English tastes, and he was cultivating a strong 
historical consciousness that was fed by the aesthetics of that 
ancient place of worship.  He would later write: 
I learnt more during my schooldays from my visits to the 
Cathedral at Winchester than I did from the hours of religious 
instruction in school.  The great church with its tombs of the 
Saxon kings and the medieval statesmen-bishops, gave one a 
greater sense of the magnitude of the religious element in our 
culture and the depths of its roots in our national life than 
anything one could learn from books.363 
 
It was at this time, too, that Dawson began to read and collect 
books on a large scale.  As he wrote years later in a letter to his 
good friend E.I. Watkin, he had “got nothing from school, little 
from Oxford, and less than nothing from post-Victorian urban 
culture.”364  What he did learn he learned from independent study, 
visits to various places, and from his life in the countryside with 
his scholarly family.   
 Dawson met Edward Watkin at Bletsoe when he was sixteen, just 
before going-up to Oxford.  Watkin would become the person who 
exerted the most influence over Dawson during his university years, 
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and it was Watkin who would eventually sponsor Dawson’s entry into 
the Catholic Church.  Meanwhile, Dawson went through a brief period 
of agnosticism, and this made his initial meeting with Watkin—an 
enthusiastic Anglo-Catholic—“hardly auspicious for a future 
friendship.” Upon meeting for the first time, both men entered into 
a conversation that turned violent.  The polemical exchange exploded 
in a burst of physical confrontation when Watkin smashed a garden 
chair over Dawson’s head.365  But in the end, it was Watkin who 
helped guide him back to the Christian faith.  This agnosticism may 
have provided the impetus for Dawson to become a Catholic, for it 
was the confusion of authorities in the Anglican Church that led 
Dawson to briefly abandon his faith.  He had written in a journal, 
in a moment of Cartesian doubt, that the only thing he could be sure 
of was his own existence.366  Anglo-Catholicism had proven to be 
weakest, for Dawson, where it had claimed to be the strongest: there 
was a lack of central authority and a small group that lacked any 
power of enforcement determined all matters of orthodoxy.  By 1908, 
however, Dawson “resolved his doubts” and returned to Christianity.  
He and Watkin would remain close friends. 
 Much of the impetus behind Dawson’s return to Christianity 
came from a sense that he could not “acquiesce altogether in a view 
of life which left no place for religion.”367  The absence of 
religion left a “gap” in his personal life that Dawson could not 
permit.  Although the lack of authority in Anglo-Catholicism drove 
Dawson to harsh skepticism, he found it necessary to find some 
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spiritual satisfaction that speaks to a higher level than the pure 
life of the intellect.  From the time Dawson was a young teenager, 
he had known the historical realities of Catholicism, but he did not 
know it as a spiritual enterprise.  He had slowly developed an 
appreciation for it as such, but it did not come into maturity for 
several years.  His early exposure to the lives of the saints, 
medieval mysticism, and ancient lure had left him wanting some 
spiritual satisfaction—but the young boy did not yet have the 
sophisticated spiritual energy to fill the void.   
 Dawson traveled to Rome when he was nineteen.  Overcome by the 
power of Baroque culture, he had found an overwhelming atmosphere 
that was conspicuously absent in all English churches.368  In Rome, 
Dawson realized that Catholic culture was not merely a relic of the 
Middle Ages, and even more importantly, he became aware of a 
resurgence of Catholic culture throughout the world.  The world of 
the counter-Reformation became alive in Dawson’s mind, and he turned 
to the literature of St Theresa and St John of the Cross, both of 
whom Dawson believed to be of higher quality than any of the great 
non-Catholic, religious writers.369  To a large degree, this is the 
period to which Dawson directed much of his energy and his 
sympathies.   
   It was through a study of St Paul and St John by which 
Dawson came to a real understanding of the unity of the Catholic 
faith.  He came to understand the significance of the trinity and 
the Incarnation, and more importantly, the sacraments and how they 
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provided a unity to the whole Catholic tradition.  For Dawson, the 
life of the saint became more than a mere account of mysticism or an 
individual achievement of moral righteousness.  The life of the 
saint became the exemplar of the “perfect manifestation of the 
supernatural life which exists in every individual Christian, the 
first fruits of that new humanity which it is the work of the Church 
to create.”370  Dawson’s earlier skepticism was removed by his coming 
to understand the “doctrine of Sanctifying Grace.”  The New 
Testament’s revelations, enlivened by the commentary of St Augustine 
and St Thomas Aquinas, led Dawson to the realization that the 
Catholic Church was the only “true” path.  For Dawson, Christianity 
was not an “esoteric religion,” as it served as a universal 
spiritual force that is the life of man.  This spirituality he took 
to be most fully embodied in the Roman Catholic Church.371   
 While at Oxford, Dawson did not especially love the standard 
curriculum in modern history.  Although he failed to secure a 
Brackenbury Scholarship at Balliol, he continued at the insistence 
of his tutor, and “achieved one out of Trinity.”372  At Trinity, 
Dawson was “painfully shy and unsure of himself socially,” as had no 
particular place in the Oxford social scene.  Although he was from a 
public school and was a member of the land-owning class, Dawson had 
no time for the snobbery of Oxford or the pettiness of the Etonians 
who were there for their “gentleman’s degree.”  Dawson’s tutor was 
the former Balliol man, Ernest Barker, a scholar of “strongly 
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individualist character” and of diverse interests.373  Barker was 
unusual at Oxford because he encouraged his students to depart from 
the standard history curriculum of Hallam and Stubbs, and encouraged 
them to focus on the larger philosophical dimensions of the subject.  
Dawson’s unusual brilliance was recognized by Barker who would later 
claim that he only had begun to learn history the day Dawson became 
his student.374   
 Part of Dawson’s conversion was his reading of the liberal-
Catholic writings of Baron von Hugel.375  Here Dawson solidified his 
interests in comparative religion—which would stay with him his 
whole life—and found an appreciation for the “infinite” and 
mysterious nature of Christianity.376  The European Thomists who, in 
Aquinas, saw a belief in intuition as a legitimate means of 
religious knowledge further influenced his Christian vision.377  It 
was, however, the writings of St Augustine, and particularly the 
City of God, that had the most significant effect upon his 
development.378  Catholicism soon became a living faith for him, and 
Dawson, who had little active interest in becoming a Catholic, found 
himself drawing closer to the Faith.  Watkin, his close friend, had 
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already converted during his first year, and Dawson’s time was 
approaching.  His decision in 1913, to “go over to Rome,” was not 
easy, and it is eerily similar to the circumstances surrounding the 
conversion of John Henry Newman.379  Like Newman, Dawson believed 
that the Protestant faiths are irreconcilable with good history in 
that they lacked a unified structure.  It was an acceptance of the 
Christian past that led Dawson to whole-heartedly accept 
Catholicism.  Newman’s view reflects Dawson’s: 
There were but two paths—the way of faith and the way of 
unbelief, and as the latter led through the halfway house of 
Liberalism to Atheism, the former led through the half way 
house of Anglicanism to Catholicism.380 
 
To a large degree, Dawson’s conversion to Catholicism is 
illustrative of his distaste for revolutionary ideas.  As he would 
later write, the Protestant Reformation was a “classic example of 
emptying out the baby with the bath.”  He continued: 
The reformers revolted against the paternalism of medieval 
religion, and so they abolished the Mass.  They protested 
against the lack of personal holiness, and so they abolished 
the saints.  They attacked the wealth and self-indulgence of 
the monks and they abolished monasticism and the life of 
voluntary poverty and asceticism.  They had no intention of 
abandoning the ideal of Christian perfection, but they sought 
to realize it in Puritanism instead of Monasticism and in 
pietism instead of mysticism.381 
 
Upon leaving Oxford, Dawson was unable to pursue military 
service because of poor health, and instead, spent the next fourteen 
years reading as wide an array of literature as possible.  The 
intellectual and spiritual energy required for his conversion, 
combined with his engagement to Valery Mills, almost caused Dawson 
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to have a nervous breakdown.382  Valery’s mother did not fully 
approve of their marriage on account of Dawson’s frail nature and 
this caused even more stress for the young scholar.  Similarly, 
Dawsons’s mother and sister—both devout Anglicans—did not approve of 
his new, Catholic wife, and this issue was never fully resolved.  As 
a consequence, he delved deeper into his work.  Valery was living 
far away with her mother at Chipping Campden in Gloucestershire, and 
Dawson was able to devote all of his energy to his scholarship. 
Although the family made their permanent residence in Exeter, 
where Dawson was associated with the local university, every summer 
they would spend about two months at Hartlington with his parents.  
Christina Scott writes that her father was always very approachable, 
except during his working hours.  Dawson loved to take the children 
for long walks and rock climbing in the nearby countryside that so 
heavily influenced his own early development.383   
Dawson rarely held formal academic positions, and in that way, 
he is one of the last men of letters in the tradition of Samuel 
Johnson, although unlike Johnson, he found use for the term 
“civilization.”  He was, between 1925 and 1933, Lecturer in the 
History of Christianity at the University of Exeter—a position that 
was unfulfilling in itself, but nonetheless allowed Dawson the 
ability to concentrate on his writing and research. Fourteen years 
passed before Dawson published his first major work, The Age of the 
Gods, in which he began his historical inquiry into the nature of 
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religion and culture.  It was this book that laid the foundations 
for all of his subsequent work.  In fact, Dawson planned to write a 
series of books on the history of culture called The Life of 
Civilizations, but this was never fully realized.  Nevertheless, 
several of his intended projects did come to full fruition.  
Progress and Religion, which is widely considered to be his most 
brilliant and enduring book, was meant to be a summary of the whole 
project.  Other books included the proposed “third” titled The 
Making of Europe, while the last—a posthumously published 
examination of the French Revolution—was called The Gods of 
Revolution.  It was Dawson’s opinion, however, that his Gifford 
Lectures delivered at the University of Edinburgh, and later 
published as Religion and Culture and Religion and the Rise of 
Western Culture, most fully illustrated his understanding of history 
and culture, and in that way, exceeded all his other works.   
The secluded nature of Hartlinton Hall, which he inherited 
upon his father’s death in 1933, combined with poor health, finally 
forced Dawson to move his family out of Yorkshire to Boars Hill, 
near Oxford.  He spent four years in America as the first incumbent 
of the Charles Chauncy Stillman Chair of Roman Catholic Studies at 
Harvard University—a five-year appointment—but he unexpectedly 
resigned after four due to compounding medical complications.  
Harvard, after finding no suitable American for the job, wanted 
him.384 The dean of the divinity school wrote to him with great 
pleasure and enthusiastically offered Dawson the position: “You, 
sir, are the man we want to be the first to fill this chair.  Even 
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if you would wish to make the term much shorter than five years, we 
should still want you.”385  The Archbishop of Boston was no less 
excited at the prospect of having Dawson fill this prestigious post.  
Horton wrote: 
We appeal to you as a son of the Church.  Never before in the 
history of the United States has there been anything 
resembling this professorship—a chair in Roman Catholic 
Studies in a university divinity school Protestant in 
tradition and Protestant in outlook.  Archbishop Cushing of 
Boston has approved the new departure, and we really expect 
that future historians will look back upon it as a new 
beginning, after centuries, of an era of happier relationships 
between the two great groups.386 
 
Dawson decided to rise to the challenge and leave his beloved 
England, but responded to Horton’s request with a note of combined 
caution and optimism: 
Of course I do not feel that I am competent to cover the range 
of studies that you outline in the third paragraph of your 
letter.  But for some years now I have been feeling that there 
was a need for a fuller study of Christian culture than has 
hitherto been found in our higher education.387 
 
He was himself excited at the prospect as he thought that the battle 
for Christian culture was shifting from Europe to America.  It was 
in the United States, he believed, that the fate of Christianity 
would be decided.  Although America was the seat of technological 
culture, it was also the home of a vibrant Roman Catholic 
renaissance—particularly situated on the Atlantic coast—that gave 
hope to the prospect of a growth in spiritual dynamism that would 
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naturally combat materialism and the ideologies driven by unyielding 
technological advance.388   
 Throughout his life, Dawson maintained numerous literary 
friendships.  Perhaps the most important was that between himself 
and Watkin, but other significant relationships are worth noting.  
T.S. Eliot was greatly influenced by Dawson, and his ideas are found 
sporadically in his writings especially in Murder in the Cathedral, 
as well as in the “Four Quartets,” and possibly, in the Wasteland.  
Eliot was so impressed by Dawson, and particularly his knowledge of 
Catholicism, that he requested he begin contributing to the 
Criterion and in the development of special projects.  Eliot was 
particularly interested in having Dawson write about marriage and 
morals, and the Catholic conception of sex.389 Additionally, it is 
likely that C.S. Lewis’s understanding of the Tao in the Abolition 
of Man is the result of Dawson’s discussion of natural law in 
Progress and Religion.390   
 Like Eliot and Lewis, Dawson believed that the West was headed 
toward some major cataclysm.  He thought that the best way to stave 
off such a catastrophe was for the West to return to a sort of unity 
based on its Christian patrimony—its organic heritage.  Here, the 
Catholic possesses a particular responsibility. 
They are not involved in the immediate issues of the conflict 
in the same way as are the political parties, for they belong 
to a supranational spiritual society, which is more 
organically united than any political body which possesses an 
autonomous body of principles and doctrines on which to base 
their judgments.  Moreover, they have an historical mission to 
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maintain and strengthen the unity of Western culture which had 
its roots in Christendom against the destructive forces which 
are attempting its total subversion.  They are the heirs and 
successors of the makers or Europe—the men who saved 
civilization from perishing in the storm of barbarian invasion 
and who built the bridge between the ancient and modern 
worlds.391 
 
The overarching theme in Dawson’s writing is unity.  The world, to 
Dawson, is not an artificial place that can be created, and 
recreated through abstract planning.  This was the root of his 
problem with both revolutionaries and people who place their faith 
in technology.  Dawson, like de Maistre before him, distrusted those 
who believed they could dismantle generations of organic cultural 
growth and swiftly replace it with some “better,” rationally 
constructed system.392   
 Dawson believed the Second World War to be the result of 
cultural forces that had been compounding for centuries.  He wrote 
“tirelessly” in support of the Allied cause, and found himself in 
the unusual position of polemicist: he was, for a short time, editor 
of the Catholic journal, The Dublin Review, and was vice-president 
of the Sword of the Spirit—a movement formed by Anglican Bishop 
George Bell, as a cooperative spiritual endeavor to rejuvenate a 
decimated culture in the wake of the war.  In this, all Christian 
denominations would have to participate, and Christianity would have 
to become a unified body of believers.393  Dawson hoped that his 
solid stance against Nazi ideology would awaken his readers to the 
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prospect that the crisis was not merely political or economic, but 
the result of a spiritual vacuum.  In The Judgment of the Nations, 
Dawson attempted to enliven the debate by insisting that something 
beyond the political was at stake.  In Religion and the Modern 
State, Dawson raised the discussion to the next level when he 
suggested that “biblical Israel,” which was both spiritually strong 
and materially weak, could triumph through its obedience to God.  
The attempt to build a “New Jerusalem,” a heaven on earth—the goal 
of the Nazi’s—was the cause, he argued, for the unwitting creation 
of a terrestrial hell.   
 The death of Dawson’s close friend and ally, Arthur Cardinal 
Hinsley, Bishop of Westminster, meant the end of his participation 
in the Sword of the Spirit, and the conclusion of his duties as 
editor of the Dublin Review.  Dawson remained undeterred, however, 
and increased his writings to include the important Understanding 
Europe (1952), and The Movement of World Revolution (1956).  Turning 
away from politics, he spent the remainder of his years dedicated to 
educational reform.  Dawson was convinced that religious believers 
were also succumbing to the pressures of secularization and that the 
only remedy was to put them into direct contact with their cultural 
patrimony.  In 1961, he published his well-known study, The Crisis 
of Western Education, in which he maintained that the most effective 
way to combat secular ideology was through a reaffirmation of 
Christian principles through a program of Christian studies.   
Throughout his life, Dawson was a tireless defender of 
religion, but he was never dogmatic.  His Catholicism was 
intellectually central, but it was informed and open.  The prospect 
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of a secular culture daunted him, and he saw in the political crisis 
of his day a more profound cultural failure—a failure of the spirit.  
Dawson’s historical imagination was enlivened by a sense of mission 
and a dedication to the principles of a transcendent reality that 
governs all things.  He understood this world as a constituent part 
of a larger, supernatural community, and most importantly, he 
believed that love and hope were the most effective agents of 
cultural regeneration.
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